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From the Editor

O

ur Spring issue opens with a forum considering the strategic
implications of Mission Command. Anthony King’s article,
“Mission Command 2.0: From an Individualist to a Collectivist
Model,” describes how mission command has evolved to facilitate synchronizing the decisions of key leaders. King uses the leadership models
of Generals James Mattis and Stanley McChrystal to illustrate his case.
Russell Glenn’s contribution, “Mission Command in the Australian
Army: A Contrast in Detail,” points out the general similarities but subtle
differences between the American and Australian models, and what they
might mean for cooperation between the two in multinational operations. Thomas-Durell Young’s essay, “Legacy Concepts: A Sociology of
Command in Central and Eastern Europe,” raises important questions
regarding the incompatibility of Western notions of mission command
with the “legacy concepts” that still dominate the leadership styles of
several formerly Communist countries. As NATO develops ways to
address Russian adventurism, it would do well to consider the possible
effects of asymmetries in the command philosophies of some of its
recently added members on its courses of action.
The second forum, After 15 Years of Conflict, offers critical insights
into the ways the United States has conducted military interventions
thus far in the twenty-first century. The first contribution, Charlotte
Blatt’s “Operational Success, Strategic Failure: Assessing the 2007 Iraq
Troop Surge” compares two perspectives on the outcomes of the troop
surge and identifies essential strategy decisions that significantly affected
the region’s stability. Stanley Wiechnik’s “Tracking Democratization:
Insights for Planners” provides some much needed clarity regarding
the issues of state- or nation-building, and what they mean for Western
strategists. Ellen Klein’s article, “Immunity in Contingency Operations:
A Proposal for US Contractors,” suggests ways to reduce strategic and
operational friction in contemporary military interventions. The US
military increasingly relies on contractor support, but several issues
stand in the way of making that support seamless and cost-efficient;
the United States needs to consider how to protect contractors from
the bureaucratic ambiguities of a host-nation’s policies over the long
term. The final essay, “Enhancing Resilience in an Operational Unit”
by Douglas Sims and Amy Adler, discusses measures to increase unit
resilience. One of the key characteristics of recent military interventions
is they are marathons, not sprints. Are we doing enough to prepare US
troops for that reality?
Our third forum, Modernization among US Partners, offers a look
at how two of America’s strategic partners, Australia and France, are
moving forward into the twenty-first century. In “Australia’s Offset and
A2/AD Strategies,” Ian Langford discusses the capabilities Australia’s
political and military leaders chose to pursue as part of their modernization strategies. In “The French Army at a Crossroads,” Rémy Hémez
describes how the French Army plans to accomplish its dual-missions
of expeditionary warfare and homeland security with acceptable risk.
~ AJE

MISSION COMMAND:
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Mission Command 2.0: From an Individualist to
a Collectivist Model
Anthony C. King
©2017 Anthony C. King

ABSTRACT: This article specifies the distinctive character of mission command in the twenty-first century by examining the generalships of Stanley McChrystal and James Mattis. These examples
contrast the historical attention to immediate tactical tasks with
today’s application, which involves a deep and enduring interdependence between commanders across echelons so that decisions are
closely aligned.

A

dopted in the 1980s, mission command is the dominant
command philosophy in American and, indeed, Western
armed forces. US Army doctrine states “mission command
is one of the foundations of unified land operations. This philosophy
of command helps commanders capitalize on the human ability to
take action to develop the situation and integrate military operations to
achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state. Mission command
emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined
initiative. This precept guides leaders toward mission accomplishment.”1
By empowering subordinates to take local decisions in line with a
superior’s intent, mission command accelerates decision-making while
simultaneously maintaining operational unity. It is therefore seen as an
optimal solution on a complex, fast-moving battlefield.
Originally developed by German General Helmuth von Moltke the
elder based upon German military traditions, mission command reached
fruition with Oskar von Hutier’s stormtroop tactics in the First World
War and the Wehrmacht’s Auftragstaktik in the Second World War.2 It
is noticeable that studies of the Wehrmacht’s operations, in particular,
informed the formal introduction of mission command into Western
military doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s.3 While accepting the importance
of historical precedents, however, it is also widely recognized that mission
command today is not a mere imitation of twentieth-century practices.
Operational, organizational, and technological transformations have
ensured that—while continuities are certainly observable, especially
at the level of principles—the actual practice of mission command is
necessarily distinctive today. Mission command has evolved.
1 Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Mission Command, Army Doctrinal
Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012), 1-1.
2 Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–18 (New York:
Praeger, 1989); and Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third
Reich (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 2005).
3 John T. Nelsen II, “Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle,” Parameters 17, no. 3
(September 1987).

Anthony C. King, the
chair of War Studies
at the University of
Warwick, recently
authored The Combat
Soldier: Infantry Tactics and
Cohesion in the Twentieth
and Twenty-First Centuries
(2013 Oxford University
Press, 2013) and Frontline:
Combat and Cohesion in
the Twenty-First Century
(Oxford University
Press, 2015). He is
currently writing a book
on divisional command
which will be published
next year.
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This article argues the doctrine of mission command in the twentieth
century referred to a very limited devolution of authority relating to
immediate tactical tasks. By contrast, mission command today does not
involve mere local, individual initiative but rather a deep and enduring
interdependence between commanders across levels. Decisions are
not simply devolved, as they were in the past, but collectively aligned
and coordinated across and within echelons to ensure the coherence
of the entire network. Mission command in the twenty-first century
involves a new level of organizational integration requiring intense,
professionalized teamwork between commanders. This article examines
the legend and reality of mission command in the twentieth century
and tries to demonstrate the distinctiveness of contemporary practices
through an examination of the generalships of Stanley McChrystal and
James Mattis.

Mission Command in the Twentieth Century

In his work on mission command, Martin van Creveld contrasts
the practices of the imperial German army with those of the British
Expeditionary Force. He describes the latter as “the most extreme a
form as can be found” where “carefully laid plans rigorously and
undeviatingly carried out are regarded as the one way to overcome the
inevitable confusion of the battlefield.”4 The German army, by contrast,
developed a highly decentralized system, which “sought to extend
the spirit of free cooperation from the highest levels.”5 Subordinate
commanders were given minimum objectives and then encouraged to
improvise. Significantly, van Creveld highlights the individualism at the
heart of this system, citing 1906 regulations: “Combat demands thinking,
independent leaders and troops, capable of independent action.” Even
more tellingly, van Creveld cites a key sentence from the 1908 regulations:
“From the youngest solders upward, the total independent commitment
of all physical and mental forces is to be demanded.”6 For van Creveld,
German mission command was a decentralized, individualistic system
in which, in order to respond to the confusion of battle, subordinate
commanders were given freedom to act as they personally saw fit in
relation to their immediate circumstances.
This argument has been very influential and, indeed, reproduced
almost exactly in the most recent works on mission command from
such authors as Eitan Shamir.7 He traces the evolution of mission
command from the initial approach of Prussian Frederick the Great
through the von Hutier “stormtroop” tactics in the First World War.
Moreover, his discussion of Helmuth von Moltke the elder is important
to understanding traditional concepts of mission command.8 Although
von Moltke planned campaigns carefully with his general staff, he
understood that once in battle, unexpected situations would arise.
Shamir notes “No discussion of Moltke’s style of command would
be complete without the extraordinary description of him lying on a sofa
4 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 166.
5 Ibid., 169.
6 Ibid., 170.
7 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli
Armies (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
8 Ibid., 36–41.
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calmly reading book while the army mobilized to fight Austria.” Indeed,
J. F. C. Fuller claimed that von Moltke “abdicated his command.”9 Yet,
the scale of operations and the limitations of communications prevented
von Moltke from exercising direct command over his forces; laissezfaire was required. Consequently, having designed the campaign, von
Moltke was forced to give his subordinate army commanders almost
total license to operate independently in any crisis; they would be out
of communication at decisive moments. Decision-making was not so
much aligned as consciously decentralized. Local commanders acted by
reference to their intuition in the light of their immediate situation.
Communications had improved enormously by the Second World
War, but with mechanization, so had the pace of battle.10 Consequently,
the Wehrmacht adopted a similarly individualist, Moltkean model of
mission command where local commanders were empowered to act
independently in broad reference to their senior commanders: “It has
always been a particular forte of German leadership to grant wide scope
to the self-dependence of subordinate commanders. . . . Generally,
the German high commanders rarely or never reproached their
subordinates unless they made a terrible blunder.”11 Shamir admits that
in the course of the Second World War, Auftragstaktik (mission-tactics
command) suffered a decline. But he explains the German method of
mission command was, perhaps, the central factor in Germany’s combat
effectiveness in World War II: “Its de-centralised tradition facilitated
organized and effective resistance even while the supreme command
had all but collapsed.”12
Karl-Heinz Frieser’s work on the legend of blitzkrieg supports
Shamir’s argument.13 While blitzkrieg was invented more or less by
accident in 1940, mission command allowed local commanders to
act on their initiative in response to their immediate circumstances
without consideration or knowledge of the wider situation—for
instance, as commander of 7th Panzer Division during the invasion
of France, Erwin Rommel “explored new paths in the command of
a Panzer Division,” which has been taken as the exemplar of mission
command.14 Significantly, at the Meuse, Avesnes, and Arras, he acted
all but independently of his corps and army commanders, Generals
Hermann Hoth and Hans von Kluge, who often had little idea of his
location. Indeed, Shimon Naveh has described Rommel’s method as
“sheer opportunism.”15 In the German army, Rommel was certainly
extreme, and other panzer commanders, such as Hermann Balck, were
less cavalier in their application of classic mission command involving
ad hoc improvisation in a highly decentralized system.
9 Ibid., 41.
10 Ibid., 50.
11 Ibid., 50.
12 Ibid., 52.
13 Karl-Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2005).
14 Frieser, Blitzkrieg Legend; Kenneth Macksey, Rommel: Battles and Campaigns (New York: Da Capo
Press, 1997); Claus Telp, “Rommel and 1940,” in Rommel Reconsidered, ed. Ian Beckett (Mechanicsburg,
PA: Stackpole, 2014); Desmond Young, Rommel (London: Collins, 1950); Ronald Lewin, Rommel as
Military Commander (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2003); and Dennis Showalter, Patton and
Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2005), 200.
15 Shamir, Transforming Command, 51.
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Jorg Muth makes a commensurate argument in his recent work
on officer education in the American and German armies before
the Second World War.16 He compares West Point unfavorably with
equivalent German officer training. Right up to the 1940s, West Point
instituted a crude pedagogy in which students learned only boorishness
and conformity. Individualism was explicitly extirpated from the
officer candidates as the US Army strove to impose discipline and a
wooden respect for military hierarchy in its students. By contrast, the
German army sought not simply to train its officers but genuinely
to educate them. It sought to create knowledgeable and questioning
individuals capable of creativity, flexibility, and adaptation. Against the
Prussian stereotype, German officer training created thinking soldiers,
encouraged to assert themselves and to improvise, not mere automatons.
In the work of all these scholars, then, traditional twentieth-century
mission command is understood to be an individualistic practice based
on independence and intuition.

Mission Command in the 21st Century

Scholars have identified the character of mission command in
the twentieth century in detail. They have also recognized a revision
of mission command today acknowledged in discussions of the Israel
Defense Force and its recent operations. In conventional operations
up until 1973, simple devolved mission command worked well for the
IDF. Then, an individualistic doctrine proved effective. On the basis
of it, the IDF developed a highly pragmatic officer class, oriented to
practice and to experience, not to theory.17 The IDF operated on an ad
hoc personal basis. In the twenty-first century in Lebanon, the West
Bank, and Gaza, however, this system of mission command has become
increasingly inadequate. As war has become more complex and Israel’s
enemies more sophisticated, “it has now become clear that the practical
soldier is no longer enough.”18
In a recent article coauthored with Uzi Ben-Shalom, Shamir
draws a divide between classical twentieth-century mission command
and contemporary practice. For these authors, contemporary mission
command involves more than just Moltkean deregulation: “Mission
command require[s] a certain quality of education and a common
language.”19 Yet, the Israeli officer corps never developed a genuinely
professional ethos. The education of the IDF officer corps has always
been markedly inferior especially to their Western peers. Consequently,
“the result is something opposed to mission command, since
commanders operating in this spirit would act in accordance with their
own understanding—not the mission.”20 As an individualist practice,
the IDF has proved classical twentieth-century mission command is,
in fact, increasingly unsuited to the special demands of contemporary
16 Jorg Muth, Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces,
1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War II (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2013).
17 Avi Kober, “What Happened to Israeli Military Thought,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 5
(2011): 708, doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.561109.
18 Ibid., 723.
19 Ibid., 111.
20 Uzi Ben-Shalom and Eitan Shamir, “Mission Command between Theory and Practice: The
Case of the IDF,” Defense & Security Analysis 27, no. 2 (2011): 112, doi:10.1080/14751798.2011
.578715.
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operations. Indeed, in many cases, the IDF have descended into directive,
centralized command of the most extreme type as they lose faith in their
own mission command system.
With his discussion of the IDF, Shamir implies the practice of
mission command today has evolved considerably. While he is aware of
these changes, however, he does not define the term with any precision,
especially in relation to Western forces. Indeed, Shamir’s monograph
mainly focuses on the failure of British and American forces to
implement mission command on operations in the last three decades,
preferring long established dirigiste systems. Similarly, although Jorg
Muth focuses on the prewar period, he adopts a compatible position.
He simply assumes the American Army is still committed to a directive
command system. Scholars have, therefore, recognized that mission
command is in transition, but they do not examine their evidence in
sufficient depth to define the scale or the character of the change.
In fact, mission command no longer refers to mere devolution
and individual license typical in the twentieth century but to the evercloser integration and interdependence of commanders. Crucially,
mission command today involves increasing interaction and synergy
between commanders. For contemporary mission command, education
and shared concepts are required so commanders at every level are
oriented to the systemic effects of their local decisions. In contrast
with the individualistic practice of the last century, mission command
today involves collectivism with commanders united around common
definitions and a shared consciousness.

Two Case Studies

Although a transformation is clearly recognized, there is a lack
of detailed analysis about mission command today. This is somewhat
anomalous since, with the long-running campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan, there is extensive evidence on which to draw. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, modern mission command was repeatedly demonstrated by
a number of commanders. Indeed, the practice is thoroughly ingrained
into the US Army and Marine Corps. There is an embarrassment of
evidence. This article draws upon some of this material. In an article
of this length, however, the empirical analysis must be limited.
Consequently, it is impossible to prove a transformation of command
definitively. The argument must, perforce, be indicative.
In this situation, rather than provide a generalized and descriptive
narrative, two particularly well-documented case studies will illustrate
this transformation of command: Lieutenant General Stanley
McChrystal, commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
in Baghdad (2003–2008), and Major General James Mattis, commander
of 1st Marine Division during the invasion of Iraq (2003). McChrystal
and Mattis practiced mission command in Iraq, constructing novel
systems of command for the challenges of contemporary operations.
They commanded very different organizations. The 1st Marine Division
conducted conventional maneuver warfare; JSOC, counterterrorism
missions. Consequently, identifying a compatible practice of command
in both headquarters would seem to be evidentially significant.

12
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Moreover, both generals have another advantage: McChrystal has
written extensively about his headquarters while the United States Marine
Corps has documented Mattis’s command. Consequently, it is possible
to develop a sufficiently detailed understanding of their command
methods. These cases not only constitute valid evidence of the revision
of mission command but also exemplify its precise character. Of course
like all samples, McChrystal and Mattis may be outliers, which cannot be
refuted here. Since the two studies corroborate each other, however, they
suggest the transition might be a much wider phenomenon—mission
command has become an increasingly collective practice.
McChrystal’s writings describe how, like other organizations, the
armed forces have been radically challenged by new global threats.
In particular, the hierarchies, developed in the twentieth century for
industrial warfare and in which classical mission command emerged,
have become increasingly obsolete. Twentieth-century warfare was
complicated, involving the coordination of massive forces. This task was
administratively demanding—a mistake could be catastrophic—but
missions were relatively simple. In contrast, twenty-first century military
problems have become heterogeneous and, above all, complex: “the
number of interactions between components increases dramatically—the
interdependencies that allow viruses and bank runs to spread; this is
where things quickly become unpredictable.”21
In Iraq, McChrystal discovered traditional methods of command
were ill-adapted for complex operations and constructed a new network:
“We had to unlearn a great deal of what we thought we knew about
how war—and the world—worked. We had to tear down familiar
organizational structures and rebuild them along completely different
lines, swapping our sturdy architecture for organic fluidity, because it
was the only way to confront a rising tide of complex threats.”22
The most important element in this network was McChrystal’s
command team itself. Here, traditional models of leadership had become
obsolete and obstructive: “The heroic ‘hands-on’ leader whose personal
competence and force of will dominated battlefields and boardrooms
for generations had been overwhelmed by accelerating speed, swelling
complexity, and interdependence.”23 Yet, the mission command
McChrystal introduced was also quite novel. In order to realize this
intent, McChrystal did not merely devolve decision-making authority
to subordinates who acted on their own initiative. He had to create a
“shared consciousness” which “helped us understand and react to the
interdependence of the battlefield.”24
One of the central means by which McChrystal created shared
consciousness was the daily Operations and Intelligence Brief, at which
representatives from every involved agency would share their assessment
of the campaign. This brief was “a relatively small video teleconference
between our rear headquarters at Fort Bragg, a few DC officers and our
biggest bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Quickly, though, that audience
21 Stanley A. McChrystal with Tantum Collins, David Silverman and Chris Fussell, Team of
Teams: New Rules of Engagement (New York: Portfolio / Penguin, 2015), 57.
22 Ibid., 20.
23 Ibid., 231.
24 Ibid., 202.
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grew”; “In time, people came to appreciate the value of systemic
understanding. O&I attendance grew as the quality of information and
interaction grew. Eventually we had seven thousand people attending
almost daily for two hours.”25
McChrystal saw the briefing as the principal means of generating
shared consciousness and therefore exercising a new form of mission
command. Indeed, he actively adopted certain practices to encourage
this sense of collective participation and shared cognition: “I adopted
a practice I called ‘thinking aloud’ in which I would summarize what
I’d heard.” “Thinking out loud can be a frightening prospect for a
senior leader” as it risks exposing ignorance and uncertainty. Yet, in
the context of JSOC, it had a salutary command effect: “The overall
message reinforced by the O&I was that we have a problem that only we
can understand and solve.”26
McChrystal recognized that even as a commander, he could not
know everything:
“Being woken to make life-or-death decisions confirmed my role as a leader,
and made me feel important and needed—something most managers yearn
for. But it was not long before I began to question my value to the process.
Unless I had been tracking the target the previous night, I would usually
know only what the officers told me that morning. . . . My inclusion was
a rubber stamp that slowed the process, and sometimes caused us to miss
fleeting opportunities.”27

Accordingly, McChrystal implemented a heightened form of mission
command in JSOC, empowering commanders at the local level to
prosecute missions—but always in line with the collective consciousness
of the organization. McChrystal specifically drew on the example of
British Naval Commander Horatio Nelson who
“had told his commanders ‘No captain can do very wrong if he places his
ship alongside that of the enemy,’ but that broad authority could have gone
terribly wrong if he had not spent decades cultivating their individual qualities as decision makers, and if they had lacked an overall understanding of
the force and the battle as a whole. This was Nelson’s equivalent of shared
consciousness, and it was only because of that his captains could thrive as
empowered agents in a chaotic mêlée.”28

Although McChrystal mentions the “individual qualities of
decision-makers,” it is important to note that he does not use Nelson as
an exemplar of laissez-faire mission command. On the contrary, in Iraq,
McChrystal created a federation of commanders, linked together in a
closely integrated network, able to cue actions reflecting the collective
goals. His subordinates exercised their individual qualities as decisionmakers precisely insofar as they were already members of an integrated
team: “The term ‘empowerment’ gets thrown around a great deal in the
management world, but the truth is simply taking off constraints is a
dangerous move. It should be done only if the recipients of newfound
authority have the necessary sense of perspective to act on it wisely.”

25
26
27
28

Ibid., 164, 168.
Ibid., 229.
Ibid., 202.
Ibid., 215.
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To distribute command authority accordingly but to retain
simultaneously unity of command, McChrystal developed a policy of
“Eyes On, Hands Off.” He monitored his subordinates, confirming they
were acting in line with his intent without seeking to manage them.
McChrystal both liberated his subordinates and drew them into an ever
closer relationship with him and their colleagues. In this way, decisionmaking at every level was closely synchronized. Using a new lexicon
of terms like “shared consciousness” and “empowerment,” McChrystal
adapted and advanced existing concepts of mission command. In place
of individual license, he created a professional team whose members
were mutually oriented to collective intentionality.
It might be argued McChrystal was only able to adopt this distinctively
collective system of command because of technological imperatives. He
enjoyed the most advanced communications and information system of
any US commander in history. In fact, while digital communications and
surveillance were certainly not irrelevant to McChrystal, his command
method cannot be reduced to mere technology. On the contrary,
digital technology potentially allowed McChrystal to operate a highly
centralized, directive system precisely because real-time, high-fidelity
video feeds were available to him. By contrast, he actively constructed
a confederated system. He employed technology not to oversee his
subordinates but to unite their activities and to coordinate their
decision-making, forming a tightly articulated but flexible network. The
technology was not employed to eliminate individualism—as it could
have been—but rather to develop an integrated command community.
Although the operational conditions in which Mattis was
working were quite different, he did something very similar with the
1st Marine Division. Instructively, while McChrystal’s command
system exploited the most advanced digital technology available to
US forces, Mattis’s division notably lacked information technology. It
was eventually supplied with Blue Force Tracker equipment, but the
division constructed its own ad hoc communications system before the
operation with procured commercial videophones, video teleconference
suites, and Iridium phones.29 The relative paucity of the 1st Marine
Division’s information and communication technology suggests that
while digital communications have certainly assisted the revision of
mission command, it cannot be reduced to them. Contemporary mission
command represents a transformation in professional expertise and
practice, not merely available technology.
Like McChrystal, Mattis consciously implemented the doctrine
of mission command, laid out in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication
1, Warfighting:30 “His style of command is a function of the mission
concept from army and marine maneuver warfare laid out in Warfighting.
He follows those tenets ‘to a T.’ It is all about intent and guidance.
Everything that can possibly be done by direct communications with
commanders should be done that way—through his intent and guidance.
Opportunities are fleeting and you have to make sure that commanders
are in a position not to have to second guess their decisions (i.e. to require
29 Michael S. Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy
(Quantico, VA: History Division, Marine Corps University, 2006), 83–86.
30 Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1
(Washington, DC: HQMC, 1997), 50.
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direction from above).”31 Indeed, Mattis consciously understood himself
to be implementing the precepts of mission command: “Commander’s
intent is straight out of Marine Corps doctrine, as written by Al Gray, 10
years ago. It demands a higher level of discipline.”32
The commander’s intent was central to Mattis’s method of
command.33 Crucially, Mattis established speed as the center of gravity for
the 1st Marine Division in his intent and impressed its importance upon
all his subordinates; indeed, one of his regimental team commanders
was removed precisely because he failed to implement this principle.
Unless the division could quickly react in Baghdad and depose Saddam
Hussein, the operation would deplete its supplies and potentially generate
regional and international political opposition.
Moreover, the commander’s intent was only as effective as Mattis’s
subordinates understood, accepted, and implemented it. Following the
precepts of Warfighting, it was here that Mattis demonstrated his greatest
skill.34 Mattis invested great effort in creating a command fraternity
able to enact his intent. Before deploying to Iraq, Mattis issued his
“Commanding General’s Staff Guidance” to his regimental and battalion
commanders, his division principals, and special staff. The guidance was
also communicated orally in a series of visits to his units; indeed, the
guidance constituted his notes for his briefing. It is a deeply interesting
document which provides a privileged insight into the way he built a
command team in the 1st Marine Division.
One of the most important principles was the equality of all
commanders in the division. Radically, Mattis stressed: “All of us are
[Marine Air Ground Task Force] MAGTF leaders.” Unusually, Mattis
believed all commanders, at whatever level, were distinctive. They
constituted a special status group within the division, unified by their
decision-making responsibilities. He worked hard to create a special
relationship with each of his subordinate commanders down to battalion
and even company level. Later in the guidance, he elaborated upon the
point: “Accused of making subordinate commanders my equal—that is
good—I stand guilty. I don’t need to call the plays so long as the plays
will gain my endstate/intent. I don’t want subordinates on a string like
puppets, but I expect them to energetically carry out my intent.”35
An officer who was a battalion commander with the 1st Marine
Division in Iraq and subsequently worked on Mattis’s staff noted the
difference: “With the relationship commander to commander, you have
responsibility. You are placed there for the commander. He gives you his
will, personality, force—and trust. That was not his relationship with
his staff. It is much more demanding to work for him as staff. It was a
privilege to be both. But he had a different relationship with his staff.”36
31 Colonel Clarke Lethin, (assistant chief of staff, G-3, 1st Marine Division), interview with
author, July 19, 2016.
32 General James Mattis, interview, January 23, 2004.
33 Michael L. Valenti, The Mattis Way of War: An Examination of Operational Art in Task Force
58 and 1st Marine Division (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College
Press, 2014), 48.
34 HQMC, Warfighting, 51.
35 James Mattis, “Commanding General’s Staff Guidance,” 1st Marine Division, Camp
Pendleton, August 14, 2002, 4.
36 Interview with a marine, March 15, 2016.
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Specifically, Mattis sought to replace a traditional military hierarchy
with a unified team. Indeed, Mattis employed sporting metaphors to
communicate unity. Rather than directing operations from above, he
saw himself as a coach or perhaps a quarterback calling plays from
within the action, a first among equals rather than a superior. Naturally,
commanders in this team were not equal; however, mission command
was anything but a license for subordinates to do as they pleased: “Don’t
screw with higher commander’s intent, missions, tasks.”37
In order to generate a common consciousness among his
commanders, Mattis exploited standard planning methods such as the
drill Rehearsal of Concept (ROC). Of course, Mattis was in no way
unique in using sandtables, tactical models, or Rehearsal of Concept
drills to prepare his troops for battle. Models of this type had been used
at the division and corps level since the First World War and their use
at higher levels can be traced back to the late-eighteenth century. But
Mattis dramatically intensified their significance, consciously seeking to
draw his commanders together as a decision-making community.
Before the operation began in Iraq, the 1st Marine Division
conducted a series of Rehearsal of Concept drills.38 In August 2002,
when the division was first warned they were possibly deploying to Iraq,
Mattis decided to conduct a rehearsal maneuver on a scale model of Iraq
constructed in front of the “White House,” the division’s headquarters
building, with over 6,000 Lego blocks representing every vehicle in
the division. After arriving in Kuwait, the marines completed two
additional drills in the desert on February 7 and 27, 2002, using two large
Olympic swimming pool sized model sandpits made with bulldozers.39
Commanders wore distinctively colored football jerseys with the unit’s
call sign to distinguish the units from each other.
On the basis of these drills, Mattis and his staff were able to
draw definite deductions about plausible and impractical schemes of
maneuver—for instance, after formulating the invasion plan the division
learned Task Force Tarawa would be assigned to their area of operations
with a mission of securing its lines of communication around Nasiriyah.
Mattis opposed the order on the basis of the Lego drill:
“Adding Tarawa, which was crossing in front of the divisional line of march
and stopping in the middle of it; it was going to conflict with [Regimental
Combat Team One] RCT-1. It was going to create friction. We knew that
was going to occur but we didn’t know how much. We had covered that one
though. When we saw Task Force Tarawa briefing their move to the [Marine
Expeditionary Force] MEF, I said: ‘You won’t be able to do that. We are
on the main effort and you are now on the same road at the same time.’ ”40

This was an important episode: it showed the drills also allowed
leaders in the division to anticipate and practice decision-making. By
anticipating alternative scenarios, the two jersey drills allowed the 1st
Marine Division to predict when a decision might have to be taken
and, therefore, accelerating or even eliminating decision-making
37 Ibid., 4.
38 Groen, With the 1st Marine Division, 109–12, 126–8.
39 Lethin interview.
40 General James Mattis (commanding general, 1st Marine Division), interview with author,
June 4, 2016.
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during the actual operation. The identification of decision points was
indispensable to the application of mission command because the
points effectively presented subordinate commanders with anticipated
decisions. Subordinate commanders were already cued to the kinds of
situations they would face, the sorts of decisions which they might have
to make, and the way that General Mattis and the division wanted the
decisions to be made. The “commanders knew the second and third
order effects of their possible decisions, based on the commander’s
intent and guidance.”41
The ROC drills impressed Mattis’s intent upon commanders
collectively orienting them to a coherent pattern of action even when
they were not copresent. In order to facilitate accurate and coherent
decision-making in line with the commander’s intent, the 1st Marine
Division also deployed nominated staff officers to those decision points
in Iraq: “We gamed out where the friction points were likely to be.
Myself and Colonel Kennedy performed that function of the division.
We would be at the friction point, for instance, when the Division was
splitting on its line of march. I was free to roam to a friction point when
they needed someone there to assist.”42
Mattis’s method of command was by no means original. Indeed,
Mattis himself has denied he was doing anything novel at all. Most of
the techniques he employed like his intent, building a command team,
and using models were all well-established practices; however, Mattis
intensified these methods to such a degree that the mission command he
exercised in Iraq was of a different order to the ad hoc decentralization
typical of the twentieth century. His subordinates did not act on their
individual initiative or instinct. Their decision-making was facilitated
insofar as they were all bound together in a highly developed team with
a shared understanding of the operation. In many cases, the decisions
subordinates “made” were in fact already anticipated and collectively
agreed upon in the course of the ROC drills. As Mattis emphasized,
this system of mission command demanded far more discipline and
professionalism; it no longer involved mere individual freedom and
independence. It stood in direct contrast to the Moltkean tradition.
In Iraq, McChrystal and Mattis explored new frontiers of command
under different operational conditions. Although they based their
methods of command on existing doctrine, they were, in fact, developing
novel practices of command. Specifically, both sought to create a dense
federation of commanders who shared a common understanding and
were closely united around the commander’s intent. Decision-making
was, therefore, collectively preconceived, aligned, and coordinated.
The McChrystal and Mattis methods of command were significant
developments of traditional Western concepts of mission command.
Although the principle of decentralized decision-making and
improvisation remained important, the practices involved articulating
different command levels and required a high level of professionalism—
commanders at each level were committed to a common understanding
of the operation. Consequently, McChrystal and Mattis did not enact
mission command by reference to their own immediate situation but
41 Ibid.
42 Lethin interview.
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rather by reference to the shared intentions of the wider force reinforced
by careful collective preparation, anticipation, and imaging reinforced by
constant interaction, communication, and feedback. Ironically, mission
command today requires intensifying the professional bonds between
commanders at each level so they are acutely attuned to each other; it
requires an accentuated shared consciousness. In this way, apparently
instinctive individual decisions are actually increasingly informed by the
collective, systemic expectations.
Although among the most gifted commanders of their generation,
McChrystal and Mattis were not unusual in implementing this intensified
system of mission command. Many other commanders in Iraq and
Afghanistan engaged in similar practices—for instance, Mattis’s
superior Lieutenant General David Mckiernan, the Combined Forces
Land Component commander, implemented a very similar system. As
he prepared his forces for the invasion of Iraq, Mckiernan was careful to
anticipate decisions through the use of ROC drills and other techniques.
He was diligent in communicating his intent to his subordinate corps
and division commanders, including Mattis, to ensure unified and
coherent decision-making at every level. In particular, Mckiernan was
careful to engage in a series of face-to-face meetings with Lieutenant
General James T. Conway, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and Lieutenant
General William S. Wallace, V Corps, to rehearse their passage of lines
and to anticipate when a command intervention might and might not be
necessary.43 McChrystal and Mattis were not unusual.
Moreover, recent developments have only accentuated the methods
McChrystal and Mattis pursued. The US Army is currently implementing
a division-level system of mission command whereby a networked main
division headquarters remains in the continental United States, while
tactical command posts deploy. Mission command has many advantages,
reducing the vulnerability and logistical footprint of the division’s
headquarters; however, a dispersed command system of this type
requires higher levels of discipline, professionalism, and teamwork from
commanders and staff. Precisely because it is now radically distributed,
local decision-making cannot be autonomous. Rather, local commanders
must continually align their decision-making with the rest of the force
to ensure coherence across tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
Mission Command 2.0 does not involve merely decentralizing vertical
hierarchy, but in fact, integrating a complex and heterogeneous network.

Conclusion

Mission command is indisputably a central precept in Western
military doctrine today; it is the professed method of command. It is also
true that when Western forces institutionalized mission command into
doctrine, they drew heavily on historical examples, especially from the
Wehrmacht in World War II. While recognizing continuity, this article
argues the changing character of operations and the expansion of the
span of control facilitated by new technologies deepens and intensifies
mission command into a highly distinctive phenomenon.

43 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers who served on Mckiernan’s staff for this
example.
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In particular, while traditional mission command might be
characterized as an individualistic system, giving local commanders
temporary independence to make immediate tactical decisions, Mission
Command 2.0 relies on a dense federation of commanders. It is
highly collective. It aligns and coordinates decisions across command
echelons. It unites commanders into dense, professional communities,
whose members are intimately and constantly attuned to each other’s
intentions and situations. Ironically, to increase the tempo and accuracy
of decision-making, Mission Command 2.0 involves not the increased
independence of subordinate commanders but radical interdependence.
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ABSTRACT: This article explains the importance of mission command to joint operational effectiveness through the
experiences of the Australian and American armies. Guidance is
also given regarding the caveats of subordinate competencies
and experiences, which affect the appropriate application of the
leadership practice.

M

ilitary operations—whether combat, peacekeeping, or
humanitarian, whether single-country or multinational—are
complex and unpredictable. Intelligence, understanding
one’s own capabilities and limitations, and carefully crafted command
guidance at best lend limited insight into how to confront what lies ahead.
Adversaries seek to deceive and surprise. Environmental conditions
change. Leaders’ understanding of circumstances at the sharp end
increasingly dims the further up the chain of command one goes, even
in an era of communications capabilities undreamed of a generation ago.
The sergeant leading his squad sees what his platoon leader cannot. Those
at battalion, brigade, and higher know little of what confronts their trusts
below. The wise military leader recognizes unforeseeable events always
lie ahead. Those commanders, therefore, require subordinates be ready
to adapt to the unexpected.
Mission command—the practice of assigning a subordinate
commander a mission without specifying how the mission is to
be achieved—provides a means of addressing this challenge.1 The
United States is not the only country committed to practicing mission
command. Armies in Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom have adopted the
familiar approach. Centuries old in concept and decades aged in military
doctrines, effective implementation has nonetheless proven elusive.
The following paragraphs focus on the Australian approach to
mission command. Australia and the United States have a long historical
partnership. The two countries’ soldiers served side by side in East
Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; on World War II battlefields;
and elsewhere. There is great value in learning from such allies and
colleagues akin to but different from ourselves.
This article presents mission command practices during recent
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, major predecessor confl icts from
World War I on, and in today’s Australian Army brigade. The events
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include both confrontations with armed foes distant from Australian
shores and disasters on the island continent itself.

US and Australian Perspectives

American and Australian views on mission command are similar
both in concept and in terms of the two countries’ expectations
regarding what the philosophy requires of senior and subordinate
leaders. Seniors must cultivate “implicit trust between and across all
elements of the land force” in such a way that subordinates develop
situational awareness that prepares them to exercise sound judgment in
support of the commander’s intent.2 In this manner, US Army General
Ulysses S. Grant conveyed he would not dictate a plan to Major General
William T. Sherman in 1864, but admonished him to “execute [work]
in your own way.”3 This exchange makes it clear the mission command
concept has long been with America’s army even though the term was
not introduced in the doctrine until 2003.4
America’s joint and army definitions of mission command are
common in spirit but different in detail. Mission command in joint
doctrine is “the conduct of military operations through decentralized
execution based upon mission-type orders, [which direct] a unit to
perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished.”5
The US Army defines the approach as
the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission
orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to
empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. . . . [It] emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution.6

This disciplined initiative is “action in the absence of orders,
when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen
opportunities or threats arise.”7 More verbose than the joint guidance,
there is little difference between the two definitions. The Army guidance
correctly observes that mission command is not the responsibility of
the senior alone. Subordinate leaders in staff and command positions
support their seniors by showing initiative and otherwise acting within
the dictates of higher echelon intent.
Consistent employment of mission command continues to prove
elusive in both the US and Australian armed forces. Clear communication
of a commander’s intent is fundamental to subordinate understanding
of what underlies an assigned mission. Intent—“a clear and concise
expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end
state helps subordinate and supporting commanders to act . . . even

2 Ibid.
3 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant (New York: Cosimo, 2007), 278.
4 John Case, “The Exigency for Mission Command: A Comparison of World War II Command
Cultures,” Small Wars Journal, November 4, 2014.
5 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint
Publication 1-02, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015), 158.
6 Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Mission Command, Army Doctrine
Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012), 1-1. “Mission orders” are
defined as “directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to
achieve them” (Ibid., Glossary-3).
7 Ibid, 2-4.
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when the operation does not unfold as planned”—allows junior leaders
to make appropriate decisions when confronted by the unforeseen.8
An omniscient commander could provide precise instructions
and the resources necessary for accomplishing every assigned task. No
such commander has yet graced history; thus, leaders need to provide
subordinates with an intent to guide judgment when conditions vary
from those envisioned. Simply stated, an effective intent conveys what
the commander wants his leaders and staff to remember when they face
the unanticipated.9
Clarity of orders and intent, decentralized decision-making, and
trust are the underpinnings that bring about unity of effort through
the exercise of mission command in Australia’s ground force as in the
US Army.10 Exercising mission command while avoiding unnecessary
risk receives explicit notice in Australian joint doctrine just as in the
American, the objective being flexibility and adaptability to respond
more effectively to the unexpected.11
Where US and Australian approaches diverge is in the amount of
doctrinal guidance provided. Australian doctrine tends to appreciate
mission command’s inherent simplicity of character better without
ignoring the difficulty of its proselytization. The desired end is no
different; the underlying wisdom is the same. But the Australian
Army seems satisfied with avoiding verbiage that obscures rather
than illuminates the philosophy. Offered in the spirit of multinational
cooperation (and simplicity), we will use its definition from here on:
Mission command is the practice of assigning a subordinate commander a
mission without specifying how the mission is to be achieved.12

We will see, however, that these few words demand much from senior
and subordinate alike.

Influences on Application

After the Roman commander Vespasian became the fourth
emperor during 69 AD, he chose his son Titus to complete the empire’s
suppression of a first century uprising in Galilee, Samaria, and Judea.
Vespasian’s choice was founded on more than nepotism. Titus had
demonstrated his expertise as a commander and experience relevant
to the tasks while campaigning alongside Vespasian in the preceding
years and while commanding away from his father’s direct oversight.
These and other factors caused Vespasian to trust Titus. Such trust
must obviously underlie decentralization. Commanders must trust
subordinates’ judgment and, in turn, subordinates must trust their
commander will back their decisions when their judgments have been
made in faith with seniors’ intentions.

8 Ibid, 2-3.
9 Russell W. Glenn, “The Commander’s Intent: Keep It Short,” Military Review 67 , no. 8
(August 1987): 51.
10 Australian Department of Defence (ADoD), Campaigns and Operations, Australian Defence
Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0 (Canberra, ACT: ADoD, July 12, 2012), 2-3.
11 ADoD, Command and Control, ADDP 00.1 (Canberra, ACT: ADoD, 2009), 2-11.
12 Australian Army, LWD 1, 45
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Familiarity, which was obvious in the father-son relationship of
Vespasian and Titus, will also play a significant role in determining the
extent of operational freedom. That scope will differ from individual
to individual. The well-known junior commander with demonstrated
ability to function without close supervision merits less oversight than
one less familiar or proven; close supervision, less freedom of action, and
more specific guidance will be given to unproven leaders. A commander
accounts for his own ignorance by exercising greater control: the less
familiar he is with subordinates’ capabilities, the greater the need for
him to ensure his guidance is clear and followed. Time together before
pending operations and nature of the mission will influence the scope
of leeway bestowed—time as it may reassure the commander of new
subordinates’ abilities, mission because the most brilliant leader might
require increased supervision when pursuing objectives with which he
or she has less experience.
Greater familiarity and trust combined with a high level of
subordinate expertise would tend to result in less risk of decentralization.
Granting the same responsibility to a less proven or well-known
individual would qualify as imprudence. During World War II, German
General Friedrich-Wilhelm von Mellenthin drew on his considerable
experience when similarly noting “commanders and subordinates start
to understand each other during war. The better they know each other,
the shorter and less detailed the orders can be.”13
Subordinates’ experience and expertise, their demonstrated ability
to exercise good judgment under relevant operational conditions,
a commander’s familiarity with those individuals, the extent of trust
that senior leader imbues given these and other considerations are all
factors influencing the nature of guidance given to and freedom of
action bestowed upon each subordinate. There must be understanding
of why one individual receives more detailed guidance and closer
supervision than another. Trust will play a part, but trust has many
components. Lesser trust by no means need imply a senior questions the
judgment or reliability of a junior, but rather that those qualities are yet
unmeasured. Trust—from above to below and vice versa—comes only
with demonstrated performance, validation, and the passage of time.
Even the most dependable subordinate will find the diligent commander
occasionally ensuring his or her actions fall within bounds of the senior’s
intent. Subordinates have a responsibility to operate within those
bounds, to educate senior commanders when their unit is less familiar
to those above them in the chain of command, and to understand that
good commander’s check on performance.
Mission command in which both seniors and subordinates
understand their responsibilities is cultivated via training, including
instruction in military schoolhouses where junior noncommissioned and
commissioned officers learn their trade, where midgrade leaders acquire
staff and command tradecraft, and where seniors prepare for the pinnacles
of responsibility. Training incorporates instruction during exercises that
force decision-makers to deal with the unexpected and that allow senior
commanders to demonstrate well-intentioned even if less-than-perfect
13 As quoted in Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S.,
British, and Israeli Armies (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 106.
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judgments are not only allowable but demanded. Training encompasses
self-education guided by mentors and ensures subordinates read Grant,
British Field Marshal William Slim, and others whose command styles
demonstrate mission command at its best. And there is training through
one-on-one evaluations when the overly conservative and risk-averse
leader is told that his or hers is not an acceptable form of leadership.
Trust, familiarity, and expertise gained in training provide cornerstones
for applying mission command during operations whether the force
hails from the northern or southern hemisphere.
This discussion clearly establishes the application of mission
command should be conditional rather than absolute. One size does
not fit all. We have noted even familiar, completely trusted, and very
experienced subordinates require more command guidance under some
circumstances. Resource availability further influences the extent of
decentralization. Freedom of action when employing one’s own forces
will logically be greater than that involving allocation of low-density
assets on which multiple commands rely.14
A military’s culture also influences the nature of mission command.
The US resurrection of the practice during the last decade of the Cold
War was partially due to perceptions that fighting a larger Warsaw Pact
foe on Western Europe’s compartmented terrain meant leaders would
be unable to personally direct all their command elements. The agility
inherent in mission command practice was seen as an advantage over
those opponents, adversaries for whom extensive variation from plans
was antithetical.15 The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were similarly
thought to favor highly decentralized tactical operations. Yet IDF
leaders proved uncomfortable with their military’s presumed extent of
decentralization. Those leaders instead opted for “selective control” in
which those exercising higher-echelon oversight provided mission-type
orders and expected initiative even as they tracked operations in detail,
remaining ever prepared to intervene should a situation appear to be
beyond a subordinate’s capabilities or should an opportunity arise that
otherwise might be lost.16
Israeli control has apparently become even further centralized in
succeeding years. While ground force units were assigned increased
numbers of air support liaison personnel during Operation Protective
Edge (2014) in Gaza, those at the sharp end had to request clearance
for danger close strikes from a centralized authority remote from
the battlefield.17 Some contrast British command approaches (and
presumably those of the Australian and other militaries with similar
cultural and historical ties) with those of America; the former rely on
assigned objectives communicated in quite general terms while US
leaders provide more detailed guidance in their orders. This greater
14 Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands, Command and Control, Joint Doctrine Publication 5
(The Hague: Doctrine Branch, Netherlands Defence Staff, 2012), 59.
15 Douglas A. Pryer, “Growing Leaders Who Practice Mission Command and Win the Peace,”
Military Review 93, no. 6 (November-December 2013): 32.
16 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, “Command Arrangements for Peace Operations”
(Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program, 1995), 69. Alberts and Hayes’ work
is summarized in Keith G. Stewart, “Mission Command: Problem Bounding or Problem Solving?,”
Canadian Military Journal 9, no. 4 (2009).
17 Russell W. Glenn, Short War in a Perpetual Conflict: Implications of Israel’s 2014 Operation Protective
Edge for the Australian Army, Army Research Paper 9 (Canberra, ACT: Australian Army, 2016), 93.
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specificity is thought to dictate more regarding how objectives are to be
accomplished, resulting in less freedom of action by commanders on the
receiving end.18
Variations in application are not limited to those between national
militaries. Other-than-armed forces organizations have in recent years
recognized value in adopting a mission command-type philosophy. The
Australian Fire and Emergency Services Council finds the approach
beneficial during its geographically-dispersed operations. Similar
to military conceptions of mission command, the council’s leaders
communicate a commander’s intent and ensure subordinates receive the
resources necessary to achieve both mission-specified ends and those
implied by the intent.19

The Australian Army’s Path

The moniker “mission command” originated nearly one hundred
years after the Australian Army first applied the practice on battlefields
dispersed across the globe. While soldiers fought at Gallipoli, Europe’s
Western Front, Palestine, and the Pacific Islands north of Australia, the
country’s leaders came to realize success required trust, decentralized
decision-making, guidance tailored to a man’s capabilities, and checking
to ensure subordinates acted within the constraints of that guidance.
Australia’s most senior commanders first fought as subordinates to the
British during the First World War and later to Americans during the
Second. That role did not preclude their adoption of what would later
become the core content of mission command.
Writing on World War I, Peter Pedersen observed that by 1918
Australian “divisional commanders were now proven . . . that allowed
higher commanders to apply a light touch to the tiller.”20 At times
Australia’s senior alliance partners in these confl icts must have provided
insights on command worthy of emulation. Unfortunately, they most
assuredly supplied negative examples. American General Douglas
MacArthur and his staff made little attempt to decentralize decisionmaking in his Southwest Pacific Area, an approach that while contrary
to British Field Service Regulations referenced by the Australian Army
at the time, was in keeping with the 1939 edition of US Army Field
Service Regulations stipulating “so long as a commander can exercise
effective control he does not decentralize.”21 Such tension would
characterize Australian-US Army relations for the duration of fighting
in the Southwest Pacific as MacArthur and his staff believed the failure
of Australian Army commanders to provide detailed guidance to
subordinates demonstrated faulty planning while the Australians were
irritated consequently by the demonstrable lack of trust.
18 Alberts and Hayes, “Command Arrangements,” 70.
19 Euan Ferguson, “Mission Command for Fire and Emergency Managers: A Discussion
Paper,” Australian Fire and Emergency Services Council (AFAC), May 2014, http://www
.cfabellarine.com/uploads/1/3/0/0/13001256/mission_command_discussion_paper_may
_2014.pdf.
20 Peter Pedersen, “Mission command and the Australian Imperial Force,” in Trust and Leadership:
The Australian Army Approach to Mission Command (working title), ed. Russell W. Glenn (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming).
21 US War Department, Operations, Tentative Field Service Regulations FM 100-5 (Washington,
DC: War Department, 1939), 34, as quoted in Peter Dean, “Mission Command in World War II:
Australia, MacArthur’s General HQ and the Southwest Pacific Area,” in Trust and Leadership.
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The passage of time did not heal all wounds. Antipathies would arise
anew when Australian soldiers served under American commanders
in Vietnam. The friction between Australian and US commanders
tended to occur at upper echelons. Australian doctrine emphasized
population security based on earlier counterinsurgency operations in
Malaya and North Borneo. Initial tensions arose due to General William
Westmoreland’s given priority, the destruction of the North Vietnamese
army and Viet Cong enemies. Though that emphasis underwent a degree
of modification with the promotion of Creighton W. Abrams upon
Westmoreland’s departure, Australia’s senior in-country leaders found
themselves caught between what they thought was Abrams’ move away
from a priority of force-on-force operations and the dictates of the II
Field Force Vietnam Commanding General Lieutenant General Julian
J. Ewell (April 1969–April 1970).
Australian Major General Robert Hay, commander, Australian
Force Vietnam, found Ewell’s guidance not only contradictory to both
Australia’s preferred approach and Abrams’ intent but also unnecessarily
detailed. Historian Bob Hall noted,
“Ewell’s directives show[ed] a commander intent on directing his subordinates in detail, instructing them to increase enemy casualties via more
‘company days in the field’ with ‘30 to 40% of company effort’ on night
offensive operations and ambushes. Directives further dictated policies
regarding zeroing of rifles, marksmanship training, ambush techniques and
patrolling, and how best to integrate new reinforcements. A later memorandum urged subordinate commanders not to employ their troops on
population security tasks ‘unless it’s quite clear that the hamlet will be lost
unless we step in.’ ”22

The result presented a dichotomy for Australian forces. While reliance
on often highly dispersed small unit tactics meant mission commandtype approaches were characteristic of battalion and below operations,
the country’s military leaders serving above that echelon frequently
found themselves working around the dictates of US commanders to
shield subordinates from what they thought were inappropriate and
overly detailed orders.
Subsequent Australian contingencies provided repeated opportunities for refining command approaches suitable to leaders operating
distant from their senior commanders, not infrequently in environments
lacking reliable communications. Australian soldiers found themselves
in Somalia, East Timor, the Solomon Islands, and with the arrival of
the new millennium, Afghanistan and Iraq. The challenges associated
with successfully practicing mission command during these more recent
contingencies were less multinational in nature than internal. Such was
particularly the case with subordinate interpretations of the meaning of
mission command. Senior and subordinate alike understood the need
for decentralized decision-making within the constraints of a mission
and commander’s intent. Some senior commanders were surprised
by subordinates’ perspectives on those seniors’ visits to check that
performance reflected higher-level guidance.
22 Headquarters, Australian Forces Vietnam, “Memorandum to HQ II Field Force Vietnam,”
April 16, 1969, AWM98, R569-1-196, Operations-General-II Field Force Vietnam Operational
Directives, Australian War Memorial. Quoted in Bob Hall, “A Long Bridge in Time: The 1st
Australian Task Force in Vietnam via Malaya and Borneo,” in Trust and Leadership.
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Lieutenant Colonel Chris Smith was among those taken aback
during his battle group (battalion task force-equivalent) command tour
in Afghanistan. Investigating a report of a negligent discharge, Smith
determined that a round from an unauthorized AK-47 had nearly
struck an Australian soldier. The weapon had been stored behind the
driver’s seat of a vehicle for a period of weeks if not months. When
Smith questioned the responsible section commander (equivalent to
a US Army squad leader) regarding whether he inspected his drivers’
vehicles, the junior leader stated he did not, believing it to be a breach of
the trust between himself and his subordinates. The section commander
also made it clear that he considered Smith’s checks a breach of trust.
Further discussion failed to convince the section commander of his
responsibility to ensure both his and his seniors’ guidance was followed;
rather than a breach of trust, not checking was a failure of leadership
that reflected a deeply flawed understanding of the responsibilities
inherent in mission command. Recalling the incident, Smith observed
such practices led to “shoddy practices and casual attitudes.”23
Understanding what mission command requires from senior and
subordinate alike continues to challenge Australia’s professional army
no less than America’s primary ground force. The definitions might
seem clear. Yet too many leaders find the courage to exercise the full
spectrum of mission command responsibilities overly daunting. Too
many subordinates also cease listening upon hearing mission command
encourages decentralization of decision-making; they choose to ignore
the responsibility to check that decisions and behaviors are in keeping with
the commander’s guidance. Rooted in distant history, its value already
repeatedly proven in twenty-first century operations, full understanding
and effective practice of mission command remain elusive.

Concluding Observations

Australia’s and America’s armies face similar challenges in
employing mission command. While many leaders have the courage to
trust and decentralize, too many remain committed to hypercontrol,
the antithesis of effective application. Of notable significance given
Australian commanders’ experiences and American commanders’
comments, subordinates recognize the two-way nature of mission
command: it is not “fire and forget.” Rather, senior commanders have
the responsibility to confirm those more junior understand and operate
within the constraints of higher-echelon intent and mission. These are
not the only similarities between the two professional armies, however.
Americans and Australians operating together find more in common
than otherwise. Historians, politicians, and soldiers tend to emphasize
the differences and resulting frictions that arise during coalition
operations. Mission command instead offers a common foundation on
which to build multinational cooperation.
The paragraphs above establish a conditional nature of mission
command is needed to adapt guidance and supervision in light of
subordinates’ abilities. What should be unconditional, however, is
the approach’s application throughout an army. Fear of a subordinate
23 Chris Smith, “Mission Command and the 2RAR Battle Group in Afghanistan: A Case Study
in the Relationship between Mission Command and Responsibility,” in Trust and Leadership.
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making a mistake that might threaten a senior leader’s career tightens
centralization.24 Enhanced communications technologies become
implements of intrusion on junior leaders’ decision-making. Those in
helicopters overhead during operations in Vietnam at least realized that
jungle foliage or elephant grass blocked much of their vision. There
are no such obvious fi lters when looking at a computer screen’s false
clarity. “Train to trust” and “train to take appropriate risk” must be
building blocks for propagating mission command. The commander
who tolerates otherwise is an obstacle to that nurturing.
Operations in the opening years of the twenty-first century
increasingly demand a comprehensive approach involving all services,
multiple nations with several government agencies from each, and
capabilities only other-than-government organizations such as
nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental associations, and
commercial enterprises can bring to the table. Decentralization is a
given; such operations will never see unity of command. Unity of
effort is perhaps an achievable goal with various organizations’ efforts
orchestrated via a commonly agreed upon general intent. Mission
command’s cornerstones—clear intent, trust, initiative, understanding
of context and objectives sought, familiarity with subordinates,
decentralization, and the courage to accept risk—are attainable regardless
of background. Leaders, military and civilian alike, recognize the need
to employ comprehensive approaches better. Mission command offers
a means of achieving the orchestration essential to success whichever
nation or organization is in charge.
Common understanding of the approach similarly offers opportunities to share concerns and insights in its application. Increasingly
sophisticated communications technologies, for example, should
reinforce calls for better inculcation of mission command throughout a
military. Subordinates will have to turn to the commander’s intent when
communications fail due to either enemy antipathy or nature’s hand.
Organizations unable to practice effective mission command will find
themselves at a disadvantage when facing commanders who “receive
general operating guidelines but have significant autonomy to run their
own operations” as do those in the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.25
What does this mean for the American commander fortunate
enough to have an Australian unit under command?26 That those
partners would be no less professional than their own soldiers is a given
as is the reality that doctrinal, leadership, and other differences will
merit recognition and respect by all parties involved. There will almost
certainly be constraints under which the commanders of Australian
units operate differently than those imposed by America’s political or
higher-echelon military leaders. Mission command in a multinational
environment may be better practiced in an inquisitive rather than
directive mode. Clear statement of the higher echelon’s mission and
24 Gary Luck, Mission Command and Cross-Domain Synergy, Insights and Best Practices Focus
Paper (Suffolk, VA: Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Deployable Training Division, 2013), 4.
25 Eric Schmitt and Ben Hubbard, “ISIS Leader Takes Steps to Ensure Group’s Survival,” New
York Times, July 20, 2015.
26 The Australian Army currently has three maneuver brigades, which are the largest units an
American commander might find in partnership. Battle groups or regiments (respectively equivalent
to US battalion task forces or battalions) are the more likely. Australia deployed battle groups to Iraq
and Afghanistan during the first decade of this century.
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intent will be no less crucial. Savvy commanders have realized, however,
that determining how a multinational partner will support said mission
and intent may require an approach significantly different than one with
US subordinates.
Directing specific actions to be taken by partners can cross “no go”
lines established by their seniors, leaving them no other option than
refusing to comply. No less than adapting the extent of guidance given
to a subordinate depending on the individual’s capabilities, a senior
commander must mold his mission command approach to multinational
conditions. Stating the higher echelon mission and intent, then asking
how a multinational partner might best support establishes a basis for
successful coalition operations and avoids straying into red card territory.
Consideration of the Australian Army’s approach to mission
command provides an opportunity to draw on the experiences of an able
ally. Australian leaders’ experiences reveal challenges inherent in mission
command span national boundaries. They include not only the necessity
of understanding and adhering to the concept’s tenets but also the everpresent challenge of persuading over-controlling leaders to adapt their
ways. So too, experiences in both countries bring to the forefront the
less recognized requirement to convince leaders and subordinates alike
that, properly applied, mission command reinforces rather than replaces
the age-old dictum that soldiers do well what leaders check.
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ABSTRACT: Elements of the Communist concept of command
continue to ramify throughout Central and Eastern European
armed forces. They inhibit the orderly delegation of command,
the consistent creation of defense capabilities, and the professional
development of commanders and managers; they also impede these
armed services from adopting the concepts of authority, accountability, and responsibility—concepts taken for granted in Western
defense institutions.

A

n optimistic view of military leadership in the defense institutions of Central and Eastern European post-Communist
countries prevails among Western officials and influences many
of their decisions to support new allies in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Since most of these European countries have
deployed forces in combat and peace-support operations with NATO
after the Cold War, and many have received positive reviews, these
assumptions are understandable.1 Many Western leaders also presume
commanders of post-Communist nations who have been exposed to
Western philosophies of command during combined operations and
the introduction of modern Western combat platforms and systems
will naturally adopt similar practices of accountability and responsibility
in their own organizations. This article examines the contrast of such
contemporary expectations in the context of a trinity of Communist
legacy command concepts: collective decision-making to avoid personal
responsibility; conflating leadership, command, and management; and
hypercentralized decision-making.2
Leaders in Central and Eastern Europe have yet to appreciate the
effects of this trinity on the adoption of delegated decision-making on
the development of a merit-based officer and noncommissioned officer
corps and on the sustentation of Central and Eastern European military
capabilities when they assess the viability of their armed forces under
the shadow of Russia’s new adventurism. Interest also piques when discerning the challenges that have occurred during recent modernization
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efforts. With some exceptions such as Yugoslavia’s republic-based territorial defense forces, post-Communist defense organizations come from
a conceptual legacy whereby all decision-making was highly centralized
and quite different from Western mission command philosophies.3
Thus, integrating Western weapons systems and platforms, designed to
require critical thinking and decentralized operation, is formidable. The
Polish Air Force provides an apt example: they acquired F-16s in 2006,
declared them operational in 2012, deployed them on operations for the
first time during the summer of 2016, and scheduled their first Baltic Air
Policing mission for May 2017.4
The omission of similar Central and Eastern European defense institutions’ preparedness to absorb more Western equipment, training, and
exercises, let alone effectively use such resources, is not fully appreciated
by Western leaders. In March 2016, for instance, US Air Force General
Philip M. Breedlove, who was then commander of the US European
Command, presented a comprehensive review of the state of security
and defense in Europe to the US Senate Armed Services Committee.5
Yet, his testimony in no way suggested a need to address the conceptual
and philosophical foundations of these defense institutions. Thus, one
can only conclude US planning and managing of military and defense
advice and assistance to these critical allies is premised on the unchallenged, and indeed dubious, assumption that these organizations hold
Western philosophies of command and governance.
The anatomy of post-Communist defense institutions in the context
of organizational sociology, however, reveals strong political, institutional, cultural, and indeed, sociological influences that inhibit the
adoption of basic Western concepts of defense governance. These legacy
practices produce organizational pathologies which prevent delegating
command authority in a planned and predictable fashion, producing
defense capabilities, and developing commanders and managers at
all levels. Although, these challenges cannot be solved using Western
technical and educational programs alone, ignoring these command
pathologies perpetuates Central and Eastern European military weaknesses and makes them vulnerable to opportunistic Russian mischief.

3 For more on mission command, see Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA),
Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, Field Manual (FM) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
2015).
4 Lukáš Dyčka and Miroslav Mareš, “The Development and Future of Fighter Planes
Acquisitions in Countries of the Visegrad Group,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25, no. 4
(2012): 544–46, 555, doi:10.1080/13518046.2012.730370; Remigiusz Wilk, “Polish F-16s
Deploy for First-Ever Combat Operation,” IHS Jane’s 360, July 7, 2016, http://www.janes.com
/article/62046/polish-f-16s-deploy-for-first-ever-combat-operation; and Jacek Siminski, “Polish
F-16s Prepare To Take Part in NATO Baltic Air Patrol Mission for the Very First Time,” Aviationist,
February 23, 2017, https://theaviationist.com/2017/02/23/polish-f-16s-prepare-to-take-part-in
-nato-baltic-air-patrol-mission-for-the-very-first-time/.
5 Hearing to Receive Testimony on Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Assistance Programs
and Authorities, Before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 114th
Congress (March 9, 2016) (statement of General Philip M. Breedlove, commander US Forces
Europe); and Examining DOD Security Cooperation: When It Works and When It Doesn’t Before the US
House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services,” 114th Congress (October 21, 2015).
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Table 1. Understanding Western and Communist Legacy Command Concepts6
Mission Command

Versus

Detailed Command

Unpredictable
Disorder/Uncertainty
Decentralization
Informality
Loose rein on subordinates
Self-discipline
Initiative
Cooperation
Ability at all echelons
Higher tempo
Implicit
Vertical/Horizontal
Interactive and Networked
Organic
Ad hoc
Delegate
Art of war

Assumes war is
Accepts
Tends to lead to

Predictable
Order/Certainty
Centralization
Formality
Tight rein on subordinates
Imposed discipline
Obedience
Compliance
Ability only at the top
Stasis
Explicit
Vertical
Reactive and Linear
Hierarchic
Bureaucratic
Disempower and Direct
Science of war

Types of communications
Organization types fostered
Leadership styles
Appropriate to

Collective Decision-Making

Communist governance separated decision-making from accountability via collectivization. Various ministries actualized this managerial
practice by forming collegia. These groups were perfect ideological
expressions of collectivization as they removed an individual from any
responsibility for the collegium’s decisions. In addition to removing the
principle of individual accountability from governance and management,
these bodies facilitated anonymous, arbitrary meddling at the expert
level. In contrast, Western organizations encourage staffs to consult,
coordinate, and recommend, while only senior officials, or commanders,
make decisions.
Despite their dubious political provenance, collegia such as Ukraine’s
military collegium and Moldova’s military council persist throughout
former Soviet republics.7 Rarer in former Warsaw Pact defense institutions, such governing organizations existed until recently in Slovakia
and Hungary, and arguably still exist in Bulgaria.8 These bodies still

6 I am indebted to Major General Walter Holmes, Canadian Army (Ret), for permission to use
the chart he developed, which also appears in Young, “Impediments to Reform.”
7 Ben Lombardi, “Ukrainian Armed Forces: Defence Expenditure and Military Reform,” Journal
of Slavic Military Studies 14, no. 3 (2001): 32, doi:10.1080/13518040108430487.
8 A Slovakian think tank advocated for regular consultations between the president and the chief
of defense, as well as the minister of defense’s collegium to enable more informed decision-making.
See Jaroslav Naď, Marian Majer and Milan Šuplata, 75 Solutions for Slovakia’s Defence (Bratislava:
Central European Policy Institute, 2015), 2; and Réka Szemerkényi, Central European Civil-Military
Reforms at Risk, Adelphi Paper 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press / International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1996), 13, 15. The Collegium of the Minister began during the Communist period.
As the membership of that body and the current defense council remain essentially the same, arguably, its purpose to depersonalize decision-making and escape from responsibility has not changed.
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function extensively, sometimes under disguise or mutation as in the
former Yugoslav Republics.9
In Serbia, for instance, matériel requirement proposals are reviewed
by the minster of defense’s collegium. In the case of Macedonia, its collegium comprises the chief of the general staff, his deputy, the director
of the staff, and the heads of staff directorates and can include representatives from units and, at one point, even the resident NATO training
team. Moreover, many of these countries practice joint meetings of the
collegia of the ministry of defense and general staff or, alternately, the
chief of defense or chief of the general staff attends the minister of
defense’s collegium either regularly or by invitation.
Although not secretive, these bodies obscure senior-level decisionmaking and thereby violate basic Western governance concepts such as
the alignment of authority with accountability. Despite their prevalence,
printed details regarding the constitution of these bodies is difficult
to find, which could explain why some collegia, such as Montenegro’s
do not formally exist by law. Yet, one can gain an appreciation of the
scope of these bodies’ responsibilities in the case of the General Staff
collegium of the Vojska Srbije i Crne Gore (Armed Forces of Serbia
and Montenegro), circa 2002, which were based on the practice of the
Yugoslav People’s Army:
• Analyze the outcome of the general staff’s monthly work plan.
• Analyze combat readiness and determine causation of shortcomings.
• Assess the regional intelligence and security situation and determine
implications for the country.
• Assess the regional security situation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and analyze its possible implications for the combat readiness of the armed forces and the defense of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
• Analyze the financial situation in the armed forces.
• Determine whether there is a need for organizational changes within
the armed forces.
• Manage personnel issues:
 Regulate the condition in the service, promotions, termination of
service, and retention in the service for professional soldiers of
the general’s rank.
 Review and approve the colonel’s promotion list.
 Select candidates for professional military education courses.
 Assign postings of officers completing professional military
education.
 Assign postings of colonels and lieutenant colonels.
 Manage regular promotion in the rank of colonel and all extraordinary promotions for all professional solders.

9 While the title collegium is eschewed, Slovenia continues using boards or committees, some
of which are related to the collegia functions in all but name.
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 Oversee the condition of the service for colonels who are assigned
to mobilization units.
 Determine who should be retained in service as distinguished
experts who meet the requirements for retirement.
 Approve release from service.
 Analyze the personnel management of the armed forces.
• Propose other issues for the attention of the chief of the general staff
at his request.10
Based upon interviews with officials from numerous defense institutions throughout the region, these terms of reference clearly represent
the responsibilities of their own collegium, or defense councils. When
examining the strengths and weaknesses of these bodies, an inevitable
explanation for their continued utilization is that they provide useful
coordination in the absence of the chief of staff concept yet to be fully
embraced throughout the region. Another argument is the group’s ability
to obviate subjectivity, which is important to decision-making such as
assignments and promotions.
What should surprise and disturb Western observers is the power
collegia continue to hold over essentially all aspects of planning and
managing Central and Eastern European armed forces. Notably,
decision-making is limited to colonels and general officers; the views of
others, no matter how well-informed, are not considered. Also vexing is
the continued domination of these ranks in human resource management
decisions, which violates Western defense governance principles. Coming
from a tradition of conscription and an oversized officer corps based on
mobilization, those transitioning and newly formed defense institutions
lack centralized or integrated human resource structures. Except for
the Yugoslav People’s Army, these services also lack noncommissioned
officers with leadership responsibilities.11 Unsurprisingly, these factors
contribute to the legacy practice of using collegia for personnel decisionmaking that extends from individual units up to the general staffs and
the ministries of defense.
Fundamentally, this form of collective decision-making undermines
commanders’ authority to provide professional advice on individuals’
performance and prospects for growth and promotion—inherent
responsibilities of commanders in Western armed forces. In the West,
commanders’ recommendations weigh heavily in independent selection board processes to mitigate against favoritism, let alone nepotism.
Moreover, as Central and Eastern European defense institutions continue to struggle to adopt Western concepts of defense governance,
collegia have not been identified for elimination. By continuing the
practice of collective decision-making, they release senior officials from
accountability and responsibility for their decisions.
One should never underestimate the strength of bureaucratic
inertia, and clearly collegia are unlikely to be retired without considerable
10 General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, Order on Authorities of the Organizational
Units of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Sector for Manning, Mobilization
and Systems Issues, March 20, 2002), section IV (nota bene, translated text).
11 Robert Niebuhr, “Death of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Wars of Succession,”
Polemos 7, no. 13/14 (January 2004): 93.
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political pressure. Perhaps a first step would be to assess the function
of, and justification for, collegia—for example, Macedonia adopted the
chief of staff principle, which should enable objective evaluation of the
effectiveness of the director of staff function thereby removing a justification for the continued use of its collegia.
A final concern with collegium is most Western officials and analysts are unaware of their existence, which leads to misunderstandings of
the decision-making process, particularly regarding key human resource
management functions. As the underlying organization’s sociology of
decision-making remains misunderstood, Western officials have misdiagnosed the human resource management challenges faced by these
organizations. By superficially defining weak personnel structures and
processes as the challenges, Western officials and analysts have missed
the key organizational sociology cause. The reason human resource
management directorates appear to be underperforming by Western
expectations is due to these relatively new bureaucratic bodies existing
in a parallel bureaucratic universe where power continues to be exercised
by collegia.
Accordingly, human resource management directorates concern
themselves with administration and the exercise of negative control with
hardly any consistent, constructive influence on personnel decisions.
Thus, when reforming this key aspect of management, officials need to
identify collegia as a reality that can only be addressed within the political
context of democratic defense governance. In other words, a bottom-up,
technical approach without strong, supportive messaging from national
leaders will always be stillborn. Within the legacy of detailed command
structures, a directive approach is likely to be much more effective than
using Western national models and modeling delegation.
Even more pressing, Western and allied officials must acknowledge
the deleterious effect collegia have on developing commanders. The
importance of basing performance assessments on the objective assessments by field commanders should be incorporated in efforts to develop
leadership, command, management, and decision-making capabilities of
partner nations. These efforts should encourage serving in units as a
necessary step toward overcoming the current professional strategy of
seeking permanent postings on staffs, where decisions are made and
power over personnel management decisions is highly concentrated.
These current incentives are so misaligned that in some countries, such
as Hungary, officers serving on the general staff are better paid than
those commanding units.12 This perverse incentive discourages officers
from serving in units, ensuring an institutional disconnect among the
general staff, units, and commanders.

Conflating Command and Management

Defense institutions which continue the legacy practice of collective
decision-making suffer from another institutional lacuna within the
context of the Western concept of defense governance. Whereas all of
the Baltic States’ divided leadership and command from management—
the ministries of defense adopted posts for permanent under-secretaries
12 Act CCV of 2012 on the Status of Military Personnel, Hungarian Civil Code, 5th Appendix,
http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1200205.TV (accessed October 27, 2016).
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and the armed forces have directors of staff—this practice is rare, even
in Western-leaning Georgia.13
By conflating leadership and command with management, it is
essentially impossible for a policy framework that drives defense institutions to develop. Rather, power is concentrated in a small body of
officials, thereby precluding critical thinking, effective coordination,
and consensus-building. Due to centralized decision-making without a
designated official whose sole function is to optimize daily functioning
of civilian or military organizations, these organizations are also all but
incapable of performing effective staff work when judged by Western
standards. As James Sherr of Chatham House so presciently observes:
As in other post-communist states, few and far between are those who
ask themselves how policies, programmes and directives should be implemented. The vastly safer and almost universal practice is to await orders
about how orders should be implemented. If directives are not to become
conversation pieces, their authors must walk them through the system themselves. Not surprisingly, the result is a system overmanned, overworked and
largely inert.14

As a result, there is no consistent management to ensure staff
coordination, press decision-making downwards, and allow only the
most critical policy issues to be addressed at the minister or the chief
of defense level. By allowing, and indeed encouraging, all decisionmaking to remain with the minister, the chief of defense, and within
their collegia, no decision is too minor to be raised to them and modern
command and management concepts cannot take hold.
Even the widespread practice of designating deputy ministers and
deputy chiefs of defense to run the organization still breaks this principle. These individuals cannot be honest brokers in the staffing process
while being members of the leadership team. On the military side of
the equation, even the seemingly advanced and reformed Polish defense
institution has yet to embrace this concept: two deputies support the
Polish chief of defense, but there is no chief of staff. This inability to
divide command from management in Poland is remarkable considering
it was a key reform principle identified as early as 1992.15 Confusing
hybrid models, such as the Czech armed forces who have both a first
deputy chief of defense as well as a deputy chief of defense and chief of
staff, also exist.
Conflating these two responsibilities produces yet another practice
whereby commanders and staff officers are not allowed to develop
properly. While the concentration of power may suggest an illusion of
control, in reality, the system incentivizes officers to become micromanagers. Officers are taught by examples of senior officers to focus inward
13 Regarding the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense see, Vaidotas Urbelis and Tomas Urbonas,
“The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The Case
of Lithuania,” in Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, eds.
Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster (London: Palgrave, 2002), 117–18. For
more on Georgia’s structure of the ministry of defence and joint staff, see Ministry of Defence
of Georgia, Georgia, Strategic Defence Review, 2013–2016 (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defence, 2013), 22, 23.
14 James Sherr, “Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine’s Armed Forces: To What End? By What
Means?,” in Army and State in Postcommunist Europe, eds. David Betz and John Löwenhardt (London:
Frank Cass, 2001), 74.
15 Andrew A. Michta, The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of the Polish Army after Communism (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 50–53.
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on the organization as opposed to looking outward and thinking critically and creatively.16 These expectations cripple strategic-level thinking,
thereby inhibiting thoughts of creating a future for the organization and
dooming the armed services to live always in the past.17

Centralizing Financial Decision-Making

When the Cold War ended, every former post-Communist country
found itself in a state of economic crisis. Strong pressure to decrease
defense spending was accompanied by an outbreak of confl icts in
Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and Bessarabia, which further stressed
defense budgets. None of these defense institutions, with the exception of the Yugoslav Territorial Defense Force, found themselves with
a heritage of a modern defense planning nor a financial management
system that would enable them to conduct even the most rudimentary
defense planning.18
With a universal focus on effecting civilian control and shrinking
bloated Communist-era defense budgets, the fastest way to seize civilian
control of the armed forces was by removing budget responsibilities from
general staffs. Newly elected political leaders and civilian defense officials
centralized all financial decision-making within ministries of defense. In
the case of the Yugoslav armed forces, whose commanders possessed
their own budgets and spending authorities, the subsequent centralization of finances constituted a major step backwards. Conversely, the
Czech defense budget circa 1993 was almost incomprehensible to civilian
government officials who were challenged to ascertain actual spending.
In 1996, then-Czech Minister of Defense Vilem Holan launched a major
reform that included the introduction of the “revolutionary” concept of
double-entry bookkeeping management.19
Thus, the immediate task confronting early democratic reformers
was to find effective financial management methods to stop defense
institutions from spending public funds needed elsewhere. What began
in the early years of democracy to make defense “fit” its budget has
become an all but impossible task. Notwithstanding reductions in force
structure and personnel, retaining needless infrastructure continues to
waste money. To appreciate the enormity of this task, upon independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2006, Montenegro
took possession of 12,000 tons of munitions and 242 pieces of real estate
and 1,450 buildings it still owned in 2013.20
Established with Western technical assistance, planning, programming, and budgeting system directorates placed unrelenting pressure on
centralizing financial decision-making that has only increased following
16 Agnieszka Gogolewska, “Problems Confronting Civilian Democratic Control in Poland,” in
Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change, eds. Hans Born, Marina
Caparini, Karl W. Haltiner, and Jürgen Kuhlmann (New York: Routledge, 2006), 101.
17 The author is indebted to retired Colonel Vladimir Milenski, Bulgarian Army, for suggesting
this most insightful observation.
18 See Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 252; and Milojica Pantelic, “The System and Organization of
National Defense,” Yugoslav Survey 10, no. 2 (1969): 6.
19 Jeffrey Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military
Relations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 35.
20 Montenegro Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review 2013 (Podgorica: Ministry of
Defence, 2013), 19.
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the 2008 crisis—for example, Slovenia’s defense budget was savaged by
a 34.6 percent reduction from 2007 to 2015.21 Historically, these directorates have effectively maintained their own bureaucratic autonomy,
though they have been particularly ineffective at translating any existing
defense policy priorities and plans into measurable defense outcomes.22
This hypercentralized financial decision-making has produced practices
in which the general staffs of such nations as Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine,
and Serbia conduct force planning absent financial inputs.
It is not surprising that few of these defense institutions have been
capable of producing or executing viable defense plans. Thus, a unique
managerial pathology has emerged throughout the region: ministries of
defense not only manage all aspects of finances but also do so without
considering whether outcomes are achievable. Instead, salaries, pensions, military hospitals, and social welfare benefits—such as spas and
even a ski resort in Bulgaria—have become default priorities that have
produced under-staffed units, limited flying hours, and reduced ship
days at sea.

Undermining Commanders

The confluence of the Communist trinity of legacy concepts inhibits
armed forces from developing leaders and fostering an environment
for encouraging well-rounded, professional commanders to emerge.
Even in reformed defense institutions, such as in Slovenia, the chief of
defense controls no more than five percent of the force’s budget and
the midterm defense program restricts battalion commanders’ abilities
to manage finances to meet assigned missions and tasks.23 Thus, junior
leaders are not expected nor groomed to understand the relationship
between fiscal management and force outcomes necessary for mid- and
senior-grade postings.
Ministries of defense even determine personnel numbers and present
them to chiefs of services as de facto decisions as well as regularly prohibit these senior leaders from moving money from one category to
another to produce outcomes. Even worse, commanders who should
have the best appreciation of which leaders have both performed well
in stressful command postings and have the potential for succeeding in
more challenging command environments are not permitted to influence personnel management decisions comparable to Western practices.
Such decision-making, again, is highly centralized in general staffs
and ministries of defense. Arguably, the authority of the chief of defense
in Slovenia is diluted since his list of officer promotion recommendations is first vetted by the Intelligence and Security Service before being
forwarded to the human resource management directorate, a practice
one Slovenian general associates with control mechanisms and an
ignorance of military advice. Legislation even enables untrained and
21 Slovenia Ministry of Defense, NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2015/16, ANNEX 1.
AC/281-WP(2016)0024 (R), (Ljubljana: Ministry of Defense, n.d.), 1–4. For more on US assistance
programs in the area, see US Department of Defense, FY 2010 Annual Report on Cost Assessment
Activities (Washington, DC: DoD, 2011), 20, appendix 2.
22 Thomas-Durell Young, “Is the US’s PPBS Applicable to European Post-Communist
Defense Institutions?,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5 (October-November 2016): 68–77, doi:10.1080
/03071847.2016.1253382.
23 Branimir Furlan, “Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness: Slovenian Case,” Armed Forces
and Society 39, no. 3 (2012): 442, doi:10.1177/0095327X12459167.
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unqualified individuals to become commanders or take staff postings
thereby undermining the basic concept of military professionalism.24
This pervasive practice of negative civilian control undermines
the professional growth of the officer corps by denying demanding
command and staff postings. Equally, these practices preclude officers
from acquiring a full appreciation of all aspects of the operation of
the armed forces, particularly their financial implications and realities.
In short, management of the armed forces is really a misnomer while
administrating is clearly observable in the absence of experienced,
professional military advice. The persistence of the Communist trinity
of legacy concepts is nothing short of scandalous.
Despite the claim that such legacy practices constitute “national
business” exempt from allied discussions, these practices produce senior
leaders who have not been exposed to the same professionally challenging assignments as their Western counterparts: this fact ultimately creates
problems in allied commands and multinational forces. Succinctly, the
alliance should be interested in developing senior commanders who are
capable of controlling the financial and human resources necessary for
combined operations.
To be sure, there are always exceptions to the rule, but one
cannot ignore the possibility that limiting these officers from the
same professional challenges enjoyed by their Western counterparts
produces an officer corps with stunted professionalism. Equally, in lieu
of healthy civil-military relations, one finds an unbalanced relationship
substituting uninformed and risk-adverse administration for military
professionalism.

Implications and Solutions

Arguably, Western and legacy command concepts are antithetical;
however, the Communist trinity of legacy concepts—collective
decision-making; conflating leadership, command, and management;
and hypercentralized decision-making—undermines the very basis of
the Western definition of command. Absent a change in alliance policy
and the selection of allied commanders, only time will tell how the stark
conceptual rift between Western and residual legacy practices will affect
the ability of commanders from these armed forces to operate within
the alliance’s integrated military command structure. How have 25
years of cooperation with NATO and its nations’ armed forces missed
addressing this important challenge? Answers to this question are more
easily found in both Western and Eastern policy failures.
The Western approach of providing assistance to new partners
and allies has stressed technical solutions, often using Western models
that have failed to address the two antithetical concepts of command.
Moreover, Western nations’ training and professional military educational courses, which expose students to modern warfare, leadership,
and management approaches, have only been partially successful.
Appreciation (and one wonders, recognition) that this knowledge is
highly contextualized and cannot easily be exported to different national
and organizational environments has been lacking. As David Ralston
24 Ibid., 441–42.
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writes in the context of exporting European army models in the nineteenth century, “The reformers were to learn, often to their dismay, that
the introduction of European forms and methods into their military
establishments would sooner or later oblige their societies to undergo
internal adjustments which were by no means trivial.”25
Simply put, the conceptual difference between Western and Eastern
defense and military concepts are so antithetical the adoption of the
former is all but impossible without retiring the entire conceptual basis
of legacy defense institutions. Even when legacy armed forces adopt
some key Western-influenced reforms, junior and noncommissioned
officers voice complaints that NATO procedures are faithfully followed
during operations but legacy concepts prevail at home. Many young
officers and NCOs, including many with operations experience, chafe
at this reality.
The existence of this major differentiation in the concept of
command clearly needs wider understanding and attention by all NATO
nations. The traditional solution of “reform” needs to be rethought. Like
it or not, past assistance policies and programs have neither identified
this conceptual command divide nor produced any effective methods
to address it. This challenge to the Western alliance simply cannot be
addressed at the technical level alone. To be sure, Western training and
professional military education courses have their place. What needs to
be acknowledged by senior officials in both Western and Eastern capitals
is the conceptual divide in command, as well as other areas, is due to
subtle factors that can only be addressed with a deep understanding of
organizational sociological, conceptual, and political characteristics.
To be blunt, only Eastern allies at the level of presidents and prime
ministers—officials who need to accept the urgency of effecting changes
in how commanders are groomed, are selected for stressful and growing
assignments, and are expected to command—can successfully address
the contrast. After all, in any military organization, command is the
“coin of the realm” and changing its basic characteristic will strike at the
very institutional soul and enabling culture of an armed force. Such an
initiative will not be easily accepted, particularly in the more profound
legacy-leaning defense institutions where Western and legacy concepts
of professionalism are antithetical and therefore incapable of coexisting
(see table 2).26 Thus, senior Western political and military officials need
to be prepared to exert sharp and consistent political pressure on their
counterparts for the comprehensive exculpation of legacy concepts and
assumptions as well as their replacement with modern Western concepts. Assuredly, these will be politically painful, fundamental changes.

25 David B. Ralston, Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques
and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1900),
173.
26 Michael H. Clemmesen, “Integration of New Alliance Members: The Intellectual-Cultural
Dimension,” Defense Analysis 15, no. 3 (December 1999): 261–72, doi:10.1080/713604685; and
Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed
Forces (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 108–53.
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Table 2. The Professional Conceptual Divide27
Western concepts

Practical
Critical thinking is required
Decentralized execution
Commanders are empowered
Results oriented
Future oriented
Low social context
Serve the troops
Low power distance
Low uncertainty avoidance
Lying is unacceptable
Failure is part of learning

Eastern concepts
Theoretical
Iron discipline rules
Centralized execution
Commanders only execute
Process oriented
Past obsessed
High social context
Mistreat soldiers (Dedovshchina)
High power distance
High uncertainty avoidance
Lying is not a sin
Failure is never an option, but
a shame and disgrace

Conclusion

In summary, command as defined and practiced in many Central and
Eastern European defense institutions, and expressed as a Communist
trinity of legacy concepts, could not be more foreign and antithetical
to Western approaches. This premise should come as no surprise
since communism’s absolute centralization of power never entrusted
lower officials with decision-making authority. Bereft of responsibility
and accountability, the legacy definition of command constitutes
absolute power over individuals, which likely explains why most newly
independent republics systematically compromise commanders’ abilities
to command. Largely absent in the region is a timely evolution of laws,
policies, incentives, and control mechanisms that ensure the responsible
exercise of command.
Yet, these concepts and practices are too limited by the continued
practices of collective decision-making; conflating leadership, command,
and management; and hypercentralized decision-making to be effectively
adopted, particularly regarding financial authorities and human resource
management. Overcoming these legacy concepts and comprehensively
replacing them with their Western counterparts presents no small
challenge. An encouraging first step would be NATO nations’ universal
and honest acknowledgement of the challenge and their commitment
to addressing these atavistic legacies with deliberate and systematic new
methods to effect change.
The only way to undertake this challenge is to place the solution
where it belongs, at the highest political level. Thus, the default of longstanding policies and programs that address defense reform as a military
problem addressed via technical assistance programs alone needs to be
fundamentally reviewed to develop new approaches based on a deep
understanding of individual cultures and organizational sociologies.
The solution to reforming legacy command concepts will be found in
growing and empowering commanders.

27 Adapted from Young, “Impediments to Reform.”

AFTER 15 YEARS OF CONFLICT

Operational Success, Strategic Failure:
Assessing the 2007 Iraq Troop Surge
Charlotte F. Blatt
©2017 Charlotte F. Blatt

ABSTRACT: This article outlines the contemporary history of
sectarian conflict in Iraq and identifies the consequences of the US
surge strategy in perpetuating the region’s violence and strengthening
the Islamic State.

B

y 2006, security had declined dramatically in Iraq. The February
bombing of the al-Askari mosque, a major Shia holy site, sparked
a rapid increase in sectarian conflict. Violence in Baghdad
increased 43 percent over the summer; by October, civilian deaths had
risen to more than three thousand per month.1 Thus, in January 2007 the
United States radically shifted the course of the Iraq War by executing
Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, commonly known as “the surge.” Under
General David Petraeus, the surge attempted to reverse the course of
the war and stabilize Iraq using counterinsurgency tactics, which included
30,000 additional soldiers “ ‘[living] with the people’ in order to secure
them.”2 Operationally, the effort appeared to have been a success. By
January 2009, casualties declined from 2,693 to 372 civilians and from
101 to 14 US troops; violent incidents declined from 908 to 195.3 In
recent years, however, increasing sectarian conflict is again jeopardizing
Iraq’s stability.4
At this point it seems the surge has failed to achieve the strategic
objectives—“daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their
leaders, and the government will . . . make progress”—stated by President
George W. Bush in January 2007.5 Why? Most scholarship on this issue
falls into two camps. The first group claims the operation would have
succeeded if President Barack Obama had kept US forces in Iraq past
2011. The second camp argues the mission could not have succeeded
because it failed to address the underlying sectarian confl ict and the
political instability fueling civil war. Due to the complexity of the issue,
determining the correct cause with complete certainty is challenging.
The debate centers around such evidence as the contemporary history
of sectarian confl ict in Iraq, sectarian tension and institutional
mismanagement during the surge, immediate consequences of the surge,
and implications of the strategy. After carefully accounting for such

1 Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 31–32.
2 David Petraeus, foreword to Surge, by Mansoor, x.
3 David Kilcullen, Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 45.
4 “Iraq Profile-Overview,” BBC News, December 24 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news
/world-middle-east-14544541.
5 “Transcript of President Bush’s Address to Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq,” New York Times,
January 11, 2007.
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evidence, this article not only posits the military solution to the political
and sectarian problems was misguided but also illustrates lessons from
this operation for use in future confl icts.

The Debate

The optimists in the surge efficacy debate argue Iraq’s increasing
instability is due to troop withdrawal under the Obama administration.
This view claims reduced violence and improved relations with local
communities were squandered in the absence of US troops enforcing
the rule of law.6 David Kilcullen, Petraeus’ senior counterinsurgency
adviser, notes “in a conflict like Iraq, if violence drops when you apply
counterinsurgency techniques, then returns when you stop . . . it suggests
[the tactics] do work . . . and you shouldn’t have stopped before figuring
out a way to maintain the progress.” Kilcullen also criticizes Obama’s
desire to end the war rather than to fight for a status of forces agreement
(SOFA) to extend troops in Iraq past 2011.7 Similarly, Peter Mansoor,
Petraeus’s executive US Army officer, argues the surge was a successful
strategy shift: “Al-Qaeda in Iraq was allowed off the ropes . . . due to
our inability to remain sufficiently engaged in Iraq . . . not to the failure
of the surge as a strategic concept.”8
According to the optimists, two assumptions explain Iraq’s security
decline. First, reduced violence during 2007 and 2008 increased Iraq’s
stability and positioned the government to manage sectarian tension
successfully. For example, former Sunni insurgents, known as the “Sons
of Iraq” (SOI), willingly began working with coalition forces and Shia
police. Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr also stood down the Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) Shia militia.9 Second, by the end of 2011, trend lines indicated
efforts to stabilize Iraq were on target; therefore, the 20,000 troops
recommended by General Lloyd J. Austin III, commander of US Forces
in Iraq, would have likely maintained the trend and mitigated the rise of
the Islamic State (IS).10
The second camp argues the surge failed to transform operational
success into strategic success because it did not address the fundamental
problems driving confl ict in Iraq: sectarian tension and weak

6 See, for example, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, “The Anti-Surge: How Obama
Snatched Defeat from the Jaws of Victory in Iraq,” Foreign Policy, October 30, 2013; Dick Cheney
and Liz Cheney, “The Collapsing Obama Doctrine,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2014; Rick Brennan,
“Withdrawal Symptoms: The Bungling of the Iraq Exit,” Foreign Affairs, November/December
2014; Sergei Boek Combining Exit with Strategy: Transitioning from Short-Term Military Interventions to a
Long-Term Counter-Terrorism Policy (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The
Hague, 2014); and John McCain, “McCain: Fire Obama National Security Team,” interview on
Morning Joe, MSNBC, June 13, 2014.
7 Kilcullen, Blood Year, 47–48.
8 Mansoor, Surge, 270.
9 Ibid., 264–65
10 Liz Sly, “U.S. Commander, Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, Predicts Turbulence Ahead in Iraq,”
Washington Post, November 21, 2011; and Cheney and Cheney, “Collapsing Obama Doctrine.”
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governmental institutions.11 Ali Khedery, the longest continuously
serving US official in Iraq, argues US intervention ultimately failed due
to “empower[ing] a new set of elites who drew their legitimacy almost
purely from divisive ethno-sectarian agendas rather than from visions
of truth, reconciliation, the rule of law, and national unity,” ultimately
fueling nationwide sectarian strife.12 Emma Sky, political adviser to
General Ray T. Odierno, observed positive changes in Iraq immediately
after the surge, and found American-backing of Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki in the 2010 national election reflected “supporting the status
quo rather than reform,” which would have been necessary for longterm political stability.13
With this view, trends in Iraqi stability were not sufficiently positive
by the end of 2011 to render the surge a success.14 American troop
behavior did not reduce sectarian confl ict. And, American officials
supported ineffective and unsustainable institutions during and after
the surge. Since Iraq’s security and stability began declining before
troops had left, this camp could not give credence to the optimists’
argument that Obama’s failure to extend the SOFA caused Iraq’s
destabilization. Some members of this camp do consider, however,
America’s inadequate understanding of Iraqi society as a reason Iraq
could not be fully stabilized.15

Contemporary Sectarian History and the Surge (2007–2008)

The history of sectarian confl ict in Iraq is complex. The Shia and
Sunni sects of Islam have lived peacefully together, worshiping the
same god despite different religious ideologies for over a thousand
years.16 Although occasional confl icts over power, resources, and
status have occurred during the last 100 years, recent Western intervention contributed to a resurgence of violent sectarian confl ict in Iraq
before 2007.17
The Sunni minority has consistently enjoyed political control of
Iraq since the time of the Ottoman Empire, consolidating power with
the 1958 overthrow of the British-installed monarchy and effectively
maintaining power during the 1963 Baath Party coup.18 Politicization
of sectarian confl ict increased sharply after the Iranian Revolution of
11 See, for example, Steven Simon, “The Price of the Surge,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008;
David Hastings Dunn and Andrew Futter, “Short-Term Tactical Gains and Long-Term Strategic
Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq,” Defence Studies 10, nos. 1–2 (Spring 2010),
doi:10.1080/14702430903377977; Bernard Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics and the Iraq Surge,” Strategic
Studies Quarterly 4, no. 2 (Summer 2010); T. David Mason, “Ending the War in Iraq: The Third
Option,” Civil Wars 14, no. 2 (June 2012), doi:10.1080/13698249.2012.679504; Ivo H. Daalder, “Iraq
After the Surge,” Brookings Institution, December 8, 2007; Alex Kingsbury, “Why the 2007 Surge
in Iraq Actually Failed,” Boston Globe, November 17, 2014; and Peter Beinart, “The Surge Fallacy,”
Atlantic, September 2015.
12 Ali Khedery, “Iraq in Pieces: Breaking Up to Stay Together,” Foreign Affairs, November/
December 2015.
13 Emma Sky, The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs
Books, 2015), 338.
14 Ali Khedery, “Why We Stuck with Maliki—and Lost Iraq,” Washington Post, July 3, 2014.
15 Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics.”
16 Geneive Abdo et al., “The Sunni-Shia Divide,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 9,
2017.
17 Harith Hasan al-Qarawee, “Iraq’s Sectarian Crisis: Legacy of Exclusion,” Carnegie Middle
East Center, April 2014.
18 David Gritten, “Long Path to Iraq’s Sectarian Split,” BBC News, February 25, 2006.
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1978–79 that established a Shia theocracy focused on inspiring similar
movements in neighboring nations. Saudi Arabia countered Iran’s
ambitions, promoting the Sunni vision of Islam in the region and
supporting Iraq during the long and brutal Iran-Iraq War (1980–88).19
Though notable, the destabilizing effects of Iraq’s dependence on
oil for state revenue and inability to manage and divide the resource
between groups is beyond the scope of this article.
Further disrupting sectarian relations, Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein, a Sunni, pursued a largely secular governance strategy.20 Despite
reports of equally applied force, much of Saddam’s brutality targeted
Shias and Kurds. During the Iran-Iraq War, for example, thousands of
Shias were not only prohibited from freely practicing their religion but
were also expelled from the country, imprisoned, tortured, or killed.
In 2006, Saddam was tried on a charge of “genocide for attempting
to annihilate the Kurdish race” during the Anfal military campaign
(1988) that killed at least 50,000 civilians and destroyed thousands of
villages.21 Thus, Saddam’s practices reinforced the historically Sunni
Arab-dominant society and marginalized Shias and Kurds.22
Arriving in 2003, the United States further divided the population
by forcing each Iraqi to list his or her sect on any state issued document.
This identity was used for the country’s new political structure, pitting
sectarian groups against each other for government positions and
authoritative roles. While this structure placed power in the hands of
the Shia majority, who had long been disenfranchised, the rapid and
aggressive de-Baathification policy disproportionately impacted Sunnis:
they were removed from positions in the military and government and
had few avenues of recourse.23 As the war escalated, tensions worsened,
and violence increased throughout Iraq.24 Though there were certainly
many other divisive factors in Iraqi society, sectarian lines were wellpronounced before the surge.

During the Surge

While “all quantitative measures . . . indicated the tentative success
of the surge” due to the counterinsurgency strategy reducing violence,
and the Sunni community increasingly working with US forces, these
changes did not substantively address underlying sectarian tension.25

19 Ian Black, “Iran and Iraq Remember War that Cost More than a Million Lives,” Guardian
(Manchester), September 23, 2010; Mike Gallagher, “The ‘Beauty’ and the Horror of the Iran-Iraq
War,” BBC News, September 26, 2015; and Abdo et al., “Sunni-Shia Divide.”
20 Musa al-Gharbi, “The Myth and Reality of Sectarianism in Iraq,” Al Jazeera America, August
18, 2014.
21 Edward Wong, “Saddam Charged with Genocide of Kurds,” New York Times, April 5, 2006.
22 Gawdat Bahgat “Saddam Hussein’s Legacy: A Preliminary Assessment and Future
Implications,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 25, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2005), doi:10.1353
/sais.2005.0027; and Gritten, “Long Path.”
23 Daniel Byman “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or a Bridge Too Far?,” Security
Studies 17, no. 4 (October-December 2008); and al-Gharbi, “Myth and Reality.”
24 Mansoor, “A War Almost Lost,” in Surge, 31–43.
25 David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 125–26.
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Sectarian Tension

The surge did not sustain reduced violence for several reasons, which
undermines the optimists’ claim the operation set Iraq toward longterm stability. Cooperation between Sunnis, Shias, and coalition forces
was a marriage of convenience rather than intentional reconciliation.
Sunnis who had previously cooperated with al-Qaeda began to work
with coalition troops as members of the Sons of Iraq due to al-Qaeda’s
control of resources as well as a series of killings of important Sunnis. The
deaths led one Sunni leader to explain “resistance groups [were left] with
two options: either to fight al Qaeda and negotiate with the Americans
or fight the Americans and join the Islamic State of Iraq. . . . Both
options are bitter.”26 Furthermore, Sunni cooperation with the United
States happened to increase as they were simultaneously losing a civil
war with the Shias. Thus, Sunnis did not form the SOI to cooperate with
the United States because of genuine support for their goals, rather they
were motivated by a desire to reverse their marginalization and to better
position themselves against al-Qaeda and Shias, a risk factor for future
confl ict.27 Similarly, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia, consented
to a US assault on Shia militias because he saw cooperation with America
as his best hope for survival.28 And, the US military worked with SOI out
of necessity, unable to take counterinsurgency action without the help of
local allies.29 Thus, cooperation during the surge was unrepresentative
of underlying trends in sectarian behavior.
Also undermining long-term stability, coalition forces used payments to motivate the Sons of Iraq. Sunni sheikhs took as much as 20
percent of US payments to SOI groups, which was often worth over
$100,000. This practice caused concerns that chiefs would not agree to
integrate SOI forces into Iraqi state security services. Most SOI militia
members were already well armed, but some individuals and their
sheikhs were given US weapons.30 Fears that allied militia members
would return to insurgency when the money stopped flowing came to
fruition; violence eventually returned.31
The divergent goals of each sectarian group fueled the violence and
reduced the operation’s state-building capacity because negotiation and
resolution never occurred. Sunnis frequently believed reconciliation
between Iraq’s sectarian groups would mean their restoration to power.
Shias wanted justice for previous regimes’ subjugation indicative of early
elements of Maliki’s regime.32 Kurds viewed reconciliation as respecting
their autonomy.33 When Sunnis realized their cooperation with coalition
troops would not equate to help challenging the Shias, the work with US
forces decreased and some returned to al-Qaeda.34
26 Simon, “Price of the Surge.”
27 Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 267–68; and Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics.”
28 Kaplan, Insurgents, 267–68.
29 Jon Lee Anderson, “Inside the Surge: The American Military Finds New Allies, But at What
Cost?,” New Yorker, November 19, 2007.
30 Simon, “Price of the Surge.”
31 Kingsbury, “2007 Surge in Iraq.”
32 Kaplan, Insurgents, 284.
33 Simon, “Price of the Surge.”
34 Ibid.
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Not only did these factors further divide sectarian groups, but US
troop missteps combined with a weak sectarian government also set
Iraq down a path of instability. American presence in Iraqi communities
helped gather better intelligence; however, the lack of understanding
of local culture and language led to the mistaken arrests of thousands.
Prisons became centers of radicalization described as “jihadi universities,”
contributing to later confl ict.35 Furthermore, Iraqis were angered by
decisions to wall off Baghdad neighborhoods and hire and arm SOI
groups without community input. Locals worried the United States
was just arming new militias and further undermining the unstable
state government. The population disapproved of constant raids that
reinforced the idea of the United States as a coercive power, a catalyst
leading some Iraqis to become insurgents.36
The lack of a strong national government throughout the surge
meant Iraq did not develop its own viable and independent national
army or police force. Existing societal divisions materialized within
Iraq’s armed forces, laying the foundation for further sectarian strife
after US troops left.37 Moreover, the Shia government arrested hundreds
of Sunnis who were cooperating with US forces, which was indicative
of the confl icting goals of US and Iraqi leadership and foreshadowed
later sectarian confl ict driven by the Maliki regime.38 Indeed, during the
surge, Shia militias dominated Iraqi government security forces, while
Maliki resisted any threat to his authority. Moreover, groups like the
Jaysh al-Mahdi militia purportedly accepted Iran’s support, increasing
Iranian power in Iraq.39
In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group, a congressionally formed
bipartisan research organization, concluded, “Sectarian confl ict is the
principal challenge to stability.”40 Because the surge did not sufficiently
manage the combination of issues illustrated above, trends in Iraqi
security and stability were bound to be negative after the surge, regardless
of the short-term benefits.

Institution-Building

When Sky left Iraq in 2008, she and Odierno understood “the surge
had not eliminated the root causes of confl ict in Iraq . . . the Iraqis
must still develop the necessary institutions to manage competition for
power and resources peacefully.”41 Troops had not laid the foundation
for the civil institutions vital to the surge’s overall success. Even during
the surge, then-Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon Panetta,
recognized the mistake of assuming other elements of Iraqi reconciliation
like institution-building would “fall into place” if surge troops reduced

35 Kingsbury, “2007 Surge in Iraq.”
36 Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”
37 Daalder, “Iraq After the Surge.”
38 Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Iraq Takes Aim at U.S.-Tied Sunni Groups’ Leaders,” New York Times,
August 21, 2008.
39 Kaplan, Insurgents, 210; and Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”
40 James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, co-chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report (New York:
Vintage Books, 2006), xiii.
41 Emma Sky, “Iraq, From Surge to Sovereignty: Winding Down the War in Iraq,” Foreign
Affairs, March/April 2011.
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violence.42 One scholar elaborates: “Only when Iraq’s Sunni and Shia
Arabs and its Kurds all felt represented by the government would the
country be safe from civil war.”43
The problems with institution-building during the surge largely fell
into three categories: institutional discrimination, leadership failures, and
service delivery challenges. Iraqi institutions, largely unchecked by US
forces, perpetuated discriminatory sectarian policies during the surge.
These polices led to sectarian influence over the leadership and the staff
of government ministries and hindered efforts to build a professional
civil service.44 Important ministries remained under sectarian militia
control, “creating an environment of danger and intimidation both
for Iraqi civil servants and their coalition advisors.”45 The population
also experienced government-perpetuated discrimination. One Sunni
neighborhood, for example, received half as much electricity per day as
a nearby Shia community.46
American civil servants spent almost no time mentoring their
Iraqi counterparts due to security concerns about leaving the Green
Zone. Furthermore, action taken by American forces to reform the
government’s sectarian tendencies was described as “fragmented and
incoherent.”47 Thus, the United States did not sufficiently manage the
creation of secular institutions during the surge, allowing destabilizing
sectarian discrimination to continue within the Iraqi government.
The Bush administration attempted to mentor senior Iraqi ministers even though the advice and council US officials provided was
insufficient to guard Iraqi institutions against future turmoil. Both
Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker met frequently, sometimes
even simultaneously, with Maliki, mentoring him about proper
governance; Bush regularly video conferenced with Maliki, seeing
himself as a mentor to the prime minister.48 Former National Security
Adviser Stephen J. Hadley elaborates Bush decided, “I’ve got to be his
best friend. I’ve got to be his counselor . . . Because if he doesn’t succeed,
U.S. policy isn’t going to succeed.”49 Despite these efforts, Maliki did not
heed the counsel he received during the surge and led Iraq back toward
unstable institutions.
By May 2007, there were only 150 members of provincial
reconstruction teams assisting with service provision in Iraq. This
“woefully inadequate” number was not shocking as few State Department
(or even Agriculture Department) personnel know how to maintain
local irrigation systems or electrical grids. Because the United States did
not have enough skilled personnel on the ground, American civil and
42 Leon E. Panetta, “Surge Not Working as Hoped,” Monterey (CA) Herald, September 9, 2007,
reproduced by Panetta Institute.
43 Beinart, “Surge Fallacy.”
44 Colonel Guy T. Cosentino, “The United States Government Interagency Process and the
Failure of Institution Building in Iraq” (Senior Service College Fellowship Project, US Army War
College, 2008), Defense Technical Information Center.
45 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq,
from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Vintage Books, 2013), 512.
46 Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”
47 Gordon and Trainor, Endgame, 511–12.
48 Conrad C. Crane, Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2016), 143–44.
49 Jason M. Breslow and Evan Wexler, “Who is Nouri al-Maliki,” Frontline, July 29, 2014.
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military personnel did not sufficiently support the Iraqi government’s
delivery of vital services during the surge, which established a long-term
trend of ineffective institutions.50
By late 2007, most Iraqis still lacked electricity, trash collection,
potable water, healthcare, and telephone services.51 Pervasive corruption
exacerbated this problem.52 Even if the United States had increased the
size of the provincial reconstruction teams, inefficiencies would have
likely persisted due to cultural clashes between American civilian and
military bureaus. Thus, the US failure to assist the Iraqi government in
providing services for its people during the surge caused most Iraqis to
view sectarian militias, rather than the state government, as the provider
of security and services.53
Many argue that by mid-2008 the surge was successful and that the
gains would have been maintained with extended US troop presence.54
Stephen Biddle testified to Congress that “the violence reduction was
more than just a temporary lull. It reflected a systematic shift in the
underlying strategic landscape of Iraq, and could offer the basis for
sustainable stability if we respond appropriately.”55 By the end of 2008,
Biddle’s view seemed justified. Violence had declined so substantially
that Iraq’s future seemed bright, the SOI program appeared successful,
and Iraqi institutions seemed relatively stable; however, significant
arguments stand in contrast to the surge optimist viewpoint. Evidence
suggests that at the end of 2008 Iraq was not trending toward long-term
sectarian confl ict resolution even though violence had declined.

Consequences of the Surge

Despite the compelling argument for the surge’s success, Iraq may
not have been as stable as believed. By 2010, challenges leading up to
and surrounding the national election illustrated the surge had not
achieved “sustainable stability” and “Washington had reneged on the
promises it had made to Iraqis to protect the political process and it had
betrayed the very principles the US military believed it was fighting to
uphold.”56 Violence had returned to pre-surge levels in 2012.57 Iraq was
not trending toward long-term sectarian confl ict resolution.

Immediate Instability

Some attribute the increased instability to Maliki, who had been the
US choice for prime minister in 2005 due to his low profi le, leadership

50 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Civil Defense: The Surge That Would Really Save Iraq,” Brookings
Institution, May 21, 2007.
51 Panetta, “Surge Not Working.”
52 Daalder, “Iraq After the Surge.”
53 Pollack, “Civil Defense.”
54 See McCain and Graham, “The Anti-Surge”; Cheney and Cheney, “Collapsing Obama
Doctrine”; Brennan, “Withdrawal Symptoms”; Boek, Combining Exit with Strategy; and McCain,
“McCain.”
55 Stabilizing Iraq from the Ground Up, Hearing on Iraq after the Surge: Political Prospects, Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong., (April 2, 2008) (statement of Stephen Biddle, Senior
Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations).
56 Sky, Unraveling, 338.
57 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction &
Security in Iraq (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013).
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skills, and acceptability to Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds.58 Indeed, in March
2008 Maliki supported a successful charge against the Jaysh al-Mahdi in
Basra, earning him praise as a secular and patriotic nationalist.59 After
the surge, however, the prime minister began treating former Sons of
Iraq and secular governmental institutions differently.
Broken pre-surge promises to reintegrate former members of the
SOI into post-surge national security forces indicated a continuation
of Iraq’s sectarian struggle. After much resistance, the Maliki regime
agreed to accept 20 percent of the former militia members into regular
state security forces and to employ the remainder in nonsecurity
government jobs.60 But, the government quickly failed to pay salaries to
former SOI members or to complete the integration. Sunni leaders were
also arrested and protests were repressed, which led to additional Sunni
disenfranchisement and future radicalization.61
In 2008, polls indicated public satisfaction with government
services was exceptionally low.62 Some Sunnis compared the Maliki
regime to a Shia mosque due to unequal distribution of government
services.63 Khedery stated, “The insatiable lust for power and money
evidenced by virtually every national leader I met . . . still leaves me
dazed.” Corruption was rampant among leaders from all sects; leaders
supported by Americans engaged in more corrupt behavior than those
under Saddam Hussein.64 Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the surge,
Iraq was not trending toward stability: its leaders exacerbated sectarian
tension while America backed an ineffective regime.

The 2010 Iraqi Election

The Iraqiya coalition—a nonsectarian group headed by Iyad Allawi,
a secular Shia, and leaders of the Sunni community—edged out Maliki’s
State of Law coalition by 2 seats (91 to 89) in the 2010 election. Since
Iraqiya did not win by an outright majority, Allawi should have had
the first chance to form a ruling government coalition; however, Maliki
refused to accept the loss, claiming rampant fraud.65 Though there was
no evidence to support this claim, Maliki pushed Iraq’s high court to
allow him to form a government, preventing Allawi from doing so.66
The United States and Iran also committed to supporting Maliki even
though Iraqiya had won the popular vote.
Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Ambassador to Iraq, opposed the US
decision: “We . . . bandwagoned . . . rather than pushing back and saying
the [Iraqi] Constitution had to be followed.”67 Indeed, Maliki got his way;
58 Sarah Childress, “Zalmay Khalilzad: Maliki and the ‘Unmaking of Iraq’,” Frontline, July 29,
2014.
59 Ali Khedery, “Why We Stuck.”
60 Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics.”
61 David Romano, “Iraq’s Descent into Civil War: A Constitutional Explanation,” Middle East
Journal 68, no. 4 (Autumn 2014), doi:10.3751/68.4.13; and Mason, “Ending the War.”
62 Sky, “Iraq.”
63 Sky, Unraveling, 253.
64 Khedery, “Iraq in Pieces.”
65 Sarah Childress, “Zalmay Khalilzad: Maliki and the ‘Unmaking of Iraq’,” Frontline, July 29,
2014; and Emma Sky, “How Obama Abandoned Democracy in Iraq,” Politico, April 7, 2015.
66 Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Fall and Rise and Fall of Iraq,” Brookings Institution, July 30,
2013.
67 Childress, “Zalmay Khalilzad.”
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a parliamentary coalition formed, reinstated Maliki as prime minister,
and relegated Allawi to be the leader of a strategic council that never
materialized.68 A security dilemma consequently developed from Maliki’s
likely fear of instability among opposing sectarian groups and interest
in protecting his authority in contrast to other sects’ growing alienation
from and escalating anger with the election outcome.69 Iran’s active
role of payment and persuasion—including the head of the Quds Force
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continuously summoning
Iraqis to Iran—during the Iraqi election shifted additional power to
a pan-Shia coalition baking Maliki.70 Moreover, Obama’s promise to
end Bush’s “dumb war” and the global economic downturn decreased
US interest in the region. Thus, Iran’s influence over Iraqi elections
increased, contributing to Maliki’s reversion to sectarian practices.71
Rafi al-Issawi, then-deputy prime minister of Iraq commented, “If
the [United States] acknowledged that Iraqiya won the elections . . .
the others would not have challenged it.”72 Instead, US mismanagement
negatively impacted Iraqi institutions and pushed the nation toward
instability. Maliki began to influence independent governmental
institutions, including the judiciary, government oversight bureaus, and
the election committee.73 Iraq’s national security forces became almost
entirely Shia, another sign of Sunni disenfranchisement.74 Paralyzed
by sectarian disagreement, the government still struggled to provide
basic services equitably. Furthermore, Maliki ordered the arrest of Vice
President Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, illustrating secular tension at the
highest levels of Iraqi government.75
A combination of the faulty foundations laid during the surge, the
problems leading up to and surrounding the 2010 national election,
and US apathy toward continued stability contributed to the violence
rising to new highs.76 Sunnis were detained without trial and pushed
outside of political processes; peaceful protests against discrimination
faced violent retaliation.77 Indeed, even during the 2010 political crisis,
Khedery returned to Iraq and expressed he “was shocked that much
of the surge’s success had been squandered by Maliki and other Iraqi
leaders.”78 Khedery later noted the Islamic State grew from the defeat
of democratic principles during the 2010 election and the resultant
Sunni radicalization.79 Iraqis did not simply fail to manage their own
government: America failed to reduce sectarian tension during the surge
and to protect democratic principles.
68 Mason, “Ending the War.”
69 Pollack, “Fall and Rise”; and James F. Jeffrey, “How Maliki Broke Iraq,” The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, August 13, 2014.
70 Sky, Unraveling, 329; and Sky, “How Obama.”
71 Khedery, “Why We Stuck.”
72 Sky, Unraveling, 330.
73 Pollack, “Fall and Rise.”
74 Ali Khedery, “Iraq’s Last Chance,” New York Times, August 17, 2014.
75 Mason, “Ending the War.”
76 Khedery, “Iraq in Pieces.”
77 Sky, “How Obama.”
78 Khedery, “Why We Stuck.”
79 Khedery, “Iraq’s Last Chance”; Fanar Haddad “Shia-Centric State Building and Sunni
Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 7, 2016; Pollack,
“Fall and Rise”; and Colin H. Kahl, “No, Obama Didn’t Lose Iraq,” Politico, June 15, 2014.
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The Status of Forces Agreement, Troop Withdrawal, and the Rise of IS

The SOFA signed in 2008 established the legal presence of US
troops in Iraq through December 31, 2011.80 Military leaders argued
Obama should negotiate for the presence of 20,000 US troops in Iraq
past 2011; however, the proposed presence dwindled to 8,000 troops;
then 5,000—a size Obama believed would be sufficient to continue
intelligence collection, counterterrorism, training missions, and
checkpoint management.81 There was a caveat: the SOFA granting
troops in Iraq immunity from local prosecution must be renewed.
Maliki would have to sign an executive memorandum of understanding
endorsing immunity, but it had to be approved by parliament. Since US
presence was wildly unpopular among Iraqis, and parliamentarians were
influenced by then-Iran-backed Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, the SOFA
extension was impossible.82 Thus, Obama withdrew US forces from Iraq
at the end of 2011.
Many politicians, military personnel, and journalists argue a residual
troop force in Iraq beyond 2011 would have given the surge more time
to work and subsequently prevented, or at least substantially mitigated,
the rise of the Islamic State.83 The accompanying reduction of US
embassy staff and infrequent communication with the Iraqi government
compounded the destabilizing factors increasing sectarian violence.84
John McCain reiterated this stance in 2014, “General Petraeus had the
confl ict won thanks to the surge and if we had left the residual force
behind . . . we would not be facing the crisis we are today . . . we are
paying a very heavy price.” McCain and others point to nations in which
the United States left troops behind for extended amounts of time, such
as South Korea and Germany, as evidence that Iraq would be a far more
stable country today if we had acted similarly.85
While compelling, this logic does not account for the trend of
sectarian confl ict leading up to troop withdrawal. As the Maliki regime
oppressed Sunnis, former US tribal allies began to view “the Islamic
State as the lesser of two evils when compared with Maliki.”86 Indeed,
sectarian confl ict reemerged while US troops were present, suggesting
that extending US presence would not have substantially impacted the
rise of the Islamic State. Moreover, successful postconfl ict American
presence has historically focused on improving an existing state rather
than laying foundations for a new one. Thus, comparisons between Iraq
and nations with established governments, such as Germany, are poor.87
The counterfactual scenario of Iraq with US troop presence past
2011 casts additional doubt upon the optimists’ hypothesis. While it is
probable extending the presence of US counterterrorism advisers and
80 Tony Karon, “Iraq’s Government, Not Obama, Called Time on the U.S. Troop Presence,”
Time, October 21, 2011.
81 Brennan, “Withdrawal Symptoms.”
82 Kahl, “Obama Didn’t Lose”; and Karon, “Iraq’s Government.”
83 See, for example: Childress, “Zalmay Khalilzad”; and Mary Habeck et al., “A Global Strategy
for Combating al Qaeda and the Islamic State,” American Enterprise Institute, December 7, 2015.
84 Crane, Cassandra in Oz,, 214.
85 McCain, “McCain.”
86 Sky, Unraveling, 360.
87 Jason Brownlee, “Was Obama Wrong to Withdraw Troops from Iraq?,” Monkey Cage,
Washington Post, June 26, 2014.
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military trainers could have increased pressure on Iraqi terror networks,
“the idea that such a force would have completely stopped the jihadists
is a fantasy.”88 If 175,000 troops in Iraq during the surge could not
ameliorate the sectarian tension propelling the Islamic State into power,
a lesser or noncombat force could not sufficiently reconcile sectarian and
political tension to prevent IS success.89
Although Iraq was not sufficiently stable by 2011 to validate the claim
that the surge was not given enough time to work, troop withdrawal
could plausibly be a major source of Iraq’s return to instability.90 Strong
or conclusive evidence linking troop presence and stability in Iraq from
the end of the surge to troop withdrawal or proof of the effectiveness
of a residual force was not encountered. Such information would be a
compelling reason to consider the surge optimist perspective.

Lessons for Future Conflicts

By recognizing practices that amplified sectarian tension during the
surge, military and government leaders can more effectively manage
future confl icts. Paying tribes to fight alongside coalition forces yielded
short-term benefits that caused long-term problems. When the surge—
and the cash payments—stopped, dissension reemerged.91 Ignorance
of local culture as well as insufficient consultation and ineffective
communication with the populace prevented authentic coalitions from
forming.92 Inattention to the incompatible goals of various ethnosectarian
populations perpetuated confl ict.93 Tolerating a national government
that perpetuates societal divisions and sectarian discrimination prevents
the long-term reconciliation necessary for a stable state.94
The following strategies conversely reduce sectarian tension.
Military intervention must be coupled with efforts to increase
official oversight, agency funding, and interagency communication.95
Collaboration between US personnel and the nascent state’s leaders
must lead to strong governmental institutions that adequately reconcile
sectarian divides.96 Host country personnel interactions with civilian
and military trainers must occur across all levels of government to
ensure adequate representation of the country’s citizens, including in its

88 Kahl, “Obama Didn’t Lose.”
89 James Franklin Jeffrey, “Behind the U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, November
2, 2014; Abby Phillip, “Obama Keeps Iraq Promise—Will Anyone Notice?,” Politico, August 30,
2010; Brian Montopoli, “Obama Announces End of Iraq War, Troops to Return Home by Year
End,” CBS News, October 21, 2011; and Doug Mataconis, “Panetta: At Least Some Non-Combat
Troops Will Remain in Iraq After 2011,” Outside the Beltway, August 20, 2011.
90 See, for example, McCain and Graham, “The Anti-Surge”; Cheney and Cheney, “Collapsing
Obama Doctrine”; Brennan, “Withdrawal Symptoms”; Boek, Combining Exit with Strategy; and
McCain, “McCain.”
91 Kingsbury, “2007 Surge in Iraq.”
92 Ibid.; and Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”
93 Kaplan, Insurgents, 284; and Simon, “The Price of the Surge.”
94 Daalder, “Iraq After the Surge”; Kaplan, Insurgents, 210.
95 Virginia Byers, “Sharing the Load: Evaluating Two Civilian and Military Interagency Missions,”
Small Wars Journal, January 28, 2014; Richard Byess, “Civilian-Military Cooperation: What’s Next?,”
in Frontiers in Development (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 2012); and
R. Jeffrey Smith, “The Failed Reconstruction of Iraq,” Atlantic, March 15, 2013.
96 Cosentino, “Interagency Process”; and Gordon and Trainor, Endgame, 511–12.

AFTER 15 YEARS OF CONFLICT

Blatt

55

military forces.97 Cultural competency training for US troops must be
completed prior to their participation in interventions.98 These changes
will position American leaders to generate more positive outcomes in
future interventions.
To be clear, this article does not challenge the idea that
counterinsurgency requires substantial manpower, nor does it assert the
absence of positive lessons from the surge. To the contrary, the surge’s
influx of troops living among the people to provide security demonstrated
remarkable operational success.99 But, the operational success could not
be translated into strategic success because corresponding intergroup
reconciliation and institution-building did not occur.
Future efforts should focus on aligning military interventions
with intergroup reconciliation efforts. Research should explore how
US personnel can effectively facilitate intergroup negotiations and
productive dialogue in host countries. Divergent expectations for postsurge interactions should be addressed to bolster intersectarian efforts
to sustain security.100 Finally, strategies to encourage local participation
in military interventions that do not rely on cash payments should be
developed and assessed to prevent similar destabilization.101 The lessons
from the surge provide a powerful starting point for understanding
military, government, and sectarian interactions.

97 Pollack, “Civil Defense”; al-Qarawee, “Iraq’s Sectarian Crisis”; and Kenneth Pollack, A Switch
In Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq, Analysis Paper 7 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
2006), 43.
98 Allison Abbe and Stanley M. Halpin, “The Cultural Imperative for Professional Military
Education and Leader Development,” Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–10); and Paula Caligiuri et
al., Training, Developing, and Assessing Cross-Cultural Competence in Military Personnel, Technical Report
1284 (Arlington, VA: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,
2011), 53–55.
99 Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did
Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?,” International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012), doi:10.1162
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ABSTRACT: Drawing from previous debates on the topic of
state- and nation-building in this journal, this article offers a baseline understanding of the theories of democratization. It then
provides a convenient visualization of the political transition from
an autocratic or failed state to democracy. This visualization should
be useful to practitioners and policymakers engaged in strategically
expanding democracy.

T

he officially stated goal in Iraq was, and the ultimate political
objective of many recent US ground military operations has
been, promoting democracy.1 In two recent Parameters articles on
nation-building, it became clear that a general disagreement exists over
whether postconflict rebuilding can realistically entail creating a “successful democracy.”2 Obviously, understanding what it takes to promote
democracy “can precondition the Army’s ability not only to fight effectively but also to secure the political objectives of war.”3 If the ultimate
end state includes the successful transition from military authority to
democratic civilian authority, then it is incumbent upon military commanders to set conditions for the success of the nascent democracy.
To do this, commanders and planners need a basic understanding of
democratization even though guidance for military leaders on how to
promote democracy is lacking.
Broadly speaking, there are two methods to promote democracy.4
The political approach concentrates on building institutions that support
democracy by transition from autocracy to democracy. Alternatively, the
developmental approach concentrates on setting conditions for a stable
democracy to develop over time. Success requires both. Even though
applying only the political approach leaves out key social aspects of
democratization, most doctrinal literature concentrates on the political
approach and neglects the developmental approach, making the task
look far easier than it really is.
This article explores what the developmental approach can provide
strategists and planners and offers a rudimentary, but quantifiable,
1 Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of
U.S. Foreign Policy?, Report RL34296 (Washington, DC: US Congressional Research Service, 2007);
and Thomas Carothers, Democracy Promotion under Obama: Finding a Way Forward, Policy Brief 77
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).
2 M. Chris Mason, “Nation-Building is an Oxymoron,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 68.
See also Charles J. Sullivan, “State-Building: America’s Foreign Policy Challenge,” Parameters 46, no.
1 (Spring 2016).
3 Joseph Roger Clark, “To Win Wars, Correct the Army’s Political Blind Spot,” Parameters 45, no.
4 (Winter 2015–16): 37.
4 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?,” Journal of Democracy
20, no. 1 (2009): 5–19.
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understanding of the efforts necessary to transition and consolidate from
an unstable state to a viable democracy. This discourse does not explore
the academic nature of democracy but distills an extremely complex
sociopolitical event down to its essence—the fewest possible variables
that still yield a demonstrable relationship—to provide a simple way to
conceptualize and visualize the transition to democracy. While discussing
other metrics, this analysis focuses on theories of democratization, the
process of democratization, a functional definition of democracy, and
the most salient democratization data points. An introduction on using
key metrics to estimate timelines relevant to defense policy is also provided. The article concludes with some thoughts on factors to consider
when discussing democratization with civilian leaders and policymakers.

Theories of Democratic Transitions

The causes of a society’s transition from an autocratic to democratic
government are not fully understood. Over the years, researchers have
proposed multiple theories that are generally placed into one of four categories: social structural evolution, where both the elite and the general
populations simply witness the inevitable transformation of civilization;
top down, driven by the elites; bottom up, forced by the general populace; or a hybrid combination of the three.
The structural approach, commonly referred to as modernization
theory, recognizes a societal correlation between democracy and certain
structural factors that usually include average income, average education, availability of media sources, and levels of industrialization and
urbanization.5 Namely, increases in income, education, and urbanization
associated with industrialization create conditions favorable for democracy. With these changes, the population adopts “equalitarian” value
systems. Because “groups will regard a political system as legitimate or
illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their
primary values,” as a society’s values shift, so does its political system.6
Top-down approaches that apply strategic bargaining theories
of democratization deal primarily with the period of transition from
autocracy to democracy. Elites drive the process, forcing democracy
upon the general population, which has no influence on events. The
approach gives no consideration as to why, but only how, democratization occurs. The theory concentrates on the political elites and breaks
down the transition into phases. During the preparatory phase, a new
elite is born out of the leaderless masses. In the decision phase, the new
political and economic elites challenge the existing power structure.
Eventually, the current autocrat and the new challengers strike a deal
to allow elections. Autocrats only take this distasteful option when they
see they have little choice. Rather than totally lose power, they engage
in a power-sharing arrangement. In the habituation phase, elements of
democracy become more ingrained into society’s structures; democracy

5 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (March 1959): 69–105,
doi:10.2307/1951731.
6 Ibid., 105, 86–87.
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triumphs.7 This theory treats democracy as “a matter primarily of
procedure rather than of substance.”8
The idea that social forces from within a society drive democratic
transitions contrasts with the elites-only approach. In this bottom-up
notion, economic progress acting over an extended period creates a
diverse social structure where the autocrats and their vassals become
dependent upon the middle class for everything from specialized goods
to economic support. Eventually, the middle class demands more of
the privileges once restricted to the ruling elites, including influence in
political decision-making.9 Commonly associated with this approach to
democratization is the idea that the existence of democracy depends on
an economic middle class.10
Today, almost no theory is purely structural, elite driven, or population driven, which leads to the hybrid approach. Most of these methods
consider how structural factors affect populations to cause change;
for example, some hybrid theories examine the political economy to
understand how short-term economic conditions change the bargaining
powers of various political actors.11 Others explore how economic security causes a society to change its value structure from one less supportive
of democratic systems to one that supports prodemocratic change.12

Process of Democratic Transition

While theories on why countries transition from autocracy to
democracy are still widely debated, most experts recognize the process
of democratization includes the three phases of liberalization, transition,
and consolidation. Liberalization is “the process of making effective
certain rights that protect both the individual and social groups from
arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties.”13
Liberalization is easy to overlook because it often occurs as part of a
slow, indistinct process of social change.14 While some theories fail to
separate transition from the liberalization phase, other models recognize the process of legally formalizing the rights demanded during the
liberalization phase as a central component of democratization.
The second phase, transition, occurs as political leaders write
constitutions and create the political instruments necessary to run a
democracy. Even though many people consider this portion complete
7 Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics
2, no. 3 (April 1970): 337–63, doi:10.2307/421307.
8 Ibid., 345.
9 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of
the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
10 Ibid., 418.
11 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
12 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The
Human Development Sequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
13 Carston Q. Schneider and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation:
Measuring the Components of Democratization,” in Twenty Years of Studying Democratization, vol. 1 of
Democratic Transitions and Consolidations, ed. Aurel Croissant and Jeffrey Haynes (London: Routledge,
2014), 45.
14 See Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation,” 64–65 for
examples of lengthy liberalization such as Poland, which began in the 1980s and completed in 1998,
as well as many North African countries, which have yet to complete liberalization even though it
began much earlier.
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after the first free and fair election, it may take several years to replace
all the autocratic organs of government with democratic ones. The
final phase, consolidation, starts at the end of the transition phase and
continues until the country’s fall back into autocracy appears unlikely.
Successful consolidation can take decades. Most stabilization operations
occur during transition and consolidation phases.

Definition of Democracy

Before moving to specific metrics, we must define democracy. Many
doctrinal guides already provide lines of effort associated with stabilizing a host nation’s government; however, neither Joint Publication 3-07
nor Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-07 defines democracy.15
For such a definition to be useful, it should be in terms of the host nation
government and nested into the concept of legitimacy as “a condition
based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legal or moral
rightness of a set of actions, and the propriety as well as authority of
the individuals or organizations in taking them” already used in the
doctrine.16 This definition derives from Max Weber’s basic concept of
legitimacy as the “right to rule.”17 The perception of the right to rule is
founded in the population’s belief that the government has the legal and
moral authority, the legitimacy, to govern. But, what about the legitimacy of the method or type of government?
A difference that may be best distinguished by how people refer to
the government, democracy is a type of governmental system and not a
specific government. Governments, for example, include the “Bashar alAssad regime” or “Bush administration” while phrases such as “Syria is
a monarchy” or “the United States is a democracy” reflect governmental
systems. The legitimacy of a specific government, however, is tied to the
rulers: how did the authorities gain their positions and do they rule in
accordance with the values of the society? If the ultimate power of the
government is God or holy scriptures, the government is a theocracy. If
authority is tied to an ethnic group or ethnic identity, the system is an
ethnocracy, many of which are monarchies.
The legitimacy of a democracy is based on the idea that each citizen
has rights equal to other citizens regardless of social position, race, tribal
or ethnic affi liation, or religious beliefs. Therefore, a practical definition
of democracy is “a type of government whose source of legitimacy is a
grant of authority given to the government by the individual citizens
acting as individuals.”
As the population begins to recognize individual rights during liberalization, democracy takes firmer root. For it to survive, a population
that is at least partially liberalized must be willing to embrace individual
human rights and liberties over traditional parochial values that favor
in-group members in political and economic matters. Recognizing individual citizens as having equal political rights is essential to creating the
conditions for a stable democratic state.
15 US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Stability, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2016);
and Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Stability, Army Doctrinal Reference
Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012).
16 JCS, JP 3-07, I-15.
17 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and
Claus Wittich, trans. Ephraim Fischoff et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
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Identity and Factionalism

This definition of democracy does not imply one must give up one’s
identity as a Scotsman or a Catholic to be part of a democracy but implicitly recognizes that all people have multiple identities within society.
These include personal identities, or the person’s individual self-concept;
role identity, or the identity tied to a social position; and social identity,
or the identity that ties them to various social groups.18 A person’s role
identity as a citizen is key to the idea of a political system’s legitimacy.
When the social identity of ethnic or religious group members dictates
their actions as citizens, then democracy becomes difficult if not impossible. In cases where social identity dictates personal and role identity
behaviors, factionalism can result.
Factionalism occurs when ethnic or other parochial groups, which
regularly compete for political influence, promote agendas that favor their
group members over common, secular, or crosscutting agendas thereby
dominating economic and political competition.19 Many scholars recognize this “winner-take-all approach to politics is often accompanied by
confrontational mass mobilization, as occurred in Venezuela in the early
2000s and Thailand prior to the 2006 military coup, and by the intimidation or manipulation of electoral competition.”20 In an unconsolidated
democracy, factionalism increases the odds of instability and failure. In
regions like Africa, with strong tribal identities and colonial boundaries
drawn without consideration for historical tribal territories, factionalism
is particularly problematic. In fact, a recent study on forecasting political
instability found that “every African country that mixed partial democracy with
factionalism suffered instability” [italics in the original].21

Metrics of Democratic Transition

Metrics commonly used when discussing democratization
measure either the potential for democratization or the indicators of
successful democratization.

Potential for Democratization

At the national level, policymakers suggest many factors are critical
to democratic transitions; however, the positive factors of economics,
education, and cultural values, as well as the negative factor of fractionalization continue to top the list. Perhaps the most consistent factor
in democratic liberalization has been the economic condition of the
population. Identified early on by the gross domestic product or gross
national income per capita, economic conditions have been frequently
connected with the transition to democracy. But, economic conditions
alone, while necessary, are not a sufficient condition to initiate a transition to democracy in the population. Many countries, including Saudi
18 Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, Identity Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
19 Jack A. Goldstone et al., “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American
Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (January 2010): 190–208, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x.
20 Ibid., 196.
21 Jack Goldstone et al., “A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability,” Fund for Fallen
Allies, http://fundforfallenallies.org/sites/fundforfallenallies.org/files/library/A%20Global%20
Forecasting%20Model%20for%20Political%20Instability.pdf (accessed April 22, 2016). In an earlier
version of the paper, Africa was looked at separately.
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Arabia, have a high gross domestic product per capita yet have not even
begun the transition to democracy.
A strong correlation between the transition to democracy and the
level of education also exists. Early studies on education centered only
on literacy, but recently researchers began measuring average adult
education levels as well as the potential for children’s education. In addition to formal education, the number and availability of various sources
of information also matter. If the information we receive only validates
our belief in the superiority of an ethnic or religious group, then our
perceptions of that group’s superiority are unlikely to change. Conversely,
receiving information from multiple sources offering confl icting points
of view requires us to reconsider our restricted view of reality.
Theoretically, changes in these two factors can result in favorable changes to the values that support democracy, commonly called
“democratic values.” Based on the definition of democracy used in this
article, the key value is individuality—the belief that each human is an
individual, autonomous of the group, with equal rights and obligations.
Shifting perceptions of this value in a population positively affects
liberalization, which is the first step in a natural democratic transition.22
In contrast to these positive factors, measures of fractionalization
do not indicate the potential for a successful democratic transition but
rather the potential for failure. Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization,
known as ELF, calculates the probability that two randomly chosen
people in a given country would be from different ethnic groups and is
available for 129 countries.23 Other social and political sciences measure
factionalism in the context of ethnic groups becoming politically active
in a divisive manner or Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups, known as
PREG. Although this measure is a better metric for indicating threats
to democratic potential, and it identifies situations in which fractionalization becomes politically divisive, the data are only available for a
limited number of countries.24 Fractionalization not only creates an
“us versus them” mentality that runs counter to democratic values
but has also been shown to slow economic growth critical to effective
democratic consolidation.25

Indicators of Successful Democratization

The indicators of successful democratization generally identify
government and social institution outcomes paralleling the phases of
democratic transition—liberalization, transition, and consolidation.
Leaders can determine the status of liberalization by asking several
questions about the current regime or the one immediately preceding
the military intervention:

22 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy.
23 William Easterly and Ross Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (1997): 1203–50, doi:10.1162/003355300555466; and Daniel
N. Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no.
4 (October 2004): 849–63.
24 Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization.”
25 Easterly and Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy”; and Joseph Wright, “Political Competition
and Democratic Stability in New Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science 38, no. 2 (April 2008):
221–45, doi:10.1017/S0007123408000124.
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1. Has the regime made political concessions in regards to human rights
issues?
2. Does the regime have no, or almost no, political prisoners?
3. Does the regime tolerate political or social opposition groups?
4. Does more than one legally recognized political party exist?
5. Do any members of the opposing political party hold seats in the
parliament or legislature?
6. Are there trade unions or professional organizations not controlled by
state apparatuses?
7. Is there an independent press and access to nongovernmental news
sources?26
This list of questions is not exhaustive, and we should not settle
for simple yes or no answers as the answer in many cases is likely to be
“no.” An amount of gradation is preferable to give a more nuanced view;
the more positive the answer, the closer the country is to progressing
through liberalization. A hasty measure of liberalization is the Freedom
House ratings of countries as Free (liberalization complete), Partially
Free (liberalization in progress), or Not Free (liberalization not started).27

Measures of Transition

The US military invests considerable time and effort into measuring
transition, and we have a vast list of metrics frequently applied. Various
Department of Defense and Department of State entities worked
together to create the Measuring Progress in a Confl ict Environments
framework that covers all phases of the confl ict environment from
imposing stability though self-sustaining peace. Included in this system
are metrics for the three drivers of conflict and the seven indicators of
institutional performance.28

Measures of Success in Consolidating Democracy

Most of the metrics that measure successful democratic consolidation examine the nature of the government. The Polity IV dataset,
for example, uses six component measures that record key qualities of
executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political
competition to examine a governing authority.29 The most consistent
single factor in ensuring successful democratic consolidation, however,
is not one of governmental efficiency. It is a metric associated with the
potential for democratic transition: the gross domestic product per
capita. While theorists still disagree on the minimum economic requirements for successful transitions to democracy, even the most ardent
critic agrees that states are unlikely to fall back into autocracy once the

26 Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition, and Consolidation.”
27 “Freedom in the World 2015,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report
/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.WIi8k6q7pzM (accessed January 24, 2017).
28 John Agoglia, Michael Dziedzic, and Barbara Sotirin, eds., Measuring Progress in Conflict
Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010).
29 Polity IV, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2012,”
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed March 20, 2013).
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country’s gross domestic product per capita reaches about $12,800 in
2016 dollars.30

System for Gauging Eﬀort

Where the mission includes promoting democracy on any level, the
ability to estimate the amount of time required to complete that political
task is helpful. Looking only at the political approach, the task appears
relatively simple—create a constitution, hold an election, and behold
the democracy. This approach suggests success can be accomplished in
3 to 5 years; however, this focus omits the other phases of democratization. Without liberalization, the population will not likely accept the new
democracy as legitimate. Without consolidation, failure remains a risk.
US strategic planners need the capability to estimate the total time
required for democratization, not just the time required for the politicalinstitutional approach. To that end, a simple, yet demonstrably viable,
method to estimate the effort toward democratization graphs a country’s data from two readily available open-source metrics, the Human
Development Index and the World Values Survey, that correlate with the
status of consolidation. The Human Development Index moves away
from simple economic factors like gross domestic product and centers
instead on measuring improvements in human well-being—long life by
life expectancy at birth, education level by mean of years of schooling
for adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of
school entering age, and economic security by gross national income
per capita.31
The World Values Survey asks a series of questions about every
5 years to determine values most important to the societies of over
80 countries, which can be used to produce an estimate of societal
values such as communal or individualistic.32 Historically, communal
values have not supported democratic legitimacy and individualistic
values have; therefore, determinations can be made regarding the
prevalence of ethnic divisions associated with fractionalization and
factionalism.33 More specifically, Switzerland, a country with French,
German, and Italian ethnolinguistic groups, displays almost no factionalism in large part because of the society’s high level of individualistic
values. Available for more countries than the Politically Relevant Ethic
Groups metric, communal values measures can estimate the potential
for destructive factionalism.

Measurement of Democratic Attributes

Data about a nation’s government in terms of attributes associated
with democratic and autocratic regimes from the Polity IV Project can
30 Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World,
1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
31 “Human Development Index,” United Nations Development Program (UNDP), http://hdr
.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi (accessed March 20, 2012).
32 “Data & Documentation,” World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
/WVSContents.jsp (accessed February 27, 2012); and Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural
Change, and Democracy.
33 Questions link directly to whether ethnic or religious diversity is economically or politically
divisive—for example, a person’s willingness to work with, or live next to, members of another
ethnic group.
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demonstrate a country’s propensity toward democracy.34 The project
examines governing authorities using six component measures that
record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. The results combine into a
21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) correlating to the Human Development Index. Only
three categories—consolidated or full democracies (+10), more democratic than autocratic leanings (+1 through +9), and more autocratic
than democratic leanings (0 through -10)—are needed to distinguish
nondemocratic regimes from partially democratic regimes and from
completely consolidated democracies.

Dimensions

When graphing country data from the Human Development Index
(y-axis) and societal values from the World Values Survey (x-axis), an
obvious arc develops from widely scattered points in the lower left quadrant, representing countries with communal societies and low citizen
well-being, to a narrow band of points in the upper right quadrant,
depicting highly individualistic societies with high citizen well-being.
As the majority of consolidated democracies appear in the upper right
quadrant and there are no poor, uneducated democracies or autocracies
with individualistic values in the lower right quadrant, leaders can use
the graph to assess countries’ democratic attributes.
Although the previously mentioned graph would demonstrate the
relationship between a nation’s development and societal values, it would
not help determine the time and effort required to make changes that
promote democracy. Moreover, plotting 12 countries over 15 years in the
liberalization-transition period or in consolidation, illustrates democratization can take many years of effort, assuming a country achieves gross
domestic product per capita and education levels.35 In such a graph, the
progress of countries such as Mexico and India trends up and generally
to the right, even though the consolidation is not completed yet. Brazil
and Sweden steadily trend toward higher Human Development Index
and World Values Survey figures while the democratic attributes of some
countries such as the United Kingdom and Finland fluctuate along both
the Human Development Index and World Values Survey axis. Japan’s
development vacillates even though its values trend upwards.

Guidelines

Democratization can be visualized as the process of a polity going
through liberalization that sets the condition for transition. Following
transition, consolidation occurs as the population adopts the democratic
values of individualism.36 If there has been a period of liberalization,
the timeline depends on the country reaching the levels of economic
34 “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2012,” Polity IV,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed March 20, 2013).
35 Mark J. Gasiorowski and Timothy J. Power, “The Structural Determinants of Democratic
Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World,” Comparative Political Studies 31, no. 6 (December
1998): 740, doi:10.1177/0010414098031006003.
36 This is not the only model. Others have argued that liberalization is not necessary prior to
the transition to democracy. See Christopher Hobson, “Liberal Democracy and Beyond: Extending
the Sequencing Debate,” International Political Science Review 33, no. 4 (March 2012): 441–54,
doi:10.1177/0192512111432563.
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prosperity and of education needed to sustain a democracy. Specifically,
democratization requires a gross domestic product per capita of $5,000
and a literacy rate of 40 percent—a little less than half of consolidation
requirements. Though arbitrary, these numbers provide a goal for
successful liberalization and transition as well as a benchmark for
calculating the additional 5 to 10 years to complete transition and to
begin consolidation. For successful liberalization, the gross domestic
product per capita and literacy rate should nearly double. The economic
and educational aspects of democratization are normally beyond the
control of the military, so other entities should be intimately involved
in the operation.
Generally, a country that has already begun the process of liberalization, has an educated citizenry, and has the potential for a robust,
distributed economy can consolidate into a self-sustaining democracy in
roughly 15 years. Post-World War II (WW II) Germany with its history
of a republican government and educated population, would be such a
case. Germany’s experience with the Weimar Republic (1919–33) was
generally positive, and the republic might have succeeded had the 1929
Great Depression not occurred. Still, the experience with democracy and
its failings set the stage for West Germany’s postwar democratization.37
In contrast, many of the postcolonial countries that transitioned to
democracy after WW II returned to autocracy within 20 years.38 These
counties were generally poor, uneducated, and had no prior experience
with democracy. In the middle of these two extremes are countries like
Iraq, which have a relatively educated population and potentially favorable economic conditions but have not begun liberalization and have no
experience with democratic governments or democratic ideals. Democratization in Iraq could easily take decades to complete, and factionalism
will have to be addressed to complete a successful consolidation.39
A general review of democratization efforts provides some general
guidelines to estimate the required length of involvement. Assuming
regime collapse, 2 years of military governance followed by 3 years of
transition to civil authority and rebuilding the basic civil infrastructure
is safe to assume. If all of the conditions are favorable, a democratic transition could be conducted and be safely on its way to consolidation in an
additional 5 to 10 years. If liberalization has not started but the country
has prior experience with democracy or competitive government, then
10 years can be added to the transition period. If liberalization has not
started and the country has no experience with democracy or competitive political systems, then 20 years of effort must be added to the task.40
If the country has the potential for factionalism, then transition toward
democracy probably cannot proceed until leaders address the underlying
problems. These are, of course, very rough estimates and every country
is unique. Further, if there is little hope of reaching the necessary economic and educational levels, other options should be considered.
37 Michael Bernard, “Democratization in Germany: A Reappraisal,” Comparative Politics 33, no.
4 (July 2001).
38 Duncan Fraser, “Long Waves in Economics—Waves of Democracy,” Democratization 8, no. 4
(Winter 2001): 41–64, doi:10.1080/714000228.
39 Bruce E. Moon, “Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq,” International Security
33, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 115–48.
40 Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition, and Consolidation.”
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Implications for Defense Policy

From the onset of planning, strategists must consider the political
end state. Before the first shots are fired, consideration must already have
been given to setting the conditions for the postconfl ict environment,
which requires assessing the target country’s preconfl ict sociopolitical
status. A society that previously existed under the thumb of a dictator
is not likely able to administer a protodemocratic government on its
own; therefore, leaders should establish control in areas behind the division rear and remain in charge of the entire territory upon achieving
military victory.
Furthermore, the occupying force must identify and co-opt spoilers
to the democratic process as well as identify potential partners in democratization. Having a military government not only allows those things
to happen but also ensures that whatever infrastructure survives the
battle remains intact and impedes humanitarian crisis. The last manual
published by the US Army dealing with a full-scale military government
was printed in 1947; still, the security and stability provided by such
an involvement will be indispensable in setting the conditions for the
later transition.41
The breadth and depth of the commitment must also be considered and weighed against other looming threats. The recently published
Priorities for 21st Century Defense states that the US Army will no longer be
sized to conduct prolonged stability operations.42 Unfortunately, to have
any hope of a successful consolidation, democratization can require
decades of military security assistance after the transitional authority
takes command from a military government. Further, real democratization requires a significant security presence—at a minimum three
soldiers for every 1,000 residents are required for initial security duties.43
Until the country’s police and military forces can ensure security,
outside help will be required. For those units assigned this mission, there
will be no returning to forward operating bases at nightfall; properly
trained troops must be out, in force, with the people. This kind of effort
will certainly strain the capabilities of a downsized military and limit our
ability to respond to multiple threats.
Policymakers must consider whether democratization is realistically
achievable or if factionalism should be addressed first. Will the nation’s
natural environment limit the country’s ability to reach the requisite
economic levels required to both create a middle class and pay for
the mass education required to complete democratic consolidation?
What options are available to achieve the minimum economic and
educational requirements?
Partial democracies tend to be the most volatile form of government, and poor multiethnic tribal countries tend not to blossom into

41 US Departments of the Army and Navy, United States Army and Navy Manual of Civil Affairs
Military Government (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947).
42 US Department of Defense (DoD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense (Washington, DC: DoD, 2012).
43 Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirement in Counterinsurgency,”
Parameters 39, no. 1 (Winter 2009–10): 45–57.
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democracies on their own.44 Leaving the job half done may create greater
problems in the future. When present, factionalism may require more
creative options such as closely controlled partitioning, a lesson learned
from efforts in the former Yugoslavia.45
To see this approach in practice, a quick analysis of Afghanistan
and Iraq will serve as a simplified and limited example. Beginning with
the baseline human developmental index, which includes economic and
educational data, the examination will then determine liberalization,
and end by assessing other factors.
In 2015, Afghanistan had a human development index of 0.465 with
a gross national income per capita of $1,885.30.46 If placed on the x-axis
of the previously mentioned graph, Afghanistan would be graphed to
the left of the Human Development Index benchmark of 0.700 that
represents the value in which liberalization becomes possible. As to be
expected, Freedom House rates Afghanistan as Not Free, indicating that
liberalization has not begun.47 Based on this cursory review, the primary
focus in Afghanistan should be on economic growth. Planners can also
see that several decades could easily be required to build the economic
infrastructure before political liberties and individual civil rights will
likely become a priority to the general population.
Better than Afghanistan in some ways and worse in others, Iraq has
a 0.654 human development index, which would be graphed closer to
the 0.700 baseline, and a gross national income per capita of $14,003.20,
which is a much better economic condition.48 Liberalization, however,
has not started in earnest. Freedom House also rates Iraq as Not Free.49
While both Afghanistan and Iraq are fractionalized, Iraq has one
additional problem: its ethnic and religious factions are well developed
and have been vying for political power for years. This infighting will
likely produce internal instability that will keep liberalization from
taking root. Iraq may not be able to make further progress until a solution to the fractionalization is found.
Based on this extremely cursory analysis and a population of 33.4
million people, Afghanistan would require an initial total commitment of
approximately 100,000 security personnel for a period ranging between
25 and 40 years. This estimate assumes inclusive economic institutions
could create a fivefold increase in the average Afghan’s income within
the first 15 years of the effort.50 With a population of 37.6 million in
Iraq and a better economic situation, that nation’s timeframe would be
44 David L. Epstien et al., “Democratic Transitions,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3
(July 2006): 551–69, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00201.x.
45 For a discussion on partitioning, see Carter Johnson, “Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty,
Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): doi:10.1162
/isec.2008.32.4.140; and Jaroslav Tir, “Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for LongTerm Success of Partitions,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005): doi:10.1177/0022343305056228.
46 “Afghanistan: Human Development Indicators,” UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries
/profiles/AFG (accessed January 24, 2017).
47 “Freedom in the World 2015: Afghanistan,” Freedom House.
48 “Iraq: Human Development Indicators,” UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles
/IRQ (accessed January 24, 2017).
49 “Freedom in the World 2015: Iraq,” Freedom House.
50 For an explanation of inclusive economic institutions, see Daron Acemoglu and James A.
Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Publishing,
2012).
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reduced, but still, require a security force of 112,000 personnel for 20
years until liberalization could take hold and democratic institutions
become self-sustaining. In both cases, the security force size would need
to be adjusted up or down as conditions on the ground dictate.51
This overview of the developmental aspects of promoting
democracy and stability provides planners with a quantifiable frame
of reference to help them set the conditions for political victory when
the victory includes democratization. The information presented here
can be used to help explain to commanders and civilian leadership why
democratization can take so long as well as what aspects of development
might be most important, helping bridge the gap between military and
political victory.
Armed with this understanding of democratization, military leaders
can provide better advice to the civilian administration as to what
is achievable—creating a stable democracy—as well as requirements of
time, troops, and treasure commitments. As one commentator put it,
“success in Germany and Japan, moreover, was achieved by policies that
focused on sweeping economic, political, and educational reforms that
affected the entire population for several decades.”52 The information
presented here will help planners and commanders understand why
such reforms are necessary and appreciate the level of time and effort
involved in creating a self-sustaining democracy. Thus, commanders
and planners can set conditions for political victory lest military
victories become hollow ones.

51 See Goode, “Force Requirement in Counterinsurgency.”
52 Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building,”
Washington Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2000): 95, doi:10.1162/016366000560764.
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epartment of Defense (DoD) contract employees have become
a vital part of the force. Soon after Overseas Contingency
Operations began in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report observed “limits
on the number of military personnel allowed in an area, called ‘force
caps,’ led DoD to use contractors to provide support to its deployed
forces.”1 Many of these contractors play a “critical role in supporting
US troops.”2 Most third-country and even US contract employees are
generally systems contractors who provide basic life and information
technology support; however, many US contractors provide direct and
indirect command support such as advising and security.3
According to the Congressional Research Service, 28,189 of 45,592
Defense Department contractors working for US Central Command in
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016 were in Afghanistan and Iraq.4 Few
know more than 3,000 contractors were killed and another 1,000 were
wounded in these countries’ wars; American contractors account for
approximately 32 percent of these casualties.5 There were even periods
during these long wars in which more US contractors than US military
personnel were killed. In 2014, for example, “private contractors
accounted for 64 percent of all U.S. deaths in Afghanistan (56 service
members and 101 contractors died).”6 Given that contract personnel
represent approximately 72 percent, nearly two-thirds, of the DoD

1 US General Accounting Office (GAO), Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services
to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003), 8.
2 Heidi M. Peters, Moshe Schwartz, and Lawrence Kapp, Department of Defense Contractor and
Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007–2017 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
2017), 1.
3 Gordon L. Campbell, “Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to
Enter Harm’s Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon Them” (conference paper, Joint Services
Conference on Professional Ethics 2000, Springfield, VA, January 27–28, 2000).
4 Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, Contractor and Troop Levels, 2.
5 “Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs: Defense Base Act Case Summary by
Employer,” US Department of Labor, March 31, 2017, https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc
/dbaallemployer.htm; “Contractor Casualty Statistics,” Feral Jundi, February 9, 2017,
http://feraljundi.com/contractor-casualty-statistics/; and Micah Zenko, “The New Unknown
Soldiers of Afghanistan and Iraq,” Foreign Policy, May 29, 2015, http://foreignpolicy
.com/2015/05/29/the-new-unknown-soldiers-of-afghanistan-and-iraq/.
6 Zenko, “New Unknown Soldiers.”
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manpower in Afghanistan, clear legal protections for these Americans
while in theater would seem only reasonable.7
Under the US-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)
signed in 2014, US contactors working in Afghanistan became subject
to Afghan law. Since the agreement was fully implemented in January
2016, companies and individual workers must navigate complex and
onerous procedures that are often arbitrarily interpreted and inconsistently enforced. This quandary often leaves many American contract
personnel in untenable situations in which they may be subjected to
fines, deportation, or even arrest by Afghan authorities. Contractors
frequently face the dilemma of illicitly bribing Afghan officials or going
without documents required by the BSA and Afghan law. To compound
these problems, US government officials often view contractors with
suspicion and even contempt, and are reticent to defend the contractors’
cause with the Afghan government. These obstacles degrade the
contractors’ ability to support the mission for which they were hired
fully and efficiently.
Therefore, the American position regarding its contractors in
Afghanistan needs to be reevaluated. Specifically, the United States
should consider renegotiating the current BSA with Afghanistan and
any forthcoming status of forces agreements (SOFAs) for ongoing
operations to ensure legal protections for this group of Americans.
Despite the dangers and sacrifices, contractor employees often feel
marginalized and undervalued by both military and civilian government
personnel, who may think of them as greedy, corrupt, and operating
outside the law.8 This negative perception is not imaginary. Despite the
prevalence of contractors with previous military service, professional
competition between the military and the contractor communities
is fierce.9 Scholars claim to be alarmed by the level of integration of
contractors into military activities, and the bulk of the literature begins
by assuming contractor motives are less than noble.
The pejoratively titled Patriots for Profit, by Naval Post Graduate
School scholar Thomas C. Bruneau, for example, broadly challenges
stereotypes regarding civilian-military relations; nonetheless, he
identifies dependence on contractors as a strategic weakness.10 Another
scholar holds private contractor firms operate opaquely, carrying “the
stench of corruption” and eroding “trust in the motives behind [their]
efforts.”11 And some legal experts are even ready to cede US sovereignty
7 For more on the ratio of 28,626 contractors to 9,800 military personnel, see Micah
Zenko, “Mercenaries Are the Silent Majority of Obama’s Military” Foreign Policy, May 18, 2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/18/private-contractors-are-the-silent-majority-merenaries
-iraq-afghanistan/. For more on the estimated 750,000 private-sector contractors providing services
to the Defense Department, see Robert F. Hale, Business Reform in the Department of Defense: An Agenda
for the Next Administration (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2016), note 18.
8 For more on the common misuse of “mercenaries,” the similarities between them and private
military contractors, and the legal perspective, see J. Ryan Cutchin, Privately Contracted Military Firms
in the Twenty-First Century: Reclassifying, Redefining, and Reforming the Way We Fight (thesis, Naval Post
Graduate School, June 2012), 75–76. For more perspective on contractors’ sense of being marginalized, see Zenko, “New Unknown Soldiers.”
9 Scott L. Efflandt, “Military Professionalism & Private Military Contractors,” Parameters 44,
no. 2 (Summer 2014): 53.
10 Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
11 Cutchin, Privately Contracted, 3.
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over American contractors as they look to international law for ways to
“mitigate concerns,” “control private military actors,” and “encourage
their compliance to [international] public norms.”12
While there may be empirical evidence that some contractors may
not be motivated to serve solely out of a sense of patriotic duty, these
American citizens nonetheless deserve legal protections and considerations afforded to other US civilians similarly serving overseas.13
Although contractors, specifically those performing security duties, may
have had too much latitude during the height of combat operations and
expeditionary capacity building in Iraq and Afghanistan (circa 2002–08),
the opposite is true today.

The Need for Status of Forces Agreements

On September 30, 2014, in one of his first official acts as the newly
inaugurated president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani agreed to the
BSA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Status of
Forces Agreement.14 These types of agreements are standard treaty-like
mechanisms that establish the rights and privileges of US personnel
present in a sovereign nation to support larger security arrangements.15
According to an International Security Advisory Board report, the
United States has similar agreements with more than 100 nations.16
Among other things, SOFAs set the conditions for protecting
US interests to ensure taxpayer dollars are properly managed and US
personnel are not subjected to foreign taxes, customs fees, and other
administrative liabilities in the course of carrying out the security
arrangement. According to DoD Directive 5525.1, Status of Forces
Policy and Information, the main goal of any SOFA is “to protect, to the
maximum extent possible, the rights of United States personnel who may be
subject to criminal trial by foreign courts and imprisonment in foreign
prisons.”17 In general, SOFAs are negotiated with host nations to allow
the presence of US military forces and to ensure Defense Department
personnel—military members, government civilians, and sometimes
contractors—are given limited legal protections from host nation laws
12 Ibid., 89; and Laura A. Dickinson, “Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and
the Problem of Accountability Under International Law,” William & Mary Law Review 47, no. 1
(2005): 135–237.
13 In addition to anecdotal evidence that most US contractors have previously served in the US
military, 61.5 percent of respondents in a study on military versus corporate culture were former
military. For more on this finding and the trend to outsource positions such as “security guards,
operational planners, and participants in raids by special operation forces . . . endanger[ing] the basic
tenets of the military profession itself,” see Gary Schaub Jr. and Volker Franke, “Contractors as
Military Professionals?,” Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–10): 93, 94, 100–101.
14 On behalf of President Ghani, Afghan National Security Advisor Mohammed Haneef
Atmar cosigned the BSA with US Ambassador James B. Cunningham and the NATO SOFA with
NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative Ambassador Maurits R. Jochems.
15 For more on the distinctions between various international agreements, which are led by
the Department of State, see Barry E. Carter et al., International Law (New York: Aspen Publishing,
2003), 203; and Frederic L. Kirgis, “International Agreements and U.S. Law,” ASIL Insights 2, no.
5. Notably, “the NATO SOFA is the only SOFA that was concluded as part of a treaty.” R. Chuck
Mason, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 2011), 2.
16 International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), Report on Status of Forces Agreements
(Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2015), 1.
17 US DoD, Status of Forces Policy and Information, Directive (DoDD) 5525.1 (Washington, DC:
DoD, 2003); emphasis added.
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and international tribunals. In other words, the SOFA establishes how
jurisdiction over US personnel is exercised in the host nation.18
Under US law, the Department of State is the lead agency for all
international agreements, even when an agreement, such as the BSA,
is focused on Department of Defense activities.19 These agreements,
when executed by the United States, usually contain a clause that each
party has an inherent right to self-defense, which allows either party to
cancel the agreement at any time. After September 11, 2001, the United
States encountered new and complex expeditionary and civil-society
development missions imbued with varying United Nations Security
Council authority, which created a new era of SOFA-craft, requiring
experts focused on writing and negotiating such agreements.20

The Afghanistan Agreements

After the initial NATO invasion of Afghanistan, the Military
Technical Agreement of January 2002 (MTA) was established under
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 (2001).
The agreement covered all forces under the NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, including support personnel
working with the interim Afghan administration.21 The agreement did
not, however, apply to the non-NATO US forces covered under the
commonly referenced Diplomatic Note No. 202.22 While the MTA
specifically reserved jurisdiction for support personnel under the NATO
mission to an individual’s home country, the note covered support
personnel operating exclusively under the US mission, Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) (2001–14). Although the note did mention
support personnel, it left the level of protection for contractors and their
employees open to interpretation.
After 13 years, the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan formally
ended. On January 1, 2015, coalition and US forces simultaneously
began a new phase of involvement in Afghanistan: the NATO-led
mission, Resolute Support, to train, advise, and assist and the US ForcesAfghanistan (USFOR-A) mission; Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, to
contribute to the Resolute Support mission; and to US counterterrorism
missions. The new missions required new agreements, thus the NATO
SOFA and US-Afghanistan BSA were drafted and signed. Formal
implementation of these agreements, however, was not scheduled until
the following year, giving contractors until January 2016 to prepare for
compliance.
18 Mason, Status of Forces Agreement, 3.
19 See Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1972) issued pursuant thereto by the Department
of State and codified at 22 C.F.R. 181 (2010) reflecting Department of State Circular 175 (1955), as
amended, codified at Volume 11, Chapter 700 of the Foreign Affairs Manual (Circular 175).
20 ISAB, Status of Forces Agreements, 15.
21 See ISAF Commander-Afghan Transitional Authority, Military Technical Agreement of
January 2002, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta
.pdf (accessed February 25, 2017); and Jeremy Greenstock to President of the United Nations
Security Council, S/2002/117, January 25, 2002, which references UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1386 (2001), which reaffirms UNSCR 1378 (2001) and UNSCR 1383 (2001).
22 Karen DeYoung, “Only a Two-Page ‘Note’ Governs U.S. Military in Afghanistan,” Washington
Post, August 28, 2008; and Diplomatic Note No. 202, Agreement Regarding the Status of United States
Military and Civilian Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in Connection with
Cooperative Efforts in Response to Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Military Training and Exercises,
and Other Activities, State Department Number 03-67, 2003 WL 21754316 (Treaty), May 28, 2003.
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The development of specific implementation criteria is standard for
such agreements; for example, the 1966 agreement with South Korea,
amended in 2001, established a joint committee for consultation, and the
2002 Japan-United States Status of Forces Command Order established
a joint committee for “any matter regarding [the SOFA’s] implementation.” Likewise, an essential component of both the BSA and the SOFA
for Afghanistan was the requirement for implementation bodies to
resolve “any divergence in views or dispute regarding the interpretation
or application.” The BSA Joint Commission and the AfghanistanNATO Implementation Commission were established “to oversee
implementation” of the agreements and the auxiliary groups, which held
their first combined meeting on February 4, 2016.23 No further guidance
was provided; therefore, an additional document was required to lay
out the procedures for convening and conducting the business of the
commissions as well as establishing an Executive Steering Committee,
working groups, and a secretariat for each.
To date, the missions in Afghanistan have two separate agreements
and two distinct implementation bodies with identical leadership and
nearly identical members. The US contingent is, in fact, dual-hatted. As
the US member of the secretariat for the BSA, the author participated
in Joint Commission meetings at the same time and in the same room
as the NATO commission meetings; people addressed the same agenda
items and issues as members of both groups. The similarities and
concurrent meetings resulted in nearly identical minutes reflecting only
minor changes to indicate the two different bodies.
Melding these two implementation commissions may have been
expedient, but the arrangement inhibits addressing important issues
affecting only US contractors. The NATO SOFA focuses on nonkinetic
train, advise, and assist activities. The BSA is between the United States
and Afghanistan only and includes the counterterrorism mission which
may include more kinetic activities “when the U.S. deems it necessary.”24
This fundamental difference in mission alone warrants separation as
the more kinetic training usually requires contractors to be armed.
Moreover, issues regarding the proper and legal use of deadly force
by contract employees authorized to carry weapons while assisting
US military forces in dangerous missions will not be of interest to our
NATO partners.

The Immunity Question

A primary objective of the US and NATO missions is to assist the
Afghan government in becoming administratively functional and able
to properly exercise the powers of a sovereign nation, which includes
consular and immigration functions, taxing, business licenses, and
23 The similar bodies comply with Article 25 of the BSA and Article 23 of the “Agreement
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the
Status of NATO Forces and NATO Personnel Conducting Mutually Agreed NATO-Led Activities
in Afghanistan” (NATO SOFA) signed by the RS Commander and the Afghan Minister of Defense
on November 6, 2015.
24 Note that BSA articles 4, 5, and 6 refer to an earlier agreement, The Strategic Partnership
Agreement, which went into effect on July 4, 2012, and defers concerns regarding security and
defense to the Defense and Security Cooperation Working Group, which did not meet for the first
time until April 2016, leaving the BSA for more mundane, operational issues, such as contractor
compliance.
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determining who is permitted to carry firearms. Therefore, as the new
Afghan government began to gain more autonomy, it seemed natural
for the United States and NATO to shift jurisdiction over contractors
to the Afghan government. This decision, however, exposed contract
employees, many of whom are US citizens, to a system rife with
corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude coupled with limited avenues
for redress.25
The US policy identifies techniques for crafting agreements to
ensure the maximum protection for all US citizens. Some SOFAs include
language that, according to the International Security Advisory Board
report, “will most always include special agreements and arrangements
for both civilian DoD employees and contractors” within the scope
of their official duty.26 The SOFAs for Japan and Korea, for instance,
cover US citizens who are contractor personnel,” especially when they
“qualify as technical experts” and are involved in assistance of “key
activities” that are “closely linked to a military mission.”27 Despite these
examples and the Defense Department’s stated policy of extending
protections to all US personnel, “less than 10 percent of SOFAs directly
address government contractors.”28 Unfortunately, the US-Afghanistan
BSA falls within the 90 percent that does not offer such protections
in a country of continued armed confl ict. The BSA specifically states:
“Afghanistan maintains the right to exercise jurisdiction over United
States contractors and United States contractor employees.”29 Such an
arrangement may be feasible in nations and regions which have a culture
of rule of law and transparency, but the reality in Afghanistan demands
revisiting this provision of the BSA.
While most contractors and contract employees finish tours of duty
without incident, many personnel find BSA compliance difficult and
understand the inherently dangerous consequences established therein—
for example, the BSA allows military personnel and Defense Department
civilians to enter and exit without passports, but contractors are required
to obtain passports and visas.30 Although most contractors purchase
multiple entry visas, the Afghan government insists contractors also
acquire an entry or exit stamp every time they enter or leave Afghanistan.
Stamping is a traditional practice at most borders. But, the Afghan
government did not have the capacity to provide such services on a
regular basis from 2015 to 2016. This deficiency affected contractors
who had been permitted in the country previously with no stamp in their
passport; they now had no way to exit Afghanistan. While they waited
for the Afghan government to obtain the capability to stamp visas,
25 For the US government’s most recent assessment on the issues of ministerial capacity building and endemic governmental corruption see, Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency
Operations, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2016–December
31, 2016 (Washington, DC: US Office of the Inspector General, 2017), 4–5, 39–41, 48, 64–67.
26 ISAB, Report on Status of Forces Agreements, 20.
27 Donald P. Oulton and Alan F. Lehman, “Deployment of U.S. Military, Civilian and
Contractor Personnel to Potentially War Hazardouss Areas from a Legal Perspective,” DISAM
Journal of International Security Assistance Management 23, no. 4 (Summer 2011): 15–21, 16; and ISAB,
Report on Status of Forces Agreements, 52.
28 G. Christine Ballard and Wray E. Bradley, “Beyond Tax Treaties: Status of Forces and
USAID Agreements,” Journal of International Taxation 17, no. 4 (April 2006).
29 BSA, art. 13, para. 6.
30 BSA, art. 15, paras. 1, 2.
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contractors had to choose between traveling back to the United States or
mailing their passports for processing. Moreover, if an Afghan official
found a contractor’s passport had no stamp in it when the contractor
attempted to leave the country, there would be dire consequences—
unless the official was paid to ignore the lack of a stamp.31
In one incident, contractors spent months diligently pursuing entry
stamps in order to comply with the Afghan law, only to be told that the
stamps were not readily available. Without a separate US-focused implementation committee, there was nowhere to voice concerns formally or
to seek official assistance. When the Afghan Border Police finally did
start stamping visas, some contractors traveled days to and from the
designated ports of entry within Afghanistan to join others who were
literally lining up for the only opportunity to get their passports stamped.
There was little official information to enable efficient compliance. In
fact, despite the willingness of the US contractors to comply, at least one
group was issued a blunt statement through official US channels: report
for a stamp within 48 hours or face arrest, fines, or deportation.
As the January 1, 2016, deadline for contractor compliance with
the BSA approached, a significant number of contract employees were
unable to attain the required paperwork and permits, including those
for weapons, which put their safety at risk. In some cases, individual
employees had no one to blame but their own lack of urgency. But,
many cases of noncompliance were caused by external forces, including
political and legal pressures such as the well-documented bribery and
corruption endemic in Afghanistan.32 When contractors sought redress
with US officials, there was little institutional support for them due to
the lack of protections in the BSA.

Full Immunity Option

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to provide
jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the armed forces during war or
contingency operations.33 Today, American contractors in Afghanistan
are subject to US federal and military jurisdiction as well as Afghan law.
While the International Security Advisory Board report recommends
protections for contractors be written into agreements on a case-by-case
basis, it acknowledges there “will be instances where the United States
has a strong interest in protection for contractors.”34 Specifically, the
report mentions missions with “large scale deployments that entail a
very substantial and continuing U.S. presence,” environments where
“contractors are deeply integrated into core military operations and
mission tasks,” and tasks in which contractor involvement has a high
31 A number of contractors in Afghanistan expressed they had no choice but to pay Afghan
officials who demanded bribes even though the practice violated Afghan and US law, specifically the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
32 For more on Afghanistan’s ranking of 166 out of 168 countries ranked for corruption, see
Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/country#AFG Afghanistan.
33 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109364, § 552; and Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802, para. a(10). See US Secretary
of Defense, “UCMJ Jurisdiction Over DoD Civilian Employees, DoD Contractor Personnel, and
Other Persons Serving With or Accompanying the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War
and in Contingency Operations” (memorandum, March 10, 2008).
34 ISAB, Report on Status of Forces Agreements, 51–52.
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“risk of incidents.”35 When negotiating such agreements, the report
suggests “contractor protection is worth insisting on.”36
One solution to the dilemma with contractors is renegotiating the
BSA to include full immunity for contractors supporting US military
and diplomatic missions. American and Afghan officials have reasons
to avoid this option, not the least of which is that it amounts to an
admission of the Afghan government’s failure to oversee contractors
competently. Nonetheless, the short-term pain of the United States
reasserting full jurisdiction over contractors may pay dividends in the
long-run for both countries, as the mission would be better equipped to
train, advise, and assist the Afghan government even with reductions in
military and diplomatic personnel.
Some skeptics claim immunity for contractors and their employees
will never again be politically viable as the result of Blackwater
contractors’ actions at Nisour Square in Baghdad (2007). The shootings
left 17 Iraqi civilians dead and 20 others injured.37 While the Coalition
Provisional Authority established immunity for all coalition personnel,
including contractors, the American government chose to prosecute
several members of Blackwater through the US court system.38 After this
incident, the United States felt compelled to reconsider the large aperture
of legal and political protection created for contract employees. In 2008,
the US government agreed to lift immunity for contractors in Iraq.39
Others argue the contractors’ case in Afghanistan not only suffers
from the bitter legacy of the Blackwater contractor’s actions but also
from President Hamid Karzai’s residual distrust from America’s first
attempt at an agreement.40 This personal animosity combined with
the shifting US policy against contractor immunity shaped the current
BSA so that it lacks much needed administrative and legal protections
for contract companies and employees. These insufficient protections
affect contractors’ daily lives, especially those who are required to carry
weapons in order to do their jobs. Such contractors must apply for an
endorsement from US Forces-Afghanistan to be armed and must acquire
weapons permits issued by the Afghan government.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 The question of the legitimacy of the actions of the Blackwater employees, despite the
eventual sentencing of several members of the security team, remains a subject for debate.
38 Coalition Provisional Authority, Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liason Missions, Their Personnel and
Contractors, Order Number 17, June 26, 2003. The UN Security Council-recognized legal receivership
was in authoritative control of Iraq at the time of the Nisour Square incident. Some pundits called
for the US government to waive the immunity clause granted in Order No. 17 and allow the contractors who committed serious crimes to be prosecuted in Iraqi courts. See Scott Horton, “Getting
Closer to the Truth about the Blackwater Incident,” Browsings (blog), Harpers, November 14, 2007.
39 During negotiations for the 2008–11 SOFA, some Iraqi politicians also wanted to remove
immunity for US service personnel, which the military opposed.
40 For more on the background and history of presidential directives from the Karzai administration concerning private security companies, see Moshe Schwartz, The Department of Defense’s
Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 29, 2009); Renata Giannini and Rens
de Graaff, “The Private Security Companies (PSCs) Dilemma in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Security
4, no. 10 (December 20, 2010); and Presidential Directive (PD) 62, which mandated that all private
security companies be disbanded by December 2014 and directed the development of a committee
to facilitate the actions necessary to “scrap” all such contractors. Under President Ashraf Ghani,
Presidential Directive 66 rescinded some of the prohibitions of PD 62 to relieve some of the pressures on security contractors, but the new status of contractors is still under debate.
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Moreover, while the BSA states members of the military and US
civilians can wear uniforms, bear arms without acquiring Afghan
weapons permits, and have unlimited entry and exit rights without
requiring visas, US contract employees cannot. Under Afghan
jurisdiction, if contractors do not have a valid visa, they can be detained
or deported; if they do not have proper weapons permits, they can be
arrested.41 These obstacles create moral and legal dilemmas for a number
of contractors and their employees. Some contractors can obtain relief
through administrative exceptions, but many cannot.
An additional concern for contractors involves accusations of owing
taxes to the Afghan government, which can create an administrative
logjam.42 For example, when a contracting company is on the Afghan
blacklist for failing to pay taxes—rightly or wrongly—their employees
can incur great personal risk. Without the proper tax documents,
American corporate contractors cannot acquire or renew their licenses
to operate their businesses in Afghanistan. Without those licenses, their
employees cannot obtain other documents needed to carry weapons
legally for self-protection.
Although most contractors worked in Afghanistan without the
need to carry a weapon, those who had weapons were left in precarious
positions.43 Either they could not participate in missions because they
would have left the secure military bases while carrying their weapons
illegally—without the proper Afghan permit—or worse, they would
go on missions with no weapon at all. This left US citizens who were
performing critical services for the military without proper force
protection in what was often a very dangerous environment. These
administrative catch-22s frustrated contractors and prevented them
from providing services. The situation also created headaches for the US
military and diplomatic personnel responsible for ensuring compliance
and strained the US mission.44

The Limited Immunity Option

Providing contractors full immunity from Afghan law, which is
currently granted to military personnel and federal civilians, would
alleviate such problems and allow missions to be conducted more
efficiently. But, amending the BSA for such privilege may be a bridge
41 By 2015–2016, there was little reason to think arrests would actually occur despite numerous
anecdotal cases and one reported detention. See Sayed Jawad, “Afghanistan Frees US Contractor
Illegally Detained in a Dispute,” Khaama Press, April 6, 2013.
42 For more on the thorny taxation issues in Afghanistan arising from “a lack of clarity” in the
MTA, see US Department of Defense Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs) Charles A.
Allen, “Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq—Assistance in Responding to Questions Regarding
Taxation under the Respective Status of Forces Agreements” (memorandum, March 29, 2011).
See also Paul Pompeo, Afghanistan Initiates Plans to Tax US Government Contractors (Washington, DC:
Arnold and Porter LLP, 2011); Ballard and Bradley, “Beyond Tax Treaties”; and Adam G. Province,
“Aggressive Foreign Tax Authorities and Military Agreements: Maintaining Tax Exemption in
SOFAs to Protect Civilian Contractors from Local-Country Tax,” Journal of International Taxation
27, no. 3 (March 2016).
43 Note that under international law, contractors are noncombatants who are generally not valid
military targets depending on their specific function. See Campbell, “Contractors on the Battlefield.”
44 Hearing on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan Before the House Committee on Armed Services, 114th Cong.
(October 8, 2015) (statement of General John F. Campbell, Commander, Operation Resolute
Support and US Forces-Afghanistan); and Hearing on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Posture in Afghanistan:
Post-2014 Transition, Risks, and Lessons Learned, 114th Cong. (March 4, 2015) (statement of General
John F. Campbell, Commander, Operation Resolute Support and US Forces-Afghanistan).
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too far. Thus, limited immunity might be a more realistic option to
ease the burden on contractors and better provide for their safety.
Under such a scheme, the US government would play a greater role in
facilitating contractor compliance—for instance, the multiple-entry visa
requirement for contractor employees would remain, but the visas would
be renewed through a US government contracting officer.
Additionally, weapons permits would once again be handled
through the commander of US Forces-Afghanistan or the US Embassy,
who would provide a current list of permits to the Afghans for accountability. In the unlikely event of a crime against an Afghan national,
the United States would have detention authority with an established
diplomatic process for handling requests to transfer US citizens to
Afghan jurisdiction. Although other conditions-based details would
be required, any limited immunity option would provide the Afghan
government with ultimate authority over contractors while providing
administrative mechanisms consistent with protections of other US
citizens accompanying military forces.

Conclusion

Even if one insists on viewing contractors as “mercenaries” such
actors have had a very long history, “much longer, in fact, than the
almost-exclusive deployment of national militaries to wage wars.”45
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have “triggered an explosion
of contracting, measured both in amounts of money and numbers of
personnel.”46 But, the reduction of contractor protections increases risks
to contractors and adversely affects the US mission. The following three
actions will remedy this problem:
1. Separate the BSA Joint Commission meetings from the NATO
SOFA Implementation Commission meetings. This independence will
allow US personnel to address contractor issues relevant to the US
mission that are not a priority interest for NATO and are currently
neglected in the Joint Commission. Additionally, recognition should be
given to the duty of US government personnel to protect and invest in
the welfare of US-citizen contractors.
2. American contractors and their US employees should be granted
greater immunity, especially when supporting dangerous activities. If
full immunity is not possible, then a system of limited immunity should
be negotiated as part of an amended BSA. In the meantime, the United
States should consider creating an official government position in theater
with the primary duties of assisting contractors with BSA compliance.
3. As the United States moves away from long-term contingency
operations and towards more frequent midterm expeditionary
operations, it is important to consider similar protections for contractors
in all combat theaters.
The United States military incorporates extensive contractor
support into both its routine and special operations at home and abroad.
45 Kathy Gilsinan, “The Return of the Mercenary: How Private Armies, and the Technology
They Use, Are Changing Warfare,” Atlantic, March 25, 2015.
46 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Contracting Out Security,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 5 (2013):
650, doi:10.1080/01402390.2016.1139485.
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At present, at least one commander has had to “substitute contractors
for soldiers” to “meet force manning levels” in Afghanistan.47 Ensuring
US contractors have the necessary administrative support and legal
protections ultimately benefits our nation and contributes to achieving
our strategic goals.

47 Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan, Before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, 115th Cong. (February 9, 2017) (statement of General John Nicholson, commander Resolute
Support and US Forces-Afghanistan).
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ABSTRACT: Leaders understand the importance of training their
soldiers for rigorous combat assignments, but frequently misunderstand the importance of engaging in the resilience training activities
discussed in this article.
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esilient soldiers, cohesive teams, and adaptable leaders serve
as the backbone of the human dimensions concept, enabling
effective performance in decentralized operations over
protracted periods of conflict.1 While there are many ways to build these
capabilities, including tough realistic training, soldiers can also be trained
in specific resilience skills that help them withstand and recover from
significant stress. Such training can yield surprising benefits; but with
competing requirements for units’ time, leaders want to be confident that
resilience training is worth the effort.
While evidence-based resilience training that has proven effective
with servicemembers is a wise investment, both financially and in
terms of human resources, even good, empirically validated resilience
training implemented half-heartedly and with mixed messages from
leadership is not worthwhile. When the unit environment undermines
the purpose of resilience training with a “check-the-block” mentality
or when the training is isolated from everyday military life, the training
loses potential value. And, despite its potential importance in helping
soldiers, resilience training is not a panacea: everyone has a point at
which bouncing back from stress is more difficult.

Resilience Training

Nevertheless, resilience skills training can help soldiers better
manage the psychological demands of military life and enhance the
readiness of all a unit’s members. Given each person’s background—
education, religion, socioeconomics, family, etc.—is different, each
person’s resilience is also different; thus, training needs likewise differ.
When unit training is provided, the training content will be novel for
some soldiers, but others may find the training redundant. So leaders
have a choice: build new skills for subgroups or approach resilience
training as a unit-based task similar to other traditional military training.
The benefit of focusing on groups who need specific training is that
at-risk soldiers may get more individualized attention while other soldiers
can focus on different tasks and can avoid unnecessary training. The
cost of this approach includes possibly stigmatizing and inadvertently
1 US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The US Army Human Dimension
Concept, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2014).
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overlooking some at-risk soldiers as well as not optimally equipping
units to reinforce the lessons learned.
The advantage of a unit-based approach is the potential to leverage
members’ strengths, provide buddy support, and train junior leaders in
a common vocabulary of resilience and resilience skills to effectively
communicate with unit members. Still, to avoid boring the entire unit,
training has to be engaging and progressive over the career cycle of each
servicemember. Moreover, training has to be periodically refreshed. The
training approach depends both on organizational policy and on leaders’
choices—at all levels—to integrate resilience training in their units.
Numerous studies have attempted to disentangle the ingredients
of resilience. A review of the resilience literature in a RAND report
evaluated and summarized 270 studies.2 The researchers identified a set
of common resilience skills across the scientific literature and categorized
variables associated with individual resilience into five main factors:
(1) positive coping such as active problem-solving; (2) positive affect
such as optimism; (3) positive thinking such as thought restructuring
or changing one’s view of a problem; (4) realism such as having realistic
expectations and practicing acceptance; and (5) behavioral control such
as regulating one’s emotional response. Three additional factors were
identified for unit-level resilience: (1) positive command climate such as
leaders building pride for the mission and modeling good behaviors; (2)
teamwork such as work coordination, and (3) cohesion such as bonding.
Interestingly, these factors are consistent with human dimensions
concept components, which are typically incorporated into the Army’s
comprehensive resilience training programs.

Empirical Evidence

There appears to be evidence that resilience can indeed be taught,
but some studies show an effect while others do not and almost all of
the studies that do find an effect show small effects. In each of these
studies, resilience is measured in a different way, and while there is
no one agreed-upon metric of resilience, each study infers resilience
based on other measures such as fewer mental health symptoms, better
cognitive skills, and more effective work-related performance. The
studies that identify such effects find individuals—such as civilians,
police officers, and servicemembers—have better outcomes following
universal training designed to improve resilience-related skills.3
Several well-designed studies conducted with the Army highlight
ways in which resilience training has improved soldier outcomes on a
2 Lisa S. Meredith et al., Promoting Psychological Resilience in the U.S. Military (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2011).
3 Steven M. Brunwasser, Jane E. Gillham, and Eric S. Kim. “A Meta-Analytic Review of the Penn
Resiliency Program’s Effect on Depressive Symptoms,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 77,
no. 6 (December 2009): 1042–54, doi:10.1037/a0017671; Bengt B. Arnetz et al., “Assessment of a
Prevention Program for Work-Related Stress among Urban Police Officers,” International Archives
of Occupational and Environmental Health 86, no. 1 (January 2013): 79–88, doi:10.1007/s00420-0120748-6; Amy B. Adler et al., “Battlemind Debriefing and Battlemind Training as Early Interventions
with Soldiers Returning from Iraq: Randomization by Platoon,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 77, no. 5 (October 2009): 928–40, doi:10.1037/a0016877; Amy B. Adler et al., “Mental
Skills Training with Basic Combat Training Soldiers: A Group-Randomized Trial,” Journal of Applied
Psychology 100, no. 6 (May 2015): 1752–64, doi:10.1037/apl0000021; and Amishi P. Jha et al., “Minds
‘At Attention’: Mindfulness Training Curbs Attentional Lapses in Military Cohorts,” PLoS ONE 10,
no. 2 (February 2015): e0116889, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0116889.
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range of measures. In terms of foundational skills, a randomized trial of
2,432 soldiers going through basic combat training assigned platoons to
a resilience training condition or a military history condition. The study
found mental skills training such as goal setting, imagery, self-confidence,
attentional focus, and energy management improved performance on
obstacle courses, Army Physical Fitness Test diagnostic scores, and a
weapons qualification event.4 In one example, soldiers walked across a
high beam seven seconds faster if they had training in mental skills as
opposed to training in military history. Soldiers who participated in the
training also reported greater use of these important mental skills.5 The
skills central to this study are the same core performance psychology
skills used in the Army’s resilience training program.
In terms of skills promoting social resilience, a group randomized
trial was conducted with 1,138 soldiers in garrison in which Army
platoons were randomly assigned to social resilience training or a
comparison condition of cultural awareness training. Those units in the
social resilience condition that addressed social cognition, enhancing
connections, and resolving confl icts reported improved unit cohesion
after the training. Units in the other training condition did not report
similar outcomes.6 These resilience skills could be used to maintain
and improve unit connections in challenging contexts, such as Army
National Guard units returning from combat.
In terms of the deployment cycle, predeployment studies demonstrate
mindfulness—a type of resilience training in focused attention on
the present moment without elaboration or judgment—can enhance
soldiers’ functioning as measured by neurocognitive assessments of
working memory and attention.7 Thus, mindfulness training is now
being piloted as part of the Army’s resilience training program. Studies
also routinely find that when soldiers receive predeployment resilience
training focused on anticipating deployment stressors and identifying
cognitive restructuring skills that can be useful during deployment,
they report fewer post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms and physical
health symptoms as well as greater morale than soldiers who report
not receiving such training.8 Two randomized trials of nearly 4,000
soldiers after deployment show benefits of resilience training in terms
of reductions of post-traumatic stress, depression symptoms, and sleep
problems, as well as increases in life satisfaction.9 Such trainings are a
core part of the Army’s deployment cycle resilience training program.
Regarding the level of evidence presented in these studies, the gold
standard is a randomized trial because randomization typically addresses
preexisting group differences that might otherwise account for different
4 Adler, “Battlemind Debriefing,” 928–40.
5 Ibid.
6 John T. Cacioppo, “Building Social Resilience in Soldiers: A Double Dissociative Randomized
Controlled Study,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 109, no. 1 (July 2015): 90–105, doi:10.1037/
pspi0000022.
7 Ibid.
8 Eric S. McKibben et al., “Receipt and Rated Adequacy of Stress Management Training is
Related to PTSD and Other Outcomes among Operation Iraqi Freedom Veterans,” Military Psychology
21, no. 1 (January 2009): S68–81, doi:10.1080/08995600903249172.
9 Carl A. Castro et al., “Mental Health Training with Soldiers Four Months after Returning
from Iraq: Randomization by Platoon,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 25, no. 4 (August 2012): 376–83,
doi:10.1002/jts.21721. For more on the positive impact for soldiers with higher combat exposure,
see Adler, “Battlemind Debriefing,” 928–40.
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outcomes between two study conditions. If a randomized trial is not
feasible, a quasi-experimental design can suffice. In this kind of study,
individuals are not randomized to different groups but a handful of
preexisting groups are contrasted with one another. The difficulty with
this approach is that any differences found at follow-up may be due
to some other factor, such as a change in mission or leadership, that
affected one group and not the other. Statistical techniques can help
minimize this problem, but it is still a meaningful limitation.
Sometimes, an intervention can only be tested in a pre-post design.
In this situation, individuals being trained may be assessed prior to an
intervention and then again afterward. Unfortunately, in this design,
there is no way to know if effects are due to the intervention itself or
some extraneous factor.
Finally, case studies can be used to describe an individual or a
group response to an intervention. Typically, these studies involve an
individual attesting to the value of a particular intervention. While both
the pre-post design and case study are useful starting points, if a great
deal of resources are going to be assigned to roll-out an intervention, the
optimal way to determine if this investment in resources is worthwhile
is through a randomized trial.
The problem with research, admittedly, is that it is a slow process.
Scientists are also typically muted in their enthusiasm for any results they
do find because they are trained to identify weaknesses and limitations in
their studies. In addition, resilience training usually yields small effects
because it is typically provided as a public-health style or universal
intervention, implemented with a whole population, such as a brigade.
Despite these small effects, compared to interventions that target
specific populations, universal approaches likely yield better long-term
results.10 Basically, moving a large population a tiny amount can result
in more overall change than moving a handful of people a substantial
amount. This phenomenon occurs because treatment, even evidencebased and validated treatment, typically only attracts a small proportion
of people who need it, and of those who seek treatment, only a handful
stick with it. Furthermore, only a proportion of those who adhere to
the treatment regimen will actually benefit from the treatment. So,
the small improvements for more people associated with a universal
intervention can actually result in a more powerful improvement than
greater outcomes for fewer people affected by a targeted approach.

A Leader’s Perspective

In 2013, the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck,
Germany, initiated an integrated resilience training program as part of
predeployment preparations for Afghanistan. Despite the premium on
leaders’ time, particularly at the company and platoon level, the regimental
commander recognized many programs across the installation could
support unit and individual readiness. Dubbed Dragoon Total Fitness,
this regimental initiative was a commander’s priority that integrated the
10 Douglas F. Zatzick, Thomas Koepsell, and Frederick P. Rivara, “Using Target Population
Specification, Effect Size, and Reach to Estimate and Compare the Population Impact of Two PTSD
Preventive Interventions,” Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes 72, no. 4 (December 2009):
346–59, doi:10.1521/psyc.2009.72.4.346.
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Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness program with other existing
efforts. These additional resilience-building activities, such as yoga,
nutrition classes, and financial planning courses, addressed topics across
the five dimensions of strength—physical, emotional, family, social, and
spiritual—identified by the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness
program. Dragoon Total Fitness brought these disparate programs
together by providing resources and establishing specific expectations.
Leaders in the regiment were provided with a dedicated block of
time for Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness resilience training.
Every tenth morning a physical fitness period was set aside for resilience
training—90 minutes every other week—to build resilience skills
without adding to the already packed calendar of events. To help junior
leaders meet the requirement to complete both Master Resiliency
Training and at least one supplemental resilience activity per month, a
user-friendly manual was developed. The Dragoon Total Fitness Guide
provided background information on the Comprehensive Soldier and
Family Fitness program; a schedule of installation resilience-building
activities; and an overview of events, contact information, and required
equipment; as well as recommendations and milestones for conducting
the Dragoon Total Fitness program over a year. Leaders could use the
guide to select specific resilience activities for their units and their
understanding of their soldiers.
As is the case with all things, leader priority and involvement were
critical to the program’s success. Leaders were expected to participate.
From first-line supervisors to the regimental commander, classes and
additional resilience activities were not relegated to optional status; they
were regarded as places of duty.
Competing requirements for leaders’ time resulted in initial
reluctance to schedule the classes and ensure they were conducted with
detailed preparation and effort. Furthermore, the seemingly endless
requirements dictated by the Army regulation caused some leaders to
determine what they believed was important, often reporting completion
of some tasks regardless of the quality of completion.11 This reporting
style has been identified as a risk the Army takes when there are too
many requirements.12
Leaders who rejected the program often poorly selected their
resilience instructors. In fact, bad instructors were actually more
destructive to the program than not conducting training. Soldiers who
attended classes led by inadequate instructors were less likely to see the
benefits of the training, not inclined to attend additional training, nor
were they open to the positive potential of resilience training.
In conjunction with leader emphasis, tenacity played a key role in
increasing the unit’s engagement in resilience. Despite concerns from
some junior leaders, the commander retained resilience as a priority.
Timelines for resilience module training and completion of individual
soldiers’ training were tracked with the same importance as physical
fitness tests and marksmanship qualification records. Rather than simply
11 Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Training and Leader Development,
Army Regulation 350-1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014).
12 Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015).
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complete two or four classes, soldiers had to complete full modules
in accordance with a published and tracked standard. Recognizing
the 2nd Cavalry Regiment would deploy over the life of the program,
the modules accommodated the tour in Afghanistan. Although the
timeline incorporated the rigors of combat, the criticality of resilience—
particularly during the deployment—increased the emphasis on
completing the resilience training.
As more leaders experienced the training as it was intended, they
became more open to its potential, and the program became part of the
regimental culture. Jokes from soldiers on post indicated the program
was increasingly becoming a part of the fabric of the unit. Soldiers
were discussing training-related terminology across the post. From
admonishing each other to “hunt the good stuff” at the post exchange
and warning those causing “activating events” that might lead to confl ict,
the jokes indicated a common language was being established.

The Soldier’s Perspective

As part of the program initiative, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment
partnered with the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research during 2013
and 2014 to assess soldier perceptions of Dragoon Total Fitness. The
research team surveyed all of the regiment’s available soldiers—a total
of 2,181 soldiers—about leader support for the program. Overall, the
soldiers rated 28 percent of their company leaders as “enthusiastic”; 47
percent, “open to the idea”; 22 percent, “going through the motions”;
and 3 percent, “negative.” The more unit leaders were perceived as
enthusiastic or open to the idea of the Dragoon Total Fitness program,
the more likely soldiers were to report the training was useful. The
usefulness of the training was recognized by 63 percent of the soldiers
who rated their leaders as enthusiastic, 43 percent of the soldiers who
rated their leaders as open to the idea, 24 percent of the soldiers who
rated their leaders as going through the motions, and 17 percent of the
soldiers who rated their leaders as negative.
Furthermore, leader engagement in the following supportive
behaviors were directly linked to soldiers’ perceptions of leader
enthusiasm for the program: (1) attend the training activities, (2)
emphasize the importance of training skills, (3) refer to resilience skills
when talking with soldiers, and (4) encourage soldiers to use these
skills—for example, 62 percent of soldiers who regarded their leaders as
enthusiastic also reported that their leaders attended resilience training
activities, 35 percent of soldiers who regarded their leaders as open to
the idea also reported leader attendance, 21 percent of soldiers who
regarded their leaders as just going through the motions reported leader
attendance, and only 9 percent of soldiers who regarded their leaders as
negative also reported leader attendance. The same pattern held true for
the other supportive behaviors. In addition, the more leaders engaged
in these behaviors, the more soldiers reported using the skills they had
learned and that the training was useful. Most importantly, the more
leaders engaged in supportive behaviors, the better soldiers rated their
unit climate and their own mental health.
Notably, even after accounting for rank and generally strong
leadership skills in a series of multiple regression analyses, leadership
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behaviors that supported resilience training were still independently
associated with using resilience skills from the training, finding the
training useful, perceiving a positive unit climate, and reporting fewer
mental health symptoms such as traumatic stress, anxiety, and anger,
which means the focus on promoting resilience training adds value.
Additionally, these same models even significantly predicted unit climate
and many of the same mental health outcomes four months later.
Command support for resilience trainers has been associated
with more effective training in previous studies.13 To our knowledge,
however, this article is the first to introduce the direct link between
ratings of leader support for training and soldier perceptions of training.
While these results confirm what many leaders have long known about
the power of command support, the findings also offer direction for
improving the impact of resilience training on units by emphasizing the
role of leaders.

Strengthening Resilience

Training needs to be valuable and relevant. Resilience training
should be tested with strong study design, with military populations,
and with pertinent military problems and challenges in mind. Training
untested in the military context may mismatch the occupational
context and could distract from the Army’s established and well-vetted
program. Interventions based on civilian data may not necessarily work
with servicemembers.
In one case, for example, a well-established intervention involving
expressive writing was shown to be contraindicated for soldiers
following combat deployment. Specifically, soldiers with high levels
of combat experiences who were randomly assigned to the expressive
writing condition reported more anger months later than did those
assigned to the control condition.14 This study, while not yielding the
expected results, was valuable because it underscored the importance of
testing interventions in a military context using a randomized controlled
design. The research emphasized the need to understand the population
and the importance of this understanding for guiding decision-making
about appropriate implementation.
Training needs to be integrated and marketed as part of one
coherent program. Programs can integrate a range of topics, but ideally,
the end user needs to see how the components fit together. Sometimes,
perhaps as the result of misplaced enthusiasm, individuals approach
senior leaders with new material that has not yet been scientifically
validated. These well-intended individuals are typically passionate about
their work and their belief that the material is critically important for the
health and performance of servicemembers. But, ad-hoc programs lack
the appropriate research evidence to validate their expected benefits.
One way leaders can respond to these suggestions is to recommend
the individual partner with academic researchers who can help submit
research proposals for funding. The government has several mechanisms
13 Paul B. Lester et al., The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program Evaluation, Report #3: Longitudinal
Analysis of the Impact of Master Resilience Training on Self-Reported Resilience and Psychological Health Data
(Arlington, VA: Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, Department of the Army, 2011).
14 Christopher Munsey, “Writing about Wounds,” Monitor on Psychology, October 2009, 58.

90

Parameters 47(1) Spring 2017

to fund research studies, including ongoing broad agency announcements
that allow preproposals to be reviewed on a continuous basis.15 These
preproposals can be selected for a full proposal, independently reviewed,
and potentially recommended for funding. This process is vital to the
development of new and effective training.
New material can be valuable to refreshing training programs when
appropriately assessed through empirical study. Approved training also
needs to be integrated into the unit culture by reinforcing the concepts
over time. Embedding resilience skills in military tasks, and not just in
a classroom setting, should increase the degree skills will be routinely
practiced and supported by unit members and leaders.
Training needs to be scalable. Training that can only be
implemented by one or two experts or that requires excessive resources
will not lead to a sustainable program. Moreover, training must be
provided by carefully selected and sufficiently prepared trainers, even at
the unit level, who are well-suited to the task. Ongoing quality control
checks need to be conducted to make sure drift from the original
training content—a natural risk in providing decentralized training—is
avoided. Professional resilience trainers, such as the Army Resiliency
Directorate’s Performance Experts who are master’s and PhD level
trainers in mental skills, can also be used to reinforce unit training and
ensure optimal presentation.
Training needs to be supported by leaders at all levels. This
support can be maximized by explaining the program’s rationale,
scientific evidence, and the importance of leader engagement. Senior
leaders need to send an unequivocal message about the importance of
resilience training. Research evidence is critical because leaders need to
be able to distinguish between good ideas with enthusiastic support and
good ideas with an evidence base. They need to know the questions to
ask or reach out to experts to help evaluate proposed ideas.
Part of leader engagement involves creating policies and procedures
to ensure implementation, coordination, and resources, such as those
described in the analysis of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment’s Dragoon Total
Fitness program. Leader support does not have to be an amorphous
concept. As suggested by the 2nd Cavalry Regiment study, effective
leader support can consist of practical steps such as attending training,
emphasizing the importance of training, referring to the training content
when talking with soldiers, and encouraging soldiers to use the skills.
A review of the Army’s resilience training would not be complete
without also mentioning the concern that the program is an unnecessary
burden on soldiers and leaders. In reality, training is ubiquitous across
the Army, and the topics, breadth, and results of such training should
be questioned to maintain the learning orientation of the organization.
Indeed, some of the analysis provided here regarding the importance of
leader support applies to all training implementation. Still, the data are
specific to resilience training perceptions and suggest leaders at all levels
can engage in behaviors that promote unit-based resilience programs,
enhance the efficacy of the training itself, and serve as force multipliers.
15 For information on submitting broad agency announcements and requests for proposals,
see “How to Submit a Research Proposal,” US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command,
http://www.usamraa.army.mil/pages/baa_paa/baaproposal.htm (accessed April 5, 2017).
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Future efforts should examine ways to select training modules that
are a good fit for leaders’ units. Combining a unit resilience profi le with
recommendations for targeted training modules would offer a more
systematic approach to matching training with particular units. In this
way, scores on various resilience factors, such as those identified by the
RAND overview, could be used to align units with specific training and
ultimately to help units operate more effectively in decentralized and
complex environments.
Prioritizing resilience training among the myriad requirements
leaders face requires careful balance in this era of perpetual confl ict.
Obviously, soldiers need practice in tactics, units need to gain confidence
working together as a team, and leaders need experience with high-stress
decision-making. Each of these requirements, coupled with individual
deployment preparations, means finding time for “additional” training
will be nearly impossible. Yet, if resilience training is understood to be
a valuable investment, then it will not be so easily dismissed. In fact,
appropriately implemented resilience training can make soldiers better
at tactics, teamwork, and critical decision-making, all essential elements
of the human dimensions concept, and more importantly, keys to success
in training and on the battlefield.
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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the competencies Australia’s
political and military leaders selected to pursue offset strategies and
anti-access/area denial capabilities.

A

ustralia’s physical security is in large part achieved as a function
of its geography. As the world’s largest island sitting astride the
Pacific, Indian, and Southern Oceans, Terra Australis Incognita
and its inhabitants have traditionally sought comfort in being located
“at the bottom of the world.”1 Australians were jolted out of this false
notion and realized their physical vulnerability when Japan suddenly
captured Singapore in 1942. Since then, Australian security planners
have emphasized the importance of possessing the military capability to
operate across the sea-air gap to the north of the continent. The Australia
in the Asian Century white paper elevated this issue: “As the global centre
of gravity shifts to our region, the tyranny of distance is being replaced
with the tyranny of proximity.”2
The Australian Defence Force focuses much of its effort on
developing the means to operate in major theaters of confl ict as well as
to maintain regional access and engagement as part of a layered approach
to national security, including continental defense. This approach
also acknowledges Australia’s reliance on its most important security
treaty—the ANZUS Pact (1951).3 One of this alliance’s most interesting
challenges is ensuring the continuity of global commerce systems in
the Asia-Pacific, which requires common access to realize the potential
benefits. This aspect has underpinned the region’s stability for at least
the past 70 years. Today, however, access across the global commons is
increasingly problematic due to political, environmental, and diplomatic
issues. To guarantee continued common access and security in the region,
the Australian Defence Force is expanding its network of parties who
likewise value developing capabilities and concepts to defeat adversarial
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats.

1 For more on Australia’s Maritime culture, see Michael Evans, “The Third Way: Towards an
Australian Maritime Strategy for the Twenty-first Century,” in 2013 Chief of Army History Conference:
Armies and Maritime Strategy, ed. Peter Dennis (Canberra: Big Sky Publishing, 2013), 327–58.
2 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), Australia in the Asian Century,
White Paper 1 (Barton, Australia: PM&C, 2012), 105. The white paper also detailed six key drivers
for developing Australia’s security environment through 2035: the roles of and relationship
between the United States and China; competitive states’ challenges to the stability of the
rules-based global order; terrorist threats; state fragility resulting from economics, crime, social
factors, environment, governing, and climate change; military modernization; and complex,
nongeographic threats such as cyber.
3 The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Pact initially bound the parties
to cooperate on security matters in the Pacific Ocean region. Today the treaty relates to conflicts
worldwide: an armed attack on any of the three parties would be met as a common threat.
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Anti-Access/Area Denial

Anti-access challenges—geographic, military, and diplomatic—are
designed to prevent, delay, or degrade the ability of military forces
to enter an operational area and establish bases farther away from
preferred locations.4 Limiting an opponent to an inland operational
area, for example, creates great distance from ports and usable airfields,
presenting a geographic challenge.5 In other cases, anti-access challenges
are diplomatic or political matters, such as when a nation in a region
prohibits or limits the ability of a military operation to deploy joint task
forces into its sovereign territory or to fly through its airspace.
Area denial refers to actions designed to restrict freedoms
of maneuver, which are characterized by an adversary’s ability to
obstruct the actions of military forces once they have deployed. Land
forces deployed to Afghanistan in 2001, for example, encountered no
significant military area denial threats though forces deployed to the
region later in the confl ict regularly faced severe area denial threats such
as improvised explosive devices. In the maritime domain, sea mines and
other defensive measures effectively deny access to and use of maneuver
corridors (straits), harbors, and beach-landing sites.
The types of A2/AD threats the Australian Defence Force could
encounter in future operations will vary considerably. At the low-end
of the spectrum of confl ict, insurgent forces such as the Taliban in
Afghanistan or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria have limited antiaccess capabilities and a small number of modern weapons. These forces
could still pose a considerable area denial challenge due to their ability
to operate among the local population and employ irregular tactics to
strike land forces at times and places of their choosing.
In the middle of the spectrum, hybrid opponents can employ
irregular or guerrilla-type tactics, but are reasonably well-armed with
modern weapons. Examples of these opponents, who can simultaneously
fight in a conventional manner, include the pairing of irregular Viet
Cong and regular North Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam War and
the Hezbollah forces that Israel fought in southern Lebanon in 2006.6
At the high end of the threat spectrum, armed forces of nationstates tend to employ conventional tactics and weapons. Even at this end
of the spectrum, the level of A2/AD capability can vary considerably. As
with the hybrid threat, this challenge is not new. In World War II, Nazi
Germany’s submarine force provided a potent, long-range anti-access
capability that threatened allied shipping routes across the North Atlantic
Ocean. Similarly, during the Cold War, a major mission of the Soviet
navy’s submarines was to interdict the movement of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization reinforcements from the United States to Europe.

4 John Gordon IV and John Matsumura, The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area
Denial Challenges (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2013), 21–23.
5 US Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and US Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army–Marine Corps Concept
(Fort Eustis, VA: ARCIC, 2012), 3.
6 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009).
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Oﬀset Strategy

Australia has, in comparison to other regional military forces,
a numerically modest capability to provide security over a significant
geographic area. To deter effectively and to provide military responses
to threats, the Australian Defence Force must compensate for its size
disadvantage by developing a competitive, asymmetrical strategy capable
of generating an advantage over potential adversaries. This type of
strategy usually centers on engineering cross-domain and technological
capabilities that effectively offset quantitative inferiority in regions
dominated by larger, more potent forces.
In its simplest form, an offset strategy is a competitive long-term
concept that generates and sustains strategic advantage.7 While not
an exclusively technological approach, the strategy does tend to have
a robust technical focus. Offset strategies strive for an appropriate
combination of technology and operational constructs to achieve
decision advantage, and in doing so bolster conventional deterrence.8
For the Australian Defence Force, who by any regional comparison will
always be a numerically small military, technology and military alliances
represent the most important combat multipliers that can generate the
military effects required to protect Australia and her national interests.
Force-on-force attrition is the end point of warfare, the least desired
operational scenario for military forces. The Australian Defence Force
seeks to generate operational outcomes by employing asymmetric effects;
it relies on tactics, technologies, personnel, and alliances—its inventory
of offset capabilities—to generate its military operations.

Oﬀset Capabilities for Asia-Pacific Access beyond 2020

To retain access and to defeat area denial systems in the Asia-Pacific,
the Australian Defence Force offset strategy concentrates on eight
core tactical competencies and concepts that, when combined with
cross-domain synergy, gives Australian and allied joint forces the edge
necessary for future military contests for access. These competencies are
at the heart of short-notice, rapid-response force success.

Competency 1: Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare

Modern military ships, aircraft, and ground forces cannot effectively
operate without using the electromagnetic spectrum and have not been
able to do so for about a century. At a very minimum, communication
via radio—notwithstanding runners, pigeons, and easily cut telephone
cables—is necessary even in an emissions-controlled environment.
Today’s Australian forces constantly transmit and receive intelligence,
operational plans, and asset locations via wireless networks and other
communication and control systems. These systems must be protected
while their platforms and their sensor suites simultaneously deny the
electromagnetic spectrum from being used by any potential adversary.
7 Robert Martinage, Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages
to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2014), 14–20.
8 Wing Commander Phil Arms, “The U.S. 3rd Offset Strategy: An opportunity for
the ADF,” Australian Army, July 28, 2016, http://www.Army.gov.au/Our-future/Blog
/Articles/2016/07/Third-Offset-Strategy.
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Electromagnetic maneuver warfare is the concept of creating
an electromagnetic battle management system, where all individual
platforms collect data on and inform the network of enemy signals while
managing their own emissions to defeat, deceive, or deny the adversary
through offensive kinetic and nonkinetic operations. By unifying and
asserting positive control inside the electromagnetic spectrum—indeed
maneuvering inside the spectrum—numerically inferior forces have an
antedote for an adversary’s military forces. Moreover, electromagnetic
maneuver warfare does not only focus on the adversary, it also guarantees
access to the electromagnetic spectrum for joint forces’ command
and control, detection, force protection, and frequency management
capabilities. Supporting the ability for forces to maneuver across all
domains—air, maritime, land, space, cyber—as well as to control the
spectrum through denial, deception, and destruction, electromagnetic
maneuver warfare provides joint forces opportunities to operate
without attribution, which protects sensitive capabilities and maintains
operational security.

Competency 2: Technologically Intensive, Human Focused Decision-Making

Effective decision-making is critical to success in war. Colonel
John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) Loop was
designed as an organizing principle for strategy that anticipated and
embraced ambiguity and uncertainty, which he perceived as inherent
features of man and nature. The randomness of the outside world,
he felt, played a large role in uncertainty. Boyd further argued the
inability of military commanders to properly make sense of a constantly
changing reality is a bigger hindrance. Thus, he called for continuously
updating mental concepts by using both man and machine to deal with
a constantly changing reality.
Boyd’s OODA Loop emphasizes alertness—the ability to observe the
changing situation and environment. A follow-on focus of the changing
character of the situation allows a person to orient to the situation. Armed
with this perspective, one can decide to act based upon action alternatives
that inform subsequent OODA Loops via a continuous learning process.
While modern technology collects critical information to inform the
loop, the interpretation of such information remains an essential human
skill founded on the decision-maker’s personal experience and prior
preparation to understand the situation and the enemy. Boyd emphasized
an additional need for the commander’s intent to unify a force’s purpose
and preference for decentralized execution to ensure redundancy in
action, thereby increasing the chances of mission success.9
As a component of an offset strategy, decision-making is critical.
Embracing the OODA Loop allows the military to harness technologies
that support decision-making, which is emphasized during the
observe and orient phase, while preserving the human aspects of the
decide and act component.
The observe and orient focus within an offset strategy generates
superior situational understanding for commanders and joint forces to
ensure their ability to execute the key warfighting functions—know,
9 For more on John Boyd, see Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War
(New York: Bay Back Books, 2002).
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shape, strike, shield, sustain, and adapt.10 To achieve this perspective
and the ability to defeat complex systems such as an adversary’s A2/AD
capability, focus must be maintained on key intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities, which include electronic warfare,
electronic attack, persistent surveillance, supercomputing, autonomous
systems, and unmanned systems, as well as decision support systems
such as geoimagery, synthetic simulation, artificial intelligence, and
computer learning systems. Analytical technologies that determine
the alertness and character of problem-solving as well as analytical
functions such as data management and data analysis are also critical:
they enable processed and analyzed data to be presented as information
appropriately formatted for military forces to apply to the next phase of
the decision cycle—decide and act.
The decide and act function as part of an offset strategy requires
a centralized command and control system that emphasizes humanto-human interconnectedness and integrates Generation 5 capabilities
such as those being introduced into military service over the next
decade. Coupled with increased data processing technologies, including
accelerated analytics, the decide and act function is likely to rapidly
deliver patterns and correlations that were previously unidentified. A
more accurate and detailed data set would maximize the use of limited
capabilities such as low-density/high-demand intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance systems as well as optimize the use of scarce resources
such as aviation and logistics. High performance analytics also present
an opportunity to derive value from big data, solve complex operational
problems, and deliver timely, high-quality insights for making decisions.

Competency 3: Integrated Air and Missile Defense Systems

An effective integrated air and missile defense system detects, tracks,
identifies, and monitors airborne objects, such as aircraft, helicopters,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and ballistic missiles, and if necessary,
intercepts them using surface-based or airborne weapons systems.
Integrated air and missile defense systems are key enablers for joint
force operations and encourage a system of cooperative engagement
emphasizing a fully integrated targeting network that designs kinetic
and nonkinetic solutions in an all-informed networked environment.
The systems’ capabilities provide effective air policing with a
deterrent effect in peacetime as well as preserve the actions necessary to
nullify or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile threats during times
of crisis and confl ict. Integrated air and missile defense systems provide a
highly responsive, time-critical, persistent capability to achieve a desired
or necessary level of air control that allows joint forces to conduct fullrange missions. They integrate a network of interconnected national and
battle command systems comprised of sensors, command and control
facilities, and weapons systems.

10 The combat and warfighting functions of know, shape, strike, shield, sustain, and
adapt, which were articulated by the Australian Army, in The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Land
Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1 (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian Army, 2008), were removed
in the 2014 version of the doctrine, but an oblique reference to these functions, which excludes
strike, remains in the following: Australian Army, Operations, LWD 3-0 (Laverton, Victoria:
Defence Publishing Service, 2015).
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A theater-level system is capable of combining sensor data in real
time to create a detailed, integrated picture of aircraft and missile threats
in the air that can be shared on an allied network to give friendly ships,
aircraft, and land mobile systems the ability to create an integrated air
defense. This capability is especially important for managing the threat
level of an A2/AD environment where the simultaneous targeting
of a multitude of anti-access systems is critical to overwhelming and
defeating the enemy network.
The advent of cheap, mass-produced, autonomous drones, which
have no centralized system but are capable of generating thousands of
air vectors that can overwhelm the processing power of an integrated
air and missile defense system, has become an emerging arms race. The
need for adaptive refresh capabilities and the avoidance of block or
system obsolescence will be essential to ensuring the systems remain
capable and effective.
Given the myriad of capability priorities for modern military
forces, including the Australian Defence Force, the development of
an interoperable, robust integrated air and missile defense system must
be seen in the context of cost-consciousness. System inceptors should
therefore be simple, relatively inexpensive, and employ a network
approach to engagement: the active defense versus missile attack cost
ratio should be reversed. System procurement should be managed
through a development process that allows organizations, including the
Australian Defence Force, an opportunity to leap to the end-state, thereby
leveraging the defense industry and Australia’s alliance frameworks.

Competency 4: Manned and Machine Teaming

Unmanned systems are changing the way all militaries operate and
protect forces. Exploration and expansion of these capabilities must be
continued while militaries remain conscious of low-technology threats,
such as drone technology, that effectively act as autonomous rounds of
ammunition. The success of an unmanned system in any domain is best
demonstrated by the way it integrates with manned activity and serves as
a combat multiplier, rather than a simple swap. Human-machine teaming
emphasizes this progression whether it occurs as tactical surveillance
in a war zone, support of a humanitarian operation, or movement of
supplies in a convoy.
The Australian Defence Force must invest additional resources
and effort in developing manned-machine systems that enhance
image-capture and sensor systems, positioning and navigation systems,
targeting and decision-support systems, and advanced simulation
systems. Advanced computing capabilities now allow systems to
communicate with teams of humans and other systems. Improvements
in affordable, portable, and long-lasting power sources also improve
system mobility and accelerate processing ability. Technologies on and
off any teamed platform will also help unmanned systems understand
tasks and how to respond to obstacles, weather conditions, and other
unknown interferences.
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Competency 5: Defended and Defending Communications Networks

The Australian Defence Force relies heavily on cyberspace to enable
its military, intelligence, and logistics operations, including the movement
of personnel and matériel and the command and control of the full
spectrum of military operations. Exploitation of cybervulnerabilities
could undermine the force’s ability to operate, thereby threatening
national security and competitiveness. Recent government investments
in cybersecurity have improved the posture of networks, systems, and
data by reducing attack surfaces and improving control over information
access. Results include enhancements in cybersecurity measures and
situational awareness, such as monitoring for intrusions, mitigating
vulnerabilities, improving identity management and authentication,
and central collection of incident data; however, cyberthreats are
increasing and adversaries are becoming more skilled, sophisticated, and
strategically minded. The Australian Defence Force must ensure it does
not overlook the vulnerability of cyberassets.
To meet the challenges expected between now and 2020,
transformational changes to cyberculture, workforce, technology,
policy, and processes of the Australian Defence Force are required. The
results of this strategy will enable the organization to continue to operate
effectively in cyberspace, as well as actively defend against adversarial
cyberactions. This strategy should emphasize establishing a resilient
defense posture, transforming the management of all deployments and
operations, enhancing all situational awareness assets with a specific
focus on network integrity, and increasing assurance and survivability
against highly sophisticated attacks against core systems.11
To support these efforts, the Australian Defence Force will work
more closely with its interagency partners, the private sector, and
international partners toward collective cyberdefense. Most importantly,
the Australian cyberspace workforce will have to be fully trained,
equipped, and prepared for defending the cyberinterests of not only the
military but also Australian society in general. Although not addressed
as a critical element, each focus area will require development of related
policy, oversight, and compliance mechanisms to be successful.

Competency 6: Dark Systems

Survivability in a highly contested A2/AD environment demands
capabilities that can operate below adversaries’ detection threshold,
in other words, the capability to “go dark.” The Australian Defence
Force should develop stealth-like systems that include air, maritime,
and land platforms with the following design characteristics: acoustic
design features that reduce operating noise emissions and thermal
masking through equipment insulation, low emissivity paint, and radar
absorbent materials that reduce the probability of interception, as well
as metamaterial concealment and nonmagnetic construction materials.
Of significant note is the requirement to reduce a platform’s
electronic signature, use low-probability intercept transmissions, as well
as develop and implement mathematical and statistical algorithms for
allied and adversarial radio frequency signal detection, characterization,
11 US Department of Defense (DoD), DoD Strategy for Defending Networks, Systems, and
Data, (Washington, DC: DoD, 2013).
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and localization with a particular emphasis on wideband, multichannel,
and distributed sensors. This capability will not only help the Australian
Defence Force mask its communication signals but also improve its
ability to detect other signals within the operating environment.12

Competency 7: Anti-Position Navigation Timing Protection and Disruption
Systems

There is a growing awareness among modern militaries of the major
disruption risks to operations and capabilities that rely on GPS as the
only means of position determination and precision timing. Developed
in the 1970s by the US Department of Defense, GPS was created for
military navigation and is widely credited with America’s military
dominance during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91). Since that time,
the capability has become absolutely critical to military operations and
weapons systems as well as international commerce, which is critical to
the global economy. Thus, the Australian Defence Force must possess
both the ability to operate within a GPS degraded environment and to
deny effectively the use of the same system to an adversary. This ability
should increase space resiliency, hedge against the loss of space-based
enablers, and develop counterspace capabilities accordingly.
As part of its offset strategy, the Australian Defence Force should
pursue a robust and cost-effective solution to protect military capabilities
from GPS interference: high-performance GPS antijamming devices
that allow GPS receivers to acquire and track satellite signals so the
Australian Defence Force can retain the ability to determine accurate
battlefields positions.13 Alternatively, Australia may need to choose a
less direct approach such as ensuring systems can operate on multiple
systems such as an adversary’s primary Glonass or Beidou systems,
which would be less likely to be jammed.14 This redundancy in position
determination and precision timing capabilities does not currently exist.
Spoofing, a process of replacing correct GPS readings by creating
a false signal that leads devices to display incorrect times or locations,
could potentially disrupt power grids or hijack systems including weapon
platform and key maneuver systems.15 As an offensive capability, the
ability to deny GPS signals to an adversary would be an important
maneuver and attack tool, especially in a highly decentralized and longrange targeting confl ict such as an A2/AD environment with unmanned
systems and attack munitions whose core functions rely on the signal.16

Competency 8: Directed Energy Systems

With the groundbreaking test of a laser weapons system aboard the
USS Ponce in 2014, directed energy systems have never been closer to
12 “Spectrum Sensing and Shaping,” Australian Department of Defence Science and
Technology, http://www.dst.defence.gov.au/capability/spectrum-sensing-and-shaping (accessed
August 18, 2016).
13 NovAtel, Mitigating the Threat of GPS Jamming: Anti-Jam Technology (white paper,
Alberta, Canada: NovAtel, 2012).
14 Philip G. Mattos and Fabio Pisoni, “Quad Constellation Receiver: GPS GLONASS, Galileo,
BeiDou,” GPS World, January 1, 2014.
15 “The increasing risk of GPS systems,” Homeland Security NewsWire, November 22, 2011,
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20111122-the-increasing-risks-of-gps-systems.
16 “China Unveils Anti-Drone Laser Weapon Able to Shoot Down ‘Small Aircraft’ within 5
Seconds,” RT, 2 November 2014, https://www.rt.com/news/201795-china-drone-defense-laser/.
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becoming integrated as fully operational military systems.17 An effective
capability that can block adversaries’ electronics and communications,
protect maritime and ground convoys in high risk zones, and protect
critical land, maritime, and airborne assets is crucial in defeating
future threats. Electromagnetic rail guns and directed energy missile
technologies are now fielded capabilities in some countries. Once
developed and deployed, these systems, such as the Tomahawk cruise
missile and the Javelin antitank missile, are relatively inexpensive.
While size, weight, interoperability, and lethality are factors, other
concerns, which mostly involve environmental extremes, limit directed
energy weapons. Traditional assault rifles are reliable in extreme tropical,
desert, and arctic conditions. They operate effectively in rain, snow,
dust, and fog. They can generally be immersed in water and covered
in mud without degrading their performance, and unlike directed
energy systems, assault rifles are not negatively affected by solar flares or
electromagnetic pulses.
A directed energy weapon relies on a sophisticated electronic circuit
to generate an energy beam, which can be isolated and shielded from
outside influence but not without adding weight and sophistication.
Clouds, fog, rain, and snow are all enemies of directed energy. Today’s
powerful antimissile airborne systems simply burn their way through
targets, but lower-energy man-portable systems will not have similar
sustained power nor are they likely to be as reliable in extreme battlefield
environments. Notwithstanding these caveats, directed energy weapons
will continue to evolve and potentially offer a significant technology
advantage against a peer adversary, especially against area denial
systems such as integrated air defense networks and hypersonic
antiship ballistic missiles.

Conclusion

As our forward-looking document, Australia in the Asian Century
states, “predicting the future is fraught with risk, but the greater risk is in
failing to plan for our destiny. As a nation, we face a choice: to drift into our
future or to actively shape it.”18 In a region that is increasingly dependent
on its maritime, air, and land access as a key element to support national
sovereignty, the Australian Defence Force must now focus significant
effort on developing the means to conduct expeditionary operations in
addition to maintaining regional access and engagement as part of a
layered approach to global and regional security as well as continental
defense. This amplification will require the Australian Defence Force
to develop strategies and concepts for defeating adversaries’ A2/
AD capabilities as part of its core mission set. And, the well-defined,
resourced, and balanced series of offset strategies mentioned here are
important components to defeat any such mechanism.
A critical question must be: how will Australia afford an offset
system such as that proposed in this paper? What legacy systems may
have to be sacrificed in order to afford such a system? Whether it is
all or part of the offset capabilities proposed, it is clear that Australia’s
17 “US Navy Deploys Laser Weapon to Persian Gulf for First-Ever Combat Mission,” RT,
November 14, 2014, https://www.rt.com/news/205711-us-laser-weapon-persian/.
18 PM&C, Australia in the Asian Century, 1.
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traditional “technology edge” within the Asian region is deteriorating—
and quickly. And given its relatively small military force, the Australian
government must either decide to leap to a technology end state that
reasserts a technology edge or face a loss of global access and influence
due to degraded military capabilities.
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ABSTRACT: The French Army strategy to protect the people
from terrorism and to remain involved in international stabilization
efforts comes at a cost. This article identifies steps to balance the
complexities through technology and force structure.

B

etween 2010 and 2025, French Army equipment will have
changed more than it did between 1970 and 2010. But, this
shift is not limited to fielding matériel, the French Army is
also undergoing a major reorganization—the Scorpion modernization program. Since the Île-de-France attacks (January 7–9, 2015), the
French Army’s overarching challenge has been to balance its interventions abroad, reassurance missions, and homeland security operations.
Although a relatively stable equilibrium has been found, the model raises
new questions regarding its long-term sustainability.
Choosing a priority between defending borders or projecting forces
abroad has been a continuous struggle. Beginning with the French
Revolutionary Wars (1792–99), France’s strategic culture has been
predominantly defined by defending its northeastern border, which
requires a large land force. This tendency was reinforced at the end of
the Algerian War (1954–62), when colonial troops returned to France.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the early 1970s caused the
French Army to join the West’s deterrence mission; however, despite
the assigned priority to defend the homeland against a Soviet invasion, a
small projection force maintained an expeditionary culture.
This Cold War model defined by levée en masse (massive conscription)
was applied until 1996, when the suspension of the practice was
announced. Since then, strategic priorities have been inverted. The
French Army has turned toward its expeditionary force to create a
more compact and better equipped army, one in which all units are
capable of intervening abroad.1 This trend extended through 2013 with
financial pressure causing a drastic reduction of the number of units
and personnel.2
In 2015, budgetary and political constraints pushed the army chief of
staff to redesign the service’s structure. This willingness to reform also
occurred in a disrupted and changing security environment, which as
of March 2017, compelled engagement in three domains: 7,000–10,000
The author’s views do not reflect those of the French Army.
1 Jérôme de Lespinois, L’armée de Terre, de la défense du sanctuaire à la projection (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2003).
2 Between 2009 and 2013, army personnel were reduced by approximately 22,000, dissolving 21
battalions and 7 headquarters. See Audition du général Jean-Pierre Bosser, chef d’état-major de l’armée de Terre,
sur le projet de loi de finance pour 2015.2 (Assemblée nationale, October 15, 2014).
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soldiers deployed in homeland operations responding to a high-level
terrorist threat; 10,000 participated in operations abroad driven by a
jihadist threat; and 300 supported North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Reassurance missions to Eastern European and Baltic states.
This article provides an overview of the French Army’s navigation of
these overlapping demands, and their influence on the service’s structure,
doctrine, and capabilities. Impacts of the renewed organization and
equipment, the innovative tactical thinking, and the friction resulting
from French forces’ return from national and international commitments are also covered.

“Au contact”—Transitioning within the Median

On May 28, 2015, the French Army officially unveiled its new
organization plan Au contact, meaning up close, which was drafted
before the Île-de-France attacks that emphasized the plan’s necessity
and relevance. Implementation, including dividing the army into 13
commands, began in September 2015 and will be finalized in 2017.
Although Au contact focuses on overseas interventions, it also rebalances
the army’s participation and visibility in terms of protection, particularly
across French territory. The National Territory Command, created
over the summer of 2016, intends to prepare for and facilitate military
engagement in the area in the case of disaster relief or homeland security
missions. Key army capabilities—such as special forces, airmobile
combat (including a new airmobile brigade), intelligence, information
and communication systems, and logistics—have also been reinforced
and consolidated into new dedicated commands. Most combat troops
have been regrouped into a Scorpion force composed of 47,000 soldiers
and organized into the newly created 1st Division, headquartered
in Besançon, and the 3rd Division, headquartered in Marseille. This
organization was a notable comeback from the “brigadized” French
order of battle in place during the late-1990s. These two divisions
comprise six combined arms brigades: two armored, two median, and
two light (airborne and mountain). These restructuring efforts prepare
for the Scorpion program and offer better visibility for France’s allies.
Concurrent with Au contact, the French Army is completing two
important transition phases. The first increases the army’s operational
combat force from 66,000 to 77,000 soldiers by the end of 2016 and
creates 33 combat companies within the infantry, armor, and combat
engineer branches. President François Hollande decided to halt previously planned personnel cuts in the wake of the Paris attacks of 2015
and Nice attack of 2016 to meet the demands of the army’s high operational tempo. This response marks a historic turning point after years
of steady personnel reductions and implies a major recruitment plan:
14,000 new recruits enrolled during 2016 making the army France’s
leading recruiter.3
The second transition updates equipment the army needs to intervene
abroad or to counter a high-end threat. The French Army is significantly renewing its equipment requirements for the fourth time since
1945, intending to replace such vehicles as the Véhicule de l’avant blindé
(VAB) armored personnel carrier and support vehicle (1976); AMX-10
3 Ibid.
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RC wheeled reconnaissance tank (1981); SA 341/SA 342 Gazelle multipurpose, lightweight utility/attack helicopter (1973); and Aérospatiale
SA 330 Puma medium transport/utility helicopter (1968). The new
equipment (inluding 630 VBCI wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, about
20,000 complete Fantassin à Equipments et Liaisons Intégrés (FELIN) future
infantry soldier equipment systems, 77 CAESAR 155-mm howitzers
installed on 6x6 truck chassis, 60 Tiger attack helicopters, and 13 LRU
multiple launch rocket systems) was widely used during operations in
Africa’s Sahel region.4 The French Army also intends to improve its
drone capabilities by ordering 14 Sagem Patroller unmanned aerial
vehicles.
In terms of equipment transitions, the Scorpion program intends
to completely modernize the equipment of the French Army’s key
operating unit, the groupement tactique interarmes (GTIA) combined arms
tactical group, which is a battalion level task force. All vehicles in the
median segment, which is the French Army’s hallmark, will be replaced.
The army intends to own combat vehicles that can be easily projected
onto distant battlefield theaters and can fight in high intensity confl icts.
The first phase of the program, scheduled to begin in 2018, consists of
delivering the initial 780 of 1,722 Griffon multirole armored personnel
carriers that will replace the large fleet of 40 year-old VABs. The initial
110 of 248 Jaguar reconnaissance and combat armored vehicles to
replace the AMX-10 RC, among others, are scheduled to be delivered
around 2020. Scorpion also includes upgraded versions of the Leclerc
main battle tank, with the first deliveries scheduled for 2020.5
Under this modernization plan, the French Army expects to
deploy its first Scorpion battle group abroad by 2021 and to have a fully
equipped Scorpion brigade by 2023.6 This renewal fi lls a critical need
because vehicles are suffering from accelerated attrition due to ongoing
operations abroad—French VABs average 1,000 kilometers per year in
France; per month in Afghanistan; per week in Sahel.7 Nevertheless,
funding this program through completion proves challenging; of the
estimated €7–8 billion needed for the program, only €6 billion have
been secured. Even if the mainstream presidential candidates for the
2017 election pledge to increase the defense budget (which was 1.77
percent of the gross domestic product in 2016) by 2 percent, the
funding would not be enough to solve all capability gaps, especially if
the increase is not realized before 2022.8 There is also a risk that the
renewal of nuclear deterrence equipment will take away part of France’s
defense funds at the expense of the army’s acquisition budget. Indeed,
deterrence funding has been estimated at €6 billion per year by 2025,
compared to €3.4 billion per year today.9
4 Pierre Chareyron, “Digital Hoplites. Infantry Combat in the Information Age,” Focus stratégique
n°30 bis (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales [IFRI], December 2011).
5 For a good overview of the Scorpion program in English, see Nicholas de Larrinaga, “Enter
the Scorpion: French Army Vehicle Fleet Modernization,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 24, 2016.
6 “Armée de Terre, l’ère des ruptures,” TTU, May 3, 2016, http://www.ttu.fr
/armee-de-terre-lere-ruptures/.
7 Audition du général Jean-Pierre Bosser, chef d’état-major de l’armée de Terre, sur le projet de
loi actualisant la programmation militaire pour les années 2015 à 2019 (Assemblée nationale, May
26, 2015).
8 Henry Samuel, “France Must Increase Defence Spending to 2pc of GDP by 2020 Warns
Chief of Defense Staff,” Telegraph (London), December 21, 2016.
9 Institut Montaigne, Refonder la sécurité nationale (Paris: Institut Montaigne, 2016), 142.
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Tactics: Toward Collaborative Warfare

The upcoming launch of the Scorpion program has triggered
interesting debates about the future of land combat, also labeled “digitallyenhanced collaborative warfare.” The underlying challenge here is
strategic: the aim is to maintain tactical and operational superiority to
counter both irregular actors in expeditionary warfare and state armies.
In reality, most of the concepts used to revive the doctrine are not
new—for instance, in early 2000, General Guy Hubin tried developing
disruptive tactical concepts.10 But today, the French Army is engaged in a
genuine experimental process before welcoming Scorpion’s equipment.
The introduction of the Scorpion command and information system
(SICS), a new communications system replacing all the older equipment,
creates a network for vetronics—a real tactical “game changer.”11 The
system facilitates information sharing (with an update of shared information at least every 10 seconds), which enables a collaborative command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR); blue force tracking; and enhanced reality, permitting collaborative warfare after 2025. This concept suggests mutual
support functions between all ground vehicles will be optimized due to
infovalorization—disseminating automatic alerts that allow instantaneous
response to calls for assistance among other things.12 In other words, a
vehicle detecting aggression can automatically transmit information to
friendly forces in the area who can spontaneously direct their detection
and firing systems on the target.
These new technologies should enable the army to accelerate the
pace of combat since networked units will enhance information sharing
and considerably shorten decision cycles. A 2005 RAND Corporation
study comparing the attack of an urban area by a nondigitized infantry
brigade with a Stryker brigade combat team demonstrated that digitization reduced the delay required for a brigade commander to make a major
decision from 24 to 3 hours, thanks to the collaborative work between
echelons.13 To focus on maneuvering speed and emphasize airmobile
combat, French Army tactics also include the possibility of using attack
helicopters and drone swarms.14 The introduction of beyond visual range
firing capabilities at the battle group level is another possible tactical
breakthrough. Medium-range missile moyenne portée (MMP) antitank
missiles fired from individual posts or Jaguar strike fighters and Hellfire
air-to-surface missiles fired from Tiger attack helicopters could help
decompartmentalize the maneuver, contributing to fluidifying it.15

10 Guy Hubin, Perspectives tactiques (Paris: Economica, 2003); and Les engagements futurs des forces
terrestres (Paris: Armée de Terre, 2010).
11 Nicolas Chaligne, “Le système d’information du combat Scorpion/The Command and
Information System (CIS) of Scorpion (SCIS),” Fantassins magazine n°36 (June 2016): 48–50,
http://fr.calameo.com/books/000009779038ce32036ba.
12 Hugues Perot, “L’infovalorisation dans Scorpion/The Scorpion Infovalorization,” Fantassins
magazine, n°36 (June 2016): 42–46, http://fr.calameo.com/books/000009779038ce32036ba.
13 Daniel Gonzales et al., Network-Centric Operations Case Study: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team,
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005); and Michel Goya, “Dix ans d’expérience des brigades numérisées
Stryker,” Lettre du Retex-recherche n°16, Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, May 16, 2014.
14 Armée de Terre, Action terrestre future: Demain se gagne aujourd’hui (Paris: Armée de Terre, 2016).
15 Brice Erbland, “Aérocombat et technologies avancées,” Ultima Ratio (blog), June 13, 2016,
http://ultimaratio-blog.org/archives/7778.
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Agility, however, is needed to conduct swift maneuvers. To obtain
agility, or the “continued ability to meet the scalability of a diverse,
turbulent and uncertain environment,” the French armed forces must
take the following factors into consideration.16 First, the intellectual
capacities to understand the given environment and be imaginative
when thinking about tactics are essential.17 Second, a new information
and communication system through networked mode warfare, such as
the Scorpion infovalorization, should permit fast reconfiguration of
battle order and enable battle group flexibility.
Finally, not only technology but also command culture is key. The
French Army has a long tradition of mission-command by objective. To
take advantage of new technological advancements, however, the army
must encourage more horizontal information exchanges and increasing
subsidiarity. This transition will probably prove difficult for the army to
undertake. Some small organizational models, particularly within the
special forces community, offer us food for thought about the future of
subordination.18 Whether we successfully apply their solutions to larger
units, however, remains questionable.

The Challenges of Territorial Defense

Of course, the French armed forces’ priority has always been
protecting its national territory, but since 1996, the French Army has
devoted most of its attention to Opérations Extérieures—operations
abroad. Consequently, 2016 marked the quest for equilibrium between
interventions abroad and presence in the national territory.
As far as antiterrorism is concerned, the army has been engaged on
national soil since responding to the 1995 Paris subway bombing under
the Vigipirate homeland security program. The operational footprint
has always been light with approximately 1,000 soldiers mobilized,
mainly in Paris, since 2003.19 Three days after the Île-de-France attacks,
a historic turning point occurred: 10,000 soldiers were deployed in the
main French cities, which was the beginning of Operation Sentinelle.
Although intended as a temporary measure, the deployment was
extended after the attacks in Paris and Nice. As of August 2016, the
number of deployed soldiers had been reduced to 7,000, half of which
operate in and around Paris, and 3,000 soldiers became part of a quickreaction force.
Since implementing Sentinelle, the distribution of soldiers’ time
between foreign and domestic operations has changed tremendously.
Before January 2015, a soldier spent 15 percent of his or her time in
operations abroad and 5 percent on national soil. Since January 2015,
however, the time devoted to operations abroad has not changed and
soldiers spend an additional 35–45 percent of their time operating
within France. Once the French Army reaches an operational force of
16 “Action terrestre future.”
17 Rémy Hémez, “Tactics Mandatory Imagination in #Leadership,” The Strategy Bridge, April
1, 2016. http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the-bridge/2016/4/1/tactics-mandatory-imagination
-in-leadership.
18 Stanley McChrystal, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York:
Portfolio / Penguin, 2015).
19 Elie Tenenbaum, La sentinelle égarée? L’armée de Terre face au terrorisme, Focus stratégique n°68
(Paris: IFRI, June 2016).
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77,000 soldiers in 2018, soldiers will dedicate no more than 20 to 25
percent of their time to domestic operations.20
The Ministry of Defense report on the use of armed forces on national
soil presented before the Parliament in March 2016 suggests the logic
of projection on the national territory should be replaced by a persistent
“land protection posture” concept.21 The French public supports this
shift with 87 percent of the population having a positive opinion of the
army and 77 percent supporting Sentinelle.22 In early 2017, soldiers were
also praised for their swift and effective response in two major attacks
against them: one at the Louvre museum in February and one at the Orly
airport in March.23 Even so, experts continue to doubt the modus operandi: the current legal framework limits responses to self-defense and
does not allow soldiers to conduct intelligence missions, make arrests, or
engage in kinetic counterterrorism operations on national soil.24
Although Sentinelle predominantly entailed static guarding of
sensitive sites between January and April 2015, all current missions are
dynamic, with groups of soldiers patrolling the streets. Despite these
factors, the debate about how to use armed forces on national soil
remains heated, which is unusual for defense-related matters in France.25
The operation is demanding for French soldiers; for example, some of
them patrol 20 to 25 kilometers a day on foot.26 Also, 50 percent of the
operating force spends more than 150 days a year from their home to
conduct Sentinelle and external operations; some soldiers even work
220 days.27 This high level of engagement in homeland operations also
affects the training cycle, which was the first variable reduced to meet
requirements. On average, only 65 days were dedicated to operational
training in 2015 and 70 to 75 days in 2016, compared to a goal of 90 days
when personnel requirements are met. The impact of training deficiencies is somewhat offset by operations abroad, but the negative effect on
readiness should not be ignored, especially in high-intensity confl icts.
Another way to alleviate pressure imposed on French troops is to
use available reserve forces. Hence, France must consider increasing
operational reserves from 16,496 members in 2016 to 24,334 members
by 2019.28 Rapid mobilization of these soldiers is not straightforward as a
20 Audition du général Arnaud Sainte-Claire Deville, commandant les forces terrestres (Assemblée nationale, November 17, 2015).
21 Ministère de la défense, Rapport au Parlement relatif aux conditions d’emploi des forces armées sur le
territoire national (Paris: La Délégation à l’information et à la communication de la defense [DICoD],
March 2016).
22 “Les chiffres clés des sondages de la défense,” Ministère de la défense, July 7, 2016,
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail-defense/mediatheque/publications/les-chiffres-cles-de
-sondages-de-la-defense-juillet-2016.
23 Lizzie Dearden and Caroline Mortimer, “Le Louvre Terror Attack: Man Shouting ‘Allahu
Akbar’ Shot after Trying to Kill French Soldier with a Machete,” Independent (London), February 3,
2017; and David Chazan, “Radicalised Muslim Known to Seucrity Agencies Shot Dead in Attack
at Paris Airport – As Security Stepped Up at Stadium Where Duke and Duchess Watch Rugby,”
Telegraph (London), March 18, 2017.
24 Tenenbaum, La sentinelle égarée?
25 Florent de Saint-Victor, “Débat stratégique français et opération Sentinelle—Quand la
France est capable de débattre,” Mars Attaque (blog), September 1, 2016, http://mars-attaque
.blogspot.com/2016/09/debat-strategique-sentinelle-france-operations-territoire-national.html.
26 Audition du général Jean-Pierre Bosser, chef d’état-major de l’armée de Terre, sur le projet de loi de finance
pour 2016 (Assemblée nationale, October 13, 2015).
27 Audition du général Jean-Pierre Bosser, chef d’état-major de l’armée de Terre, sur le projet de loi de finance
pour 2017 (Assemblée nationale, October 11, 2016).
28 Refonder la sécurité nationale, 118.
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30-day notice period is currently required. This issue is far more complex
regarding the secondary level reserve, which represents a significant
capacity of at least 20,000 soldiers available to the army alone.29
The secondary level reserve comprises soldiers who left the army
in the past 5 years that can be recalled under a prime minister’s decree.
Although this disposal has never been evaluated on a large scale, it was
tested in March 2016 when 46 percent of 3,600 veterans within two
brigades responded positively to the call.30 In fact, since the French
Army’s professionalization in 1996, administrative monitoring for secondary level reservists has been inconsistent. Concerns have also been
raised regarding the lack of equipment available for reservists. To revive
the operational reserves, France recreated a national guard in October
2016—which, unlike its American counterpart, primarily designates
coordination authority. The aim is to constitute a force of 84,000
soldiers by regrouping police, gendarmerie, and reserves before 2018.
Most importantly, incentives—mostly financial—have been introduced
to attract interest and to accelerate recruitment in the reserves. The
2017 presidential elections also initiated a public debate regarding the
reactivation of conscription in France that, if implemented by the future
president, will drastically change the French Army model.
Hence, Sentinelle has largely defined the evolution of the French
Army’s new operational equilibrium between homeland and foreign
operations, which will clearly have long-term effects and most certainly
remain a controversial issue. The impact this strategic balance will have
on foreign interventions is difficult to assess, but it could affect the
French Army’s operational readiness for high-end scenarios and hamper
its ability to react swiftly to a strategic surprise.

Toward a New Model of Intervention

Despite the renewed commitment to homeland operations, the
French Army remains heavily engaged abroad. Since September 2014,
French troops have been engaged in Operation Chammal in Iraq and
Syria to support operations against the Islamic State. In 2015, half of
army personnel spent more than 200 days in operations with intense
and continual activity. As of March 2017, 10,000 French soldiers are
deployed outside France, mostly to counter terrorist threats, and 1,120
strikes have been conducted against the Islamic State, which represents
about 8 percent of coalition strikes, the third largest contribution.
France also has three task forces dedicated to the training and mentoring mission of Chammal in Iraq. The first one is embedded inside
the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service. The second task force, about 100
soldiers, is embedded inside Iraq’s 6th Infantry Division, headquartered near Abu Ghraib. Finally, Task Force Wagram, comprising four
CAESAR guns, has been dispatched to Iraq since summer 2016.
Operation Barkhane remains France’s prime military deployment
and strategic priority. This operation began in August 2014 after the end
of Operation Serval (2013–14), a joint combat operation with Malian
29 Audition du général Arnaud Sainte-Claire Deville, commandant les forces terrestres (Assemblée nationale, November 17, 2015).
30 Ministère de la défense, Exercice Vortex 2016, la réserve rappelle ses anciens (Paris : Ministère de
la défense, May 15, 2016).
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government forces aimed at protecting the capital city of Bamako
and retrieving militant held territory.31 Operation Barkhane partly
reorganized French military forces that were already present in West
Africa. As of March 2017, the French are deploying 3,500 personnel
throughout five countries in the Sahel region: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, and Niger. Due to its high level of engagement, France has
been forced to curtail other nonpriority operations such as Sangaris
in the Central African Republic (December 2013–October 2016).
France also maintains forward presence forces of up to 3,800 personnel
conducting long-term military assistance and training missions in allied
countries such as Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Djibouti, and the
United Arab Emirates.
To cope with the high rate of external deployment and the demand
for homeland security operations, France is to a certain extent looking
to reform its intervention model by reducing operational durations.
Since the war in Mali and Operation Sangaris, Paris has promoted
the concept of “bridging operations.”32 The aim of such transitional
operations is to stabilize a situation until other forces can take over the
mission. According to this concept, a limited but decisive volume of
force is used during the intervention phase to work towards the rapid
deployment of United Nations forces and to transfer the authority to a
multinational body.
The will to reduce the length of commitments abroad is largely
driven by the fact that the size of the French Army has been drastically reduced since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, according to
its operational contract, France should only deploy 15,000 soldiers to a
main theater, and 7,000–8,000 soldiers to a secondary theater, for up to
six months; however, an average of 7,500 troops have been deployed in
overseas operations since 2008, not counting those operating in France
under Operation Sentinelle since January 2015.
These harsh matériel and human constraints are coupled with a
strong desire to not engage in lengthy stabilization missions, as experienced in Afghanistan. This perception is particularly true in a context
where operations involving French soldiers are cumulative and rarely
last less than 13 years. Operation Serval only lasted 18 months, but was
continued as Operation Barkhane. Operation Pamir in Afghanistan
lasted 13 years (2001–14) as did Operation Licorne in the Ivory Coast
(2002–15). Moreover, this bridging model is far from an ideal solution:
first, it is always difficult to transform tactical success into strategic
effects, and second, United Nations forces are not always efficient.
Faced with major changes in its strategic environment, France must
“renew the approach of military commitments” as mentioned in the
army strategic vision.33 The era of external operations that began in the
1970s when the French Army sought efficiency by undertaking quick
military action at a low cost is questioned.34 This “techno-professional
31 For a good analysis of this operation in English, see Christopher S. Chivvis, The French War
on Al Qa’ida in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
32 Rémy Hémez and Aline Leboeuf, Retours sur Sangaris, Entre stabilisation et protection des populations, Focus stratégique n°67 (Paris: IFRI, April 2016).
33 “Action terrestre future,” 15.
34 Michel Goya, “Les opérations extérieures,” in L’action militaire terrestre de A à Z, ed. Didier
Danet, Ronan Doaré, and Christian Malis (Paris: Economica, 2015), 372–79.
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compact Army” model is further challenged by four factors.35 First,
victory still requires the continued presence of forces on the ground.
Second, the average level of the median threat is rising. Third, the risk
of state-to-state confl ict is reemerging. And fourth, the army is engaged
afresh in France to protect the homeland.

Conclusion

The French Army is engaged in an extremely critical modernization process that includes Scorpion vehicles and information systems,
which will renew the French battle groups’ equipment. Though, most
important, the French Army is also beginning to encourage a revival of
military thinking to adapt the doctrine and tactics for disrupted environments and the new equipment to maintain a tactical and operational
edge in a changing strategic environment.
Tensions fostered by the deployment of 7,500 to 10,000 soldiers on
the national territory following multiple terrorist attacks have triggered
a quest for a new equilibrium between commitments abroad and homeland operations. As far as Europe is concerned, the necessity is specific
to France, the only country to have so many troops deployed abroad.
Germany has only 2,500 soldiers committed to interventions: that is
60 percent less than France. Even if some European countries, such as
Belgium and Italy, have deployed soldiers in the streets of their cities to
respond to terrorists threats, the size and duration of the French Army’s
commitment to homeland security operations is exceptional. The French
Army’s increased operational force from 66,000 to 77,000 soldiers is an
answer, but will not be enough latitude for strategic response.
The revival of France’s reserve force will be a key factor in determining the nation’s ability to maintain balance between foreign and
domestic operations and should be considered as the means to reconnect with the continental operational legacy of French strategic culture.
Besides, it is no coincidence that mass—the “ability to generate and
maintain sufficient strength ratio to produce strategic decision effects in
the long term”—is coming back into the French Army’s gray literature.
The return is necessary due to “demographic expansion in Europe’s
southern flank,” “the proliferation of mega-cities,” and the importance
of having a robust force when conventional deterrence is considered.”36
The need for mass also highlights the problems raised by military
resurgence and emphasizes, among other things, the requirement for a
high rate of supervision within the orders to cope with the 118,000 soldiers and policemen that could be recalled under the second tier reserve
principle.37
With 77,000 soldiers in the operational force and the reforms
carried out as part of Au contact, the French model is still viable even if
the equilibrium between homeland operations and territorial operations
continues. Moreover, because this equilibrium is driven by a political
inclination to make the French feel safer and retain French status in the
international system, reforms will prove difficult without a major shift
35 Christian Malis quoted in “Action terrestre future,” 15.
36 Ibid., 37–40.
37 Guillaume Garnier, Les chausse-trapes de la remontée en puissance, Focus stratégique n°52 (Paris:
IFRI, May 2014).
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in the global security environment. It is worth noting, however, that this
model will remain in tension and may have trouble reacting to a major
shift in the strategic environment. It is difficult to always ask for more
financial resources, especially in a country with budgetary problems, but
as General Pierre de Villiers, the French chief of defense staff said: “The
price of peace is the war effort.”38

38 General Pierre de Villers, “Le prix de la paix c’est l’effort de guerre,” Les Echos, December
20, 2016.
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Torture and the Human Mind
Larry D. Miller

F

or the United States government to authorize the infliction of
severe physical and emotional distress as a means of extracting
information from detainees, the situation must be grave and
the need for intelligence extreme. Whether understood as “enhanced
interrogation” or “torture,” the process requires stepping outside the
bounds of normal interrogation conduct. Evaluating the efficacy
of enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT), therefore, is vital to the
decision-making process as the consequences of a failed program of
interrogation could be severe. Two recent books address the question of
effectiveness by exploring enhanced interrogation as a way to achieve an
end: Enhanced Interrogation by James E. Mitchell and Why Torture Doesn’t
Work by Shane O’Mara.
Considered separately, the two works appear to be in contrast
with each other. Mitchell argues from personal experience that enhanced
interrogation can be an effective method for extracting information,
but only if undertaken with exacting care. O’Mara, on the other hand,
argues from neuroscientific and biomedical evidence that torture is
counterproductive to mission success. A careful read of each book
in turn, however, illustrates the fine line between success and
failure and demonstrates that, although sometimes credited with
successful outcomes, torture techniques are far more likely to fail than
to succeed and authorizing them may create more difficulties and
roadblocks than desired.
Enhanced Interrogation details the author’s insider account of the
development and execution of “enhanced interrogation” techniques
within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Efforts to enhance
interrogation were initiated early in 2002 in response to the 9/11 attacks.
Enhancement adds coercive elements to conventional interrogation.
Conventional interrogation operates from a “traditional rapport-based
law enforcement approach,” excludes coercive manipulations, and
maximizes social influence tactics in an effort to elicit information from
reluctant informants (43). Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
Collector Operations, details approved techniques for interrogating
prisoners and detainees. One might tersely summarize the field manual’s
guidance as: “talk, but don’t threaten and don’t hit.”
According to Mitchell, once EITs were defined and approved by
appropriate agencies and authorities, they were employed on highvalue detainees believed to harbor intelligence essential to US national
security (51). Enhanced interrogation increases physical and mental
stress through an array of manipulations, sensory deprivations, and
progressively harsher treatment, to include life-threatening, but
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non-lethal force under monitored conditions in highly restrictive environments. The
purpose is straightforward: create sufficient
mental and physical distress to prompt a
detainee to reveal what he or she knows. The
enhancement increases distress, induces fear,
and maximizes discomfort with hard-case,
high-value detainees until they are willing to
talk. Once they start talking, the interrogator opts for conventional social influence
approaches.
Mitchell, a clinical psychologist, is
exceptionally knowledgeable and highly
experienced with EITs. Prior to being
recruited by the CIA, he was an Air Force
James E. Mitchell, PhD, with Bill Harlow,
officer and an operational psychologist
Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds
and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying with experience in hostage negotiation and
to Destroy America (New York: Crown
considerable expertise in preparing military
Forum, 2016), 400 pages, $28.00
personnel risking capture during critical
missions (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape [SERE] training).
Mitchell quickly became a leading figure within a relatively small cadre
of interrogators responsible for both crafting enhancement techniques
and establishing protocol at secret locations known as “black sites.”1 He
was a CIA contract interrogator from August 2002 until the program
ended in January 2009.2
In this book, Mitchell proffers an explanation, critique, and, in good
measure, a defense of EITs and his CIA work. Mitchell believes he has
been “the target of rumor and innuendo” for over a decade and until
recently was relegated to silence by a “nondisclosure agreement with the
US government.”3 He argues the official Senate report on CIA torture is
incomplete, inaccurate, and, at best, one-sided (3, 5).4
Mitchell tells his side of the story in a direct, first-person, narrative
style that is somewhat earthy at times. In 12 chapters, he explains how
he was recruited by the CIA, why he was recruited, what he did, to
whom and how he did it, what he observed, and his perspective on how
his advice and council were received. He argues his views were sometimes ignored, overlooked, or dismissed by on-site authorities who took
inappropriate liberties in applying unapproved EITs and/or ignoring
safeguard protocols.
Mitchell enumerates 10 approved EITs employed at CIA black sites,
noting the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Program “ . . . used only the
1 Mitchell’s primary colleague was Bruce Jessen, a former Air Force colleague and a contract
CIA operational psychologist.
2 Barack Obama, “Executive Order 13491—Ensuring Lawful Interrogations,” January 23, 2009,
linked from The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85669
(accessed January 22, 2017).
3 Mitchell and colleague Bruce Jessen have been charged in federal court with violation(s) of the
Alien Tort Statute which allows foreign nationals to seek remedies in US courts for human rights
violations committee outside the United States. A trial to adjudicate a suit initiated by three plaintiffs
is slated for June 2017.
4 For the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, see Committee Study of the
Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 2014). The full report contains three documents: primary findings and conclusions,
additional views, and minority views.
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EITs that were cleared by the Department
of Justice, approved by [President Bush],
briefed to congressional leadership, and
authorized by CIA headquarters” (51, 287).
Cleared EITs included: attention grasp,
walling, facial hold, insult slap, cramped
confinement with or without insects, stress
positions, wall standing, sleep deprivation,
and waterboarding (52–53). Two additional
EITs, “manhandling” and “smoking”
were not recommended. Manhandling
involves violently shaking a detainee using
a towel “rolled up and placed like a cervical
collar around the neck.” Smoking involves
blowing smoke in the detainee’s face until a
state of nausea is attained (54).
Shane O’Mara, Why Torture Doesn’t
Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation
On balance, Mitchell advances an (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press,
2015),
336 pages, $29.95
informative and concerning read anchored
by three considerations. First, following
9/11 “getting rough” with high-value detainees (i.e., captives believed to
possess needed intelligence) was essential to national security. Second,
enhanced interrogation is inherently unpleasant for everyone except
possibly those inclined toward excess and misconduct when given a free
hand. Third, opportunities for misstep and error in judgment at black
site operations are substantial as national security interests can quickly
preempt and overwhelm American values.
Mitchell incorporates ample specifics detailing numerous
interrogations while unpacking an enduring narrative of his experience
with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, the fluent English-speaking
terrorist who, along with Osama bin Laden, is believed to be “the principal
architect” behind the 9/11 attacks.5 Mitchell’s initial encounter with
Mukhtar, the title KSM preferred (which translates to “the brain” in
English), revealed a short, pot-bellied, naked, angry man with shaved
head and beard and “hands and feet shackled” (7).
In chapter six, “KSM: From Confrontation to Compliance,” Mitchell
describes how he and Bruce Jessen systematically applied EITs to overcome resistance gradually by a very tough, psychologically resilient,
hard-core jihadist who was “highly skilled at protecting information”
(150). According to Mitchell, the Spartanesque black site environs
involved shackles and chaining, assorted sensory deprivations including
hooding, guards dressed in black head to toe behind fully covered faces,
walling, around-the-clock interrogation, and waterboarding which,
somewhat surprisingly, proved rather ineffective with KSM. Resistance
was finally “ . . . overcome [through] a combination of walling and
sleep deprivation” (149).
Administering EITs, Mitchell believes, requires a careful balance
of classical (Pavlovian) and avoidance conditioning. Generally,
following any evidence of willingness to comply, Mitchell says he and
5 KSM, detained at Guantanamo Bay, received a degree in mechanical engineering from North
Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in 1986. He beheaded Wall Street Journal
reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002. See Marc A. Thiessen, “A Horrifying Look into the Mind of 9/11’s
Mastermind, in His Own Words,” Washington Post, November 28, 2016.
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Jessen shifted from EITs to conventional interrogation techniques,
only returning to enhancement should cooperation diminish. The
key to loosening the tongue, Mitchell intimates, derives from the
interrogator’s ability to identify when the detainee is lying or
misdirecting and initiating enhancement at precisely the right time.
Doing so usually produced results within 72 hours. From Mitchell’s
perspective, success is not due merely to distress, pain, or discomfort,
but in good measure is a function of perceptive judgment resulting
from careful observation and extensive familiarity with the detainee’s
behavior, mannerisms, response patterns, preferences, and rapport with
the interrogator, however marginal. Interrogation of KSM reportedly
produced information that helped disrupt five terrorist plots and was
critical to locating Osama bin Laden. Mitchell maintains the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence report claiming the CIA’s interrogation program “produced nothing with intelligence value” is ludicrous
and views to the contrary were largely ignored by the media (4, 164).
Mitchell acknowledges having used EITs with five high-value detainees. He was also, at times, associated with additional applications and other
detainees, and he observed other interrogators at work (201). Peppered
throughout the book are statements and comments that EITs were
sometimes applied inappropriately, too vigorously, and/or excessively
by individuals whose desire to acquire information was compromised
by unnecessary displays of authority, mistreatment of detainees for
no identifiable or specific reason, and sometimes as an unrestrained
desire to exact revenge for violence perpetrated against American
citizens and/or uniformed personnel. Mitchell claims, when he expressed
concern that cooperating detainees were being handled roughly and
inappropriately by guards, he was told by his superiors to “mind his
own . . . business” (103).
Mitchell’s objections to the application of unauthorized and
excessively coercive techniques resulted in his exclusion from interrogation rooms at some black sites. He describes witnessing a variety of
unapproved coercive techniques (115). The “abusive drift” he observed
early in the CIA program came under scrutiny following the fiasco at
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Problems with the Army’s management
of the facility prompted a concerted review of US personnel practices
and eventually resulted in the termination of EITs within the CIA’s
Detention and Interrogation Program. Mitchell maintains that EITs,
when expertly executed, remain effective tools for extracting intelligence from hard-core, high-value detainees. Based on his experience
and observations, he believes walling and sleep deprivation to be the
most effective techniques (237).
In Why Torture Doesn’t Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation,
O’Mara advances a strikingly contrasting assessment regarding the
efficacy of interrogation as a method for extracting information from
unwilling informants. While Mitchell offers an intensely personal
“hands-on” exposé of his experiences as an interrogator, O’Mara
examines, critiques, and integrates a comprehensive body of biomedical
research literature documenting the impact of coercive interrogation
methods on the brain’s ability to regulate “expression of thoughts,
emotions, and behaviors” (3). Mitchell explains to the reading public
what happens at black sites and how EITs work. O’Mara’s goal is different
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than Mitchell’s goal. He hopes to stimulate “colleagues in neuroscience,
psychology, and psychiatry to become more deeply involved in [what are
important] public policy issues” (5).
O’Mara, a dedicated experimental neuroscientist, examines how the
human brain functions in response to extreme physiological and mental
stressors commonly employed to enhance information extraction from
unwilling informants. In his view, the term “enhanced interrogation” is
a euphemistic mask for the infl iction of severe and sustained stressors,
anxiety, fear, and pain such that fundamentally torturous acts are rendered more socially acceptable within the body politic. O’Mara maintains
the evidentiary basis for torture lacks credibility in biomedical literature.
Moreover, enthusiasm for torture generally, and EITs specifically, is
largely the product of an “ad hoc mixture of anecdotal, cherry-picked
stories,” convincing counterfactual fabrications, and fanciful projections
by contemporary screenwriters and production houses (2, 6).
In short, O’Mara argues there is no evidence information stored in
the memory systems of detained persons is rendered accessible through
EIT protocols. What is more likely is the “profound and extreme
stressors [associated with EITs and other forms of torture] cause
widespread and enduring alterations to the very fabric of the brain . . .
upon which memory depends” (8). His fundamental question: Is there
verifiable evidence enhanced interrogation techniques “ . . . actually
enhance the outcomes of interrogation” (15)?
Why Torture Doesn’t Work, organized into eight well-crafted chapters, integrates and summarizes an extensive body of peer-reviewed
biomedical literature, including nearly 250 studies. Although the primary
targeted readership is the professional biomedical community, the text
is accessible to the reading public. Technical and scientific terminology,
while somewhat common, is readily clarified by brief explanations and
parenthetical commentary.
The initial chapter, “Torture in Modern Times,” succinctly
details how modern democracies have used torture in pursuit of
democratic ends. The records of the French, the English, and Americans,
among others, are briefly noted. The primary focus, however, is on
decision-making, standards of evidence, and arguments advanced as
justification for state-sanctioned “rough handling” as a necessary aid
to intelligence gathering. Chapters two and three focus respectively
on the relationship between human memory and executive function,
including the ability to recall, memory inconsistencies, lapses in
eyewitness testimony, and the utility of technologies, such as brain
imaging and truth serums, in detecting lying and deception. Chapter
four reviews how stress and pain impact brain functioning. Evidence
shows chronic severe stressors impair psychological functioning with
deleterious effects on both memory and recall whether stress derives
from drilling an unanaesthetized tooth (not a sanctioned EIT), physical
restraint, claustrophobic confinement (with or without insects), social
isolation, sensory deprivation, or a persistent foreboding something very
bad, painful, and unknown is about to occur.
Chapter five examines the impact of sleep deprivation on the human
brain and information processing ability. Sleep deprivation produces
cognitive deficits, diminished verbal fluency and capacity to think,
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hallucinations, and impaired motor performance. Somewhat surprisingly,
it can also induce amnesia (163). Consequently, using sleep deprivation
to enhance memory and recall may be counterproductive. O’Mara is
clear: “Sleep deprivation is . . . not a tool that should be used under
any circumstances [if] access to ongoing memory function in detainees
is required” (167).
Chapter six explores how “manipulating the fundamental metabolic physiology of the body” through near drowning (waterboarding),
extreme temperature reduction (lowering core body temperature),
applying excessive heat (enhancing thirst), and dietary restrictions
(reduced caloric intake) impact the brain’s ability to function, process
information, and recover memories. Metabolic enhancements are
commonly known as “white torture” because they leave no visible marks
(172). Compromising essential metabolic functions has a deep record
of use in human history as the techniques are easy, inexpensive, and
remarkably effective in producing fright, discomfort, and pain. What is
patently lacking in the literature, however, is verifiable or even suggestive
evidence that metabolic assaults on the body and the brain effectively
prompt a willingness to disclose harbored intelligence.
Chapter seven addresses two important questions: Why do people
torture, and what impact, if any, does torturing a person have on those
who actually do it? The research literature is consistent and closely
aligned with the outcomes of the famous 1960s Milgram experiments
on obedience to authority. Human beings, all human beings, “ . . . have
a propensity to obey authority under the right circumstances” especially
so when the context is inflamed by high levels of anger (209, 211). Many
individuals, although not all, who impose extreme stressors on other
human beings, even when the acts are authorized and sanctioned by
the state, become troubled in ways that negatively impact their brain
function, especially with regard to emotional stability, psychological
health, and long-term decision-making. Jennifer S. Bryson, who interrogated detainees at Guantanamo observed “[e]ngaging in torture
damages the torturer” because the dehumanization process is selfcorrupting (222). Mitchell himself acknowledged the “ . . . techniques
are so harsh that it’s emotionally distressing to the people who are
administering them” (206).
In the final chapter, O’Mara makes his pitch: interrogation and
talking sans coercion is a viable method with a high, albeit imperfect, likelihood of extracting useful intelligence from initially reluctant detainees.
Terrorists, while reprehensible, are not generally crazy. Rather, most are
highly dangerous rational actors who are prepared to kill and to be killed
in the service of their cause (243). Accessing information and memories
from these individuals using only language and enhanced social skills
requires time and exceptional psychological and communicative insight.
Regrettably, the methods will not work in every instance.
O’Mara acknowledges the extreme challenges inherent in
interrogation when working with hostile detained populations. Simply
put, harsh practices do not work well as useful intelligence-gathering
enhancements. Fresh options are needed. His recommendations are
numerous and include: study and refinement of humane interrogation
practices, radical alternative approaches such as virtual reality-based
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interrogation, and exploring narrative and role-playing reversals,
among others.
O’Mara concludes that gathering intelligence through interrogation
is an essential, critical competency in the modern world. Current initiatives and practices, however, have not been impressively productive as
they are rooted in the whims of policymakers and the tactical methods of
poorly prepared interrogators. What is needed is a solid evidence-based
approach that establishes what works and what does not work—and
most importantly, that is fully grounded in humane, appropriately legal,
moral, and ethical interrogation practices (270).

Significance

On balance, “enhanced interrogation” as characterized by Mitchell
is not meaningfully different from “torture” as characterized by O’Mara.
Their respective experiences, backgrounds, and intents, however, for
taking pen to paper are starkly different. Mitchell seeks to tell his story,
justifying limited, specific use of torture by those with unequalled
expertise; O’Mara seeks to marshal evidence with the potential to
impact policy, eschewing torture as psychologically and physiologically
ineffective. Both authors agree security considerations require extracting
information from hostile and reluctant informants, and interrogation
is a viable way through which to accomplish that end. Thus, despite
general concurrence on ends and ways, independent readings suggest
they maintain minimal agreement with regard to means.
Mitchell believes enhanced interrogation when properly applied
works, despite associated problems acknowledged throughout his book.
O’Mara views the application of coercion as counterproductive and
antithetical to sane policy for responsible and sustainable intelligence
gathering. Their points of clear agreement are two. First, both Mitchell
and O’Mara acknowledge coercive interrogation negatively impacts the
emotional stability and well-being, not only of the subjects in question,
but also of the interrogators themselves—not a desirable outcome.
Second, and much more subtle, both authors recognize acquiring useful
intelligence is intimately aligned with the interrogator’s ability to build
and maintain a relationship with the detainee.
O’Mara demonstrates convincingly the relationship between
detainees and interrogators is absolutely key to “ . . . any process by
which information, memories, and the like are to be recovered from
suspects” (259). Mitchell agrees, contending enhancements alone do not
produce useful intelligence, but rather only work when the interrogator
is intimately familiar with the individual detainee through observation,
sustained dialogue, and comprehensive study. Thus, he argues that
although torture may be an effective tool in limited circumstances,
it cannot be utilized in isolation as human connection is an essential
component of any effective information-gathering campaign.
In sum, the two writers—worlds apart in terms of
experience, investigative orientation, and mission—achieve an element
of convergence with regard to the use of enhanced interrogation as a
programmatic response to threats. Mitchell contends enhancement in
the hands of an exceptional interrogator can produce results and, in
so arguing, suggests his own exceptionalism. Absent his (or another’s)
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exacting expertise, enhanced interrogation becomes torture without
results. O’Mara argues exceptionalism should never dictate policy, but
rather policy should be based on solid, verifiable evidence. In effect,
Mitchell’s position that absent his (or another’s) exacting expertise,
enhanced interrogation becomes torture without results advances
O’Mara’s case against embracing enhanced interrogation at the policy
level. Taken together, Enhanced Interrogation and Why Torture Doesn’t Work
provide thoughtful and compelling insights into where we have been as
a nation and how we can move forward as the leader of the free world
during challenging times.

Commentaries and Replies
On “The Army’s Identity Crisis”
Conrad C. Crane

This commentary responds to Gates Brown’s article “The Army’s Identity Crisis”
published in the Winter 2016–17 issue of Parameters (vol. 46, no. 4).

A

lthough it recognizes the difficulty of predicting the location
and timing of the next war, the Army has tried to prepare for
certain types. Historically, the choices have been between the
most dangerous, generally a full-blown conventional war against a nearpeer, or the most likely, a lower scale conflict such as counterinsurgency.
Some have argued all other types of war or contingencies are just
subsets of the first category, a misconception that has had significant
consequences from Baghdad to Bosnia, and from Haiti to Helmand. Dr.
Gates Brown has introduced a new twist, arguing that in the current
environment, the most dangerous scenario of full-scale combined arms
warfare against a near-peer competitor is also the most likely, and the
Army should train and structure itself accordingly.
He supports that claim by stating that Army Doctrine Publication
3-0, Unified Land Operations, defines the Army’s main threats as a
nonstate actor with weapons of mass destruction that would best be
handled by special operations forces, or a nuclear capable nation-state
partnered with nonstate actors. In fact, the doctrine just calls those “the
most challenging potential enemy,” a variation on the most dangerous
argument, and states, “The most likely security threats that Army forces
will encounter are best described as hybrid threats” (4). The passage goes
on to explain that such enemies might resort to high-end capabilities
of conventional state confl ict or protracted war with irregular proxies,
and the Army must be prepared to deal with all aspects of such a threat
spectrum, including protecting populations.
Without doctrinal justification, the most effective argument Brown
has left to make is that instead of risking an incoherent approach while
trying to develop a force capable of both counterinsurgency and maneuver
warfare against a near-peer, the Army would be better off focusing its
mission, acquisitions, and training on what he terms the “most direct
threat to the nation,” which is a high-intensity confl ict, and accepting
increased risk for other levels of confl ict or operations. That is a return
to the traditional debate. His position ignores the implications of hybrid
threats, and the fact that both Chinese and Russian doctrine writings
emphasize the utility of what have been called gray-zone confl icts that
avoid the level of high intensity or full blown conventional war.
His approach makes some sense for systems acquisition, as highintensity confl ict is the most technologically dependent. Training is
another matter. The Army did see degradation of some conventional
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combat skills over the last decade, most notably in large-scale fire and
maneuver, but has been working diligently to restore them. I have
heard the noted defense analyst Stephen Biddle advocate for an “Army
of Mediocrity.” That is not a very attractive bumper sticker, but his
point is the force can be given some preparation for a wide variety of
missions and then trained-up for specific deployments. That seems a
very sensible approach in an uncertain world where the Army cannot
choose the missions political leaders will assign.
Arguing in Congress for just the capabilities to conduct a highintensity conventional war risks making the Army a marginal
consideration for policymakers who want, and need, a much wider array
of options. Brown is correct that the size of the force will not allow
large-scale specialization and that future confl icts might not allow much
training time. But, there is no guarantee that such requirements will
always be for high-tech conventional war. I am confident that a force no
longer committed to the war in Iraq can maintain high enough readiness
to respond to any contingency short of the “big one.” If the worst
happens, the nation will need time to mobilize more forces anyway, and
limitations in strategic lift will always cause deployment delays from
CONUS bases. It is also incorrect to define any sort of confl ict as more
complex or difficult than another. One of my regrets about my work
with Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in 2006 was putting in the
quote that counterinsurgency was the “graduate level of war.” All war is
at the graduate level, it is just the final exams that are different.
In his article, Brown highlights the superb melding of missions,
training, and acquisitions that produced the AirLand Battle army that
performed so well in Operation Desert Storm. But, they never did
fight the chosen enemy and were lucky instead to go up against a poor
and battered Soviet clone. One of the reasons Future Combat Systems
failed—along with other programs of the 1990s like Force XXI Battle
Command Brigade and Below and the Army After Next—is they
continued to follow the same high-tech, high-intensity developmental
trajectory instead of realizing the world and its threats were changing,
with dire consequences in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Author Replies
Gates Brown
Dr. Crane rightly calls attention to the problematic nature of
forecasting future confl icts. No one knows the probability of a major
war occurring. But that reality does not mean it is impossible to discern
an emphasis for crafting our national defense or that we should assume
risks where there is a possibility of rapid catastrophic defeat.
In my article, I outlined the most dangerous threat to the nation, a
confl ict with near-peer competitors such as Russia or China who have
interests that in some ways counter those of the United States. Identifying
these states as the most likely near-peer competitors, however, is not the
same as calling them the most likely threats. The current threat, our
adversaries’ combination of conventional and unconventional forces
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into a hybrid approach to warfare, effectively mitigates the advantages
of the United States in terms of policy as well as force structure.
To understand this trend, it is important to put it into a broader
context. Hybrid tactics are a reaction to US dominance in conventional
maneuver warfare. Due to the need to maintain a low profi le, hybrid
confl icts have had a protracted nature; limited involvement, in turn,
gives rise to smaller political objectives. Neither of these characteristics
affects the threat. Thus, the critical fact Crane overlooks is that by
maintaining our capability in high-intensity maneuver warfare, US
adversaries are forced to operate in the gray zone.
Likewise, if the United States focused on a lighter force to combat
hybrid wars, our opponents would soon shift to tactics that mitigate that
approach. Focusing US force structure on maneuver warfare, therefore,
provides the capability to counter hybrid wars while preserving high-end
conventional maneuver forces necessary for bolstering and supporting
allied forces as well as countering hybrid aggression.
Hybrid wars, generally, require geographic proximity to the aggressor
state, Russia borders Ukraine, North Vietnam bordered South Vietnam.
A force fielded to fight maneuver warfare would be able to aid allied nations
to contain hybrid confl icts while maintaining the deterrence to major
combat operations. While it is true the forces fielded to support AirLand
Battle never fought the intended enemy, their capability forced potential
adversaries to wage limited wars for limited aims. The consequences of
Iraq and Afghanistan were a product of flawed strategy. The Army has
to assume risk and the best place to do that is with limited confl icts.
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On “Drawdown: The American Way of
Postwar”
John A. Bonin
This commentary responds to Brian McAllister Linn’s book review on Drawdown: The
American Way of Postwar published in the Winter 2016–17 issue of Parameters
(vol. 46, no. 4).

A

s an author of two chapters in the book, and a co-organizer of
the US Army War College conference that generated this volume,
I am uniquely positioned to respond to Brian Linn’s recent
review of Drawdown. This is especially true since his critique about the
lack of policy guidance and implications in the text seemingly overlooked
the stated purpose of the book—to contribute to the dialogue on
American military “drawdowns.” That dialogue “lacks a proper historical
perspective.” An historical baseline for drawing down forces and force
structures is essential to making informed decisions of the kind Linn seeks.
Over the course of my nearly 50 years of government service, I
have repeatedly encountered the lack of historical perspective in
critical decisions, particularly during the periods between confl icts.
Our authors provide some unique insights into America’s history of
drawdowns. Organized chronologically, the chapters establish both
context and relevance over some 500 years that can inform specific policy
prescriptions. This edited volume is no less coherent in its themes than
any edited military history volume of similar scope. Establishing a tight
relationship between early American history and those issues surrounding
the all-volunteer force of the current day is useless and ahistorical.
Beginning in the colonial era, sure patterns developed in American
history, which makes the text’s early focus relevant and necessary to the
overall thrust of the volume. These patterns include the underfunding of
military structure for short-term savings at the expense of longer-term
efficiencies. They emerged as a result of the “Liberty Dilemma”—the
uneasy relationship between the fear and the expense of standing armies
and the desire for safety that still affects drawdowns today. It goes beyond
the single aspect of “demobilization” that Linn highlights as applying only
to a portion of drawdowns, particularly of those involving mass armies.
Finally, Linn criticizes Drawdown for being too focused on battle and
operations; yet, considering aspects of drawdowns in a vacuum without
the reality of the influence of these on future successes or failures in war is
irrelevant. Understanding the trends mentioned above will better position
contemporary decision-makers to grapple with current challenges.

The Author Replies
Brian McAllister Linn
The author declined the opportunity to respond.

A DIALOGUE ON STRATEGY

On Strategy as Ends, Ways, and Means
Gregory D. Miller, Chris Rogers, Francis J. H. Park,
William F. Owen, and Jeffrey W. Meiser

ABSTRACT: This dialogue regarding teaching, understanding, and
practicing strategy stems from Jeffrey W. Meiser’s article “Ends +
Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy” published in the Winter 2016–17
issue of Parameters (vol. 46, no. 4).

The Value of a Model. Gregory D. Miller and Chris Rogers
Like Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser, we are frustrated by the formulaic
ends, ways, and means model commonly equated with strategy. We
acknowledge the handicap created by the lack of a common definition
of strategy, and recognize the need for one that does not exclusively rely
on a formula but also effectively incorporates the interests and decisions
of other actors—allies, adversaries, and neutral states alike. Yet, we
were profoundly disappointed in Meiser’s criticism, which appeared to
diminish not only the Department of Defense’s approach to strategy but
also how strategy is taught.
We assume Meiser understands models merely simplify reality and
are never intended for literal use; they only provide a starting point to
develop skilled practitioners who can wisely deviate from them. From
Meiser’s perspective, a dangerous impression might develop of American
profesional military education churning out automatons incapable of
critical, much less creative, thinking, who simply rely on a formula to
develop and implement strategy. We think Parameters’ readers will be
encouraged by the fact that Defense Department programs actually
expose senior military officers to a number of strategic models and
require critical analysis of such fundamentals.
At the National Defense University’s Joint Advanced Warfighting
School curriculum, no single definition is taught as the “right answer”
and no specific model of strategy is the “right approach.” Future
practitioners are not only required to articulate their own definitions
and models but also to justify when, how, and why they deviate from
or improve upon existing models. Thus, the curriculum incorporates
complexity and design thinking, both of which challenge conventional
approaches to solving problems, especially complex problems, which
would include nearly all national security decisions.
Consequently, senior US military officers and their equivalent
civilian counterparts who complete this and similar programs are more
than capable of moving beyond simple formulas when advising senior
leaders. This is true precisely because these students do not rely on
simple constructs of ends, ways, and means when developing theater
strategies and theater campaign plans. Moreover, these professionals
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understand the nuances of incorporating a whole-of-government
approach (interagency collaboration) and of applying instruments of
national power (diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial,
intelligence, and law enforcement tools), which Meiser mistakenly treats
synonymously. With this understanding, strategy practitioners recognize
the military frequently does not want to address problems outside its
expertise, even though its capabilities and capacities often result in it
being tasked to “do something.”
In closing, students should never be told they can solve the world’s
problems by checking all the boxes. Instead, students should learn
complex problems rarely have simple solutions because of second- and
third-order consequences and the competing interests arising from
other actors’ cultures, histories, and principles. At best, a strategist’s
efforts can help mitigate confl ict or produce more favorable outcomes.

Where Are Policy and Risk? Francis J. H. Park
While I agree in principle with the flaws Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser
identifies in the practice of strategy, his analysis omits the roles of
policy and risk as critical elements influencing strategy. The relationship
between ends, ways, and means had been part of the US Army War
College curriculum for some eight years when it appeared in Military
Review (1989). Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s model of strategy originally
appeared in Military Strateg y: Theory and Application, a US Army War
College student text he edited from 1981 to 1994. Lykke’s model bears
influence by contemporaries such as Colonel Harry A. Summers Jr.
whose work on the Army’s Vietnam Lessons Learned project eventually
bore fruit as On Strateg y (1982).
While Lykke articulated strategy in the form of an equation, only
the most mechanistic application of the model would suggest that
the formulation of strategy is merely a balancing act of ends, ways,
and means. In practice, strategists consider other factors such as policy,
which is conspicuously absent from Meiser’s analysis. Lykke warns
that military strategy “must support national strategy and comply with
national policy.” This interplay between policy and strategy is essential
because policy outlines the bounds of what strategy should attain
while strategy identifies the costs of policy’s goals. Although military
strategists can influence policy, as Eliot Cohen so notes, it is inherently
an unequal dialogue.
Risk, which receives only passing mention in Meiser’s article, is the
most important product of the dialogue between policy and strategy.
The current risk assessment methodology from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff manual 3105.01, Joint Risk Assessment, describes risk simply as “the
probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something
valued.” In practice, risk is the ultimate expression of a strategy’s
feasibility and not something that is quantitatively derived from an
imbalance of ends, ways, and means.
In Afghanistan, coalition forces and their Afghan partners still
had to secure areas and their populations while buying time to build
the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and Afghan
civil institutions—a Herculean task requiring functions and resources

A Dialogue on Strategy

127

not available in any reasonable capacity within the Department of
Defense. None of those considerations would have been apparent in an
equation consisting solely of ends, ways, and means. Those charged with
crafting policy may not have had discussions in such terms, but those
charged with developing strategy, both inside and outside the Defense
Department, certainly did. The policy constraints and the realities of
the environment did not impede critical and creative thinking. But,
any nontraditional approach would have incurred considerable, if not
unacceptable, political and strategic risk.
Traditional views of war—divided into strategy, operational art, and
tactics in many military discussions—tend to glide over discussions of
policy; however, strategy is inherently incomplete without policy and its
interactions. The current definition of strategy certainly runs the hazard
of ham-fisted execution by unskilled practitioners who might construe
strategic ends as full stops. Nonetheless, a new definition of strategy is
not required; but as Professor Meiser so notes, a good strategy is.

Strategy Is Not a Sum. William F. Owen
Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser correctly suggests the Lykke model is flawed.
A poor model based on a widely known fallacy, its adoption was and is
symptomatic of a failure to understand extant strategic theory stemming
from an incorrect description of strategy equaling ends, ways, and
means. Lykke, and those who saw merit in his model, either did not read
or did not understand Clausewitz. Otherwise, they would have likewise
framed ends as the policy objectives (the desired behavior or condition),
means as combat (the acts of violence designed to overthrow the violent
objector), and ways as the link between the two. In short, as Clausewitz
stated, strategy is the “use of the engagement for the purpose of the war.”
When Meiser referenced the dysfunction highlighted in the 2009
Afghanistan policy review, his failure to recognize nation-states’
successful application of “strategy” accomplished as a campaign within
a theater becomes evident. Nonstate actors, such as the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant, Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers, and even the Irish
Republican Army, employ the same model with only a slight variation.
Simply put, strategy in Afghanistan—or anywhere else—is the link
of tactical action to policy objectives, and those objectives should be
achievable with the removal of the armed objector. As Clausewitz clearly
warned, if that is not the case, one should not be using violence to attain
the policy. Violence is the means that makes strategy unique. Thus, the
whole-of-government approach Meiser referred to attempts to describe
a process that aligns tactical means with policy objectives.
To conclude, Lykke’s model remains incorrect within the framework
of classical strategic theory and has never had the utility ascribed to it.
Strategy is not the sum of ends, ways, and means: rather, ways is strategy,
ends is policy, and the means is combat. That the article did not point
out this principle is as alarming for obvious reasons as is the fallacious
implication that English-speaking militaries do not have adequate
strategic theories to formulate successful strategy. Highly practical and
effective strategic theory exists. But, the confusion demonstrated in the
article is simply the product of a choice to ignore it.
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In Response. Jeﬀrey W. Meiser
“Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy” was written to add clarity
to the broad conversation about strategy. I was disappointed with the
existing definitions of strategy as being either too narrow and confining
or too broad, inclusive, and vague. Both approaches tend to produce
bad strategy either by eliminating creative and adaptive thinking or by
encouraging the reproduction of vacuous generalities.
After conversing with scholars and practitioners, researching, and
teaching over several years, I settled on the definition for strategy: a
theory of success. This definition is based on the writings of Barry R.
Posen and Eliot A. Cohen, but influenced by a broad range of scholars
including Richard P. Rumelt at UCLA Business School, Hal Brands at
Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Sir Lawrence Freedman at Kings College,
among others. My goal is to develop a definition that can fit all contexts
in which strategy is relevant, including business strategy, grand strategy,
and military strategy.
My article focused on military strategy because I see significant
problems in US military strategy, including how it is taught in US
military institutions, how it is discussed in the English-speaking defense
community, and how it is implemented within the US government. It
is a great honor and privilege to have this opportunity to respond to
three thoughtful and well-articulated critiques of my essay. I thank Dr.
Gregory D. Miller, Colonel Chris Rogers, Colonel Francis J. H. Park,
and Mr. William F. Owen for taking my article seriously enough to
write responses.

Defining Strategy

The only point of consensus among the commentators is that Arthur
Lykke’s formula of ends + ways + means = strategy is an inadequate
definition of strategy. Owen takes the strongest position, arguing that
Lykke’s approach never had any utility and is profoundly misguided.
Miller and Rogers see some value in Lykke’s approach, but agree that
it should not be rigidly applied and must be supplemented by other
concepts, definitions, and approaches. This consensus is important.
Anyone relying only or primarily on Lykke’s formula should reconsider
whether he or she is taking into account the complexity of the world as
well as the intense and difficult task of being an adaptive, critical, and
creative thinker.
Agreeing on what strategy is not, the contributors disagree on how
strategy should be defined. The general definition for strategy proposed
in the article is derived from the strategy literature, but refined to focus
on what strategy is as a distinctive concept applicable across domains
and disciplines. Only one of the commentaries actually proposes a rival
definition for strategy: Owen endorses Carl von Clausewitz’s definition
of strategy as the “use of engagements for the purpose of the war.” This
definition is so narrow that even if we think only in terms of military
strategy, it is not very useful. Furthermore, in this statement, Clausewitz
does not tell us what strategy is, he tells us what to do with it. I would be
relatively happy with a definition of military strategy stated as “a theory
of the use of engagements for the purpose of war.”

A Dialogue on Strategy

129

It is quite common to refer to means as resources, as Lykke did and
many others continue to do. In some contexts, means is synonymous with
method, (e.g., the ends justify the means); however, it is not appropriate to
assert that combat is the only possible means relevant to strategy. Finally,
strategy can be applied to a wide variety of circumstances expanding well
beyond a specific military campaign within a given theater of operations.
Overall, Owen’s rigid, narrow reading of Clausewitz is not
consistent with contemporary discourse in the English-speaking
defense community even though the call to rethink our concepts in a
more Clausewitzian framework is well taken and deserves additional
consideration. Returning to On War is never a bad idea.

Strategy, Policy, and Risk

Whereas Owen wants to define strategy narrowly, Park argues it
must be broadened to include policy and perhaps risk. I agree strategy is
influenced by policy, it could hardly be otherwise; however, as I note in
“Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy,” strategy should have a clear
definition that does not include other phenomena. An overinclusive
definition distracts from the core purpose of strategy—articulating
exactly how we will achieve our goal. Policy should also have a distinct
definition. Once clear and distinct definitions are established, it is
possible to discuss how the concepts relate to one another.
Let us accept for the moment the definition of strategy as a theory
of success and use Park’s definition of policy as a statement of “what
strategy is to attain.” These definitions tell us that policy defines the
nature of success; policy tells us what we are trying to cause with the
actions we take. Strategy tell us how we will achieve the stated policy.
Therefore, we have a tight linkage between strategy and policy after
we define them as distinct concepts. Just because two concepts are
related does not mean they cannot have distinct definitions; instead,
distinct definitions are essential to forming a clear understanding of
each concept’s role and exactly how they relate to one another.
Park also notes the importance of risk as “the ultimate expression
of the feasibility of a strategy.” I do not object, except to propose a
more cost-benefit expression of feasibility. An action may be likely to
cause harm to me, but it may also be likely to result in major benefits or
to disproportionate harm to my opponent. Risk is another important
concept, but again, it is different from strategy even if it is a necessary
component to strategic planning and assessment.
Park concludes by noting the need for good strategy, but not a new
definition of strategy. It is not clear whether this is an endorsement of
Lykke’s definition of strategy or not. If it is, Park does not tell us why or
how my critique is wrong or why he thinks my proposed Posen-Cohen
model is misguided. I am interested in hearing his position on this point.

On Models

Miller and Rogers describe a fine institution and show an admirable
awareness of the broad range of issues relevant to teaching strategy in
a very compressed time frame. Though I asserted that Lykke’s model
of strategy is influential in the broad US defense community, my intent
was not to make an inclusive critique of the US defense community.
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Programs and individuals relying solely or primarily on Lykke’s formula
should feel defensive after reading my article, but those who do not,
should not.
As a general note of caution for instructors, educators have a hard
time seeing the curriculum as students see it. A wise mentor once told
me, it is not what you can teach, it is what the student can learn. This
phenomenon can be a particularly thorny problem for 10-month long
master’s degree programs where the curriculum can easily become more
about what can be taught and less about what the students can learn.
When students and teachers are drowning in material, they sometimes
grab onto whatever is easiest to comprehend, such as an easily articulated
formula for strategy.
Agreement on a simple, distinctive definition of strategy will
improve intellectual discourse on strategy in the defense community,
the strategy-making process within the US government, and crossdisciplinary dialogue on the application of strategy application. I suggest
the definition “strategy is a theory of success.” The point is not to insist
on absolute conformity. Thinking of strategy as a theory, logic, narrative
about the future, or argument are all productive because they allow
sufficient room for creative thinking while grounding us in the basic
understanding of strategy as pushing us to think about how our actions
are going to cause the future outcome we desire.
I commend Parameters for publishing these comments and enabling
this dialogue, which I hope continues.

Gregory D. Miller
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COUNTERINSURGENCY

Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War
By Conrad C. Crane
Reviewed by Russell W. Glenn, Assistant G-2, Plans and Policy, Deputy
Chief of Staﬀ, G-2, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, and author
of Reconsidering Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency: Lessons from
Post-Colonial Conflict

S

ubtitle notwithstanding, military historian Conrad Crane’s Cassandra
in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War is less what he describes as
“a story about trying to influence large institutions to change, ideally
in the right direction for the right reasons,” than an autobiographical
excursion describing his role as member of the team tasked with
creating the December 2006 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and
his experiences during the months immediately following its publication.
Additionally—if secondarily—the book is a consideration of the publication’s impact on operations in Iraq. There is also a very brief synopsis
of US involvement in Afghanistan counterinsurgency (COIN) activities.
Despite the several foci, there are a number of worthy insights
provided vis-à-vis COIN operations in Iraq. These observations include
that all soldiers and marines are potentially intelligence collectors,
that better synchronization of special operations units’ activities with
conventional units’ activities remains a crying need even after more
than a decade’s presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, that trust between
representatives of an external coalition force and members of the host
nation population is fundamental to success, and that haste in holding
elections during a counterinsurgency is unwise, the last only too evident
in the often counterproductive behaviors of former Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki government in Baghdad. While few of these perceptions,
drawn from Crane’s personal experience and interviews in Iraq, will be
new to those familiar with the war, many are sufficiently valuable to bear
the repetition. Also notable in this regard is a point too infrequently
recognized, one no less valid as operations continue today: “The most
adept sociocultural briefings . . . came from soldiers and [m]arines who
had probably conducted enough field research . . . to earn a PhD back
at a civilian university.” In COIN, no less than other forms of confl ict,
the wisdom of the soldier is both invaluable and an ore too little mined.
Crane obviously took copious notes during his weeks as a member
of the FM 3-24 writing team and in-theater travels thereafter. His
frequent listing of partners in the undertaking and myriad others
attending conferences, working groups, or otherwise influencing
the doctrine’s creation and application in the field is impressive. The
cataloging makes it clear the manual was raised by a quite populous
village. Crane’s firsthand participation in this community, combined
with both his training and practice as a historian, undeniably makes him
an appropriate vehicle for the tale’s telling. There are times, however,
in which he seems a bit too willing to give credit to those closest to
him in the endeavor. One such participant is noted for his consistent
championing of the need for a counterinsurgency force to continue to
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learn and adapt. Such points unquestionably merit prominence in COIN
doctrine; however, essentiality of learning and adapting (and anticipation
as a third consideration) was adroitly presented 15 years previously
in Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, a valuable book
coauthored by Eliot A. Cohen who was also among those influencing
the manual’s development. So too, the figure on page 88 depicting the
evolving emphasis a unit puts on mission type (denoting the relative
weights allotted offense, defense, and stability over time) initially
appeared in 2001 in Field Manual 3-0, Operations.
Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War concludes with a
series of additional observations by the author that are certainly worthy
of attention. An appendix presents a “Mission Matrix for Iraq,” its list of
tasks providing further material of value to commanders and staffs who
may find COIN or nation-building responsibilities in their “missionset” during future contingencies. In sum, senior members of the defense
community and others seeking analysis of past counterinsurgencies in
the service of future field application will find pithier sources elsewhere.
Other readers looking for the history of the development of one of
America’s most influential and necessary doctrinal publications in recent
history will find that history here in admirable detail.

Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army
By Benjamin M. Jensen
Reviewed by James H. Joyner Jr., Associate Professor of Strategic Studies, US
Marine Corps Command and Staﬀ College, and Nonresident Senior Fellow,
Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council

O
Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2016
216 pages
$24.95

rganizational change literature argues large bureaucracies tend
to remain in a state of inertia absent either catastrophic failure,
extreme pressure from external leadership, or strong fear of losing out
on resources to a competing bureaucracy. In Forging the Sword: Doctrinal
Changes in the U.S. Army, Benjamin M. Jensen demonstrates how these
explanations have not held true for the US Army, at least in the postVietnam period. Despite the popular perception of military brass as
“unimaginative bureaucrats trapped in an iron cage,” the Army has
repeatedly revised its capstone doctrine because visionary top-level
leadership continually assessed its “theory of victory” for fighting the
next war based on an evolving operational environment.
Through a series of case studies, Jensen concludes “doctrinal change
requires incubators, informal subunits established outside the hierarchy,
and advocacy networks championing new concepts that emerge from
incubators.” The former, he argues, are essential because professionals
“require safe spaces to visualize new forms of warfare.” The latter,
meanwhile, spread these new ideas within the community and help
socialize them and build “buy in.” While not a core argument of the
book, Jensen also refutes the myth on constant interservice rivalry,
pointing to several examples of seamless cooperation between the Army
and Air Force.
Since 1975, the Army has rewritten its capstone doctrinal
Field Manual 3-0, Operations, seven times. Jensen focuses on three
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of these revisions—the 1976 Active Defense, the 1982 AirLand
Battle, and the 1993 Full-Dimensional Operations concepts—
which represented a fundamental change in the Army’s “theory of
victory.” He also examines the bureaucratic struggle over the 2006
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
In 1973, a series of events forced Army leaders to reorient the
institution. The end of conscription and the dawn of an all-volunteer
force fundamentally changed the composition of the US military. The
end of American combat operations in Vietnam meant a drawdown to
an Army with half the strength it had at the height of the confl ict. And,
the short Yom Kippur War demonstrated a radical change in the range,
accuracy, lethality, and logistical sustainment requirements of modern
tank warfare while highlighting a fundamental change in the role of
tactical airpower.
Into the breach stepped General William E. DePuy, who would
become the first head of the Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) and personally oversee the rewriting of the operations
manual. He established a “boathouse gang” of senior leaders and
thinkers to write individual chapters and to serve as a “sounding board”
for new ideas, which were then field tested with corps-level exercises.
The group soon realized adequate close air support would only be
possible with air supremacy—which meant the Army would not only
need support from the Air Force but would also need to support the
Air Force in the early stages of confl ict to suppress enemy air defenses.
The resulting doctrine, dubbed Active Defense, radically changed the
Army theory of victory in Europe from one in which a trip-wire force
held off the Soviets until reinforcements could arrive to one of “winning
the first battle.” Throughout the development phase, DePuy personally
socialized the new findings to key stakeholders within the Army and
the Pentagon, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and
members of the think tank community.
Almost immediately after the Army adopted the Active Defense
doctrine, the Soviets changed their doctrine and command and control
capability and introduced modernized weapons. In response, the
Department of Defense devised an offset strategy to counter Soviet
numerical advantages with vastly improved command, control, and
precision technology. Additionally, the twin shocks of 1979—the
Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—led to
the Carter doctrine and a demand for the Army to be ready for lowintensity fights in addition to high-intensity maneuver warfare. General
Donn A. Starry, part of the boathouse gang who helped write the 1976
doctrine, succeeded DePuy at TRADOC and oversaw the 1982 manual
that introduced AirLand Battle in response to the new operating
environment. Like his predecessor, Starry networked the development
with key stakeholders, especially the Air Force, which was invited to
contribute during the development phase.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War in
1991, Army leadership was faced with a completely new landscape. Not
only would troop levels be cut to the lowest levels since 1939, but it
soon became apparent ground forces would be required to respond to
a much wider and more complex mission set without the advantage of
prepositioned forces and ready bases. Additionally, the Goldwater-Nichols
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Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 meant the services
had less autonomy in crafting their own doctrine. In response, Gordon
R. Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, personally pushed for reforms
toward his vision of a “post-industrial” force. Frederick M. Franks Jr., the
new TRADOC commander, used the Army’s branch schools as “battle
labs” to incubate new ideas and mimicked the Louisiana Maneuvers of
the 1940s as a testing ground. This resulted in the publication of the
full-spectrum dimensional operations doctrine in 1994 that outlined
the Army’s vision for being able to win two nearly simultaneous major
theater wars while also being engaged in all manner of small wars and
operations other than war lower on the spectrum. As in the previous
examples, stakeholders inside and outside the Army were courted
throughout the process for their input and buy in, and the doctrine was
developed in parallel with Air Force doctrinal revisions.
The writing of the 2006 counterinsurgency manual is different from
the other cases. Rather than a new overall theory of war for the Army,
it was a new theory of victory for a particular fight. Further, as Jensen
notes, the actual change was “much less than heralded at the time.” Still,
it was an important example of doctrinal change, coming in the midst of
America’s largest confl ict since Vietnam. Unlike the previous examples,
this was neither top-down nor even Army-centric. Army Lieutenant
General David Petraeus and Marine Corps Lieutenant General James
Mattis led the project and recruited a brain trust of midlevel leaders from
their services and a handful of outside experts from the “COINdinista”
camp. Capitalizing on the star power of the two leaders, the team
engaged in a months-long media blitz spreading their ideas through a
series of speeches and within professional and policy journals.
Jensen notes the successful examples discussed in Forging the
Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army were driven by thoughtful
professionals who worked in small groups—not drained of creativity by
gigantic staffs. To that end, Jensen concludes with a plea for continued
emphasis on education, testing new ideas in war games and writing in
professional journals, and encouragement of constant challenging of the
status quo.

“Soft” Counterinsurgency: Human Terrain Teams and
US Military Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan
By Paul Joseph
Reviewed by Michael C. Davies, coauthor of Human Terrain Teams: An
Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular Warfare

New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014
110 pages
$49.99

T

he now-defunct Human Terrain System (HTS) was developed to
improve the military decision-making process by facilitating a better
understanding of the local population—the human terrain. The program
garnered significant press attention, suffered from internal disquiet, and
was the focus of numerous denunciations. Paul Joseph, professor of
sociology at Tufts University, was one of the first external reviewers of
the program. He gained insider access during the program’s early days,
and “Soft” Counterinsurgency is the outcome of the time he spent with
program participants.

Book Reviews:Counterinsurgency

137

Joseph’s work centers on the narratives that defined the program at
its beginning and questioned whether it could be considered effective.
He excels at answering this question. Based on interviews with 30
individuals as well as a large-group session of 20 more participants,
Joseph tackles the key debates and concerns of the program from the
perspectives of the participants—something distinctly lacking in all but
a few works on HTS—while adding his expert analysis to each issue.
The book assesses five major topics, from the program’s history
and structure to its impact on military commanders, how success can
be defined and claimed, the program’s effect on operations, and the
relationship between HTS and the broader US strategy in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Joseph is blunt in his conclusion on whether HTS achieved
its stated objective of altering military perceptions of the battle space
and transforming operational outcomes: “No, it did not.”
Like the assessments on HTS, Joseph outlines relevant examples of
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) embedded in combat units who provided
soldiers and commanders with quality assessments of the human terrain.
In providing a full account of the words of team members, Joseph shows
the limited impact achieved; that while HTTs provided, “a generally
accurate assessment of the situation [they] did not contribute to a needed
revision” of US strategy in terms of goals, execution, or resources, let
alone all three iteratively. This is the unique contribution Joseph brings
to the literature on HTS.
The “cultural turn” and HTS may have correctly seen sociocultural
awareness as the necessary first step to effective strategy and eventual
victory. However, it is political governance, both emergent and
institutional, from the local through the national levels, that is at the
core of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because this issue was ignored,
pushed aside, or overwhelmed by other factors, victory remained
fleeting, if impossible from the start. The quality and quantity of the
human terrain assessments could therefore only be effective up to a
certain point.
Joseph is not the first to recognize this problem, but he fails to
tap into other researchers who support his reasoning. As “Soft”
Counterinsurgency is a slim volume, adding the works of Jenkins, Komer,
Krepinevich, the Project for National Security Reform, and others, all
of whom have made the same conclusions about how elements of the US
government operate on the battlefield, would have brought additional
weight to Joseph’s argument.
Nevertheless, Joseph shines a light on the other side of the strategy
bridge. He asks the question: if war is the continuation of politics, and
politics at the ground level is never considered in strategic interaction,
why should we be surprised when defeat occurs? He concludes the
United States consistently fails to link the two sides through effective
and sustainable governance built on an understanding of local politics.
And this failure is the core reason the United States lost the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan—and other operations. It is also why the United States
has learned little from these failures.
“Soft” Counterinsurgency offers an incisive view into one of the most
publicized programs from the 9/11 era. In attempting to answer the
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question, however imperfectly, of why the United States has struggled
so much in the wars that followed, Joseph’s conclusion—that strategic
interaction between ground truth, operational concepts, and political
goals has been unbridgeable from the beginning—should give all civilian
and military senior leaders pause.

War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of
Conflict on the Afghan Frontier
By Carter Malkasian
Reviewed by M. Chris Mason, Professor of National Security Aﬀairs, US Army
War College. Dr. Mason was the State Department political oﬃcer in the
Paktika Province of Afghanistan in 2005.

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
329 pages
$21.95

C

arter Malkasian purposefully and successfully styles War Comes to
Garmser after Jeffrey Race’s War Comes to Long An (1972), a classic
in the academic literature of Vietnam. Like Race’s book, which tells the
story of the struggle for control of one district in Vietnam between the
end of the French war and the beginning of the American war, War
Comes to Garmser chronicles the local politics and the battle for control of
the Garmser District in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan.
For those not familiar with Malkasian, he began his unlikely path
to the Garmser District with a doctorate in history from Oxford and a
position as professor of military history at Loyola Marymount University,
but a relative, who served as a Navy medical officer in Vietnam with
1st Battalion 9th Marines (The Walking Dead), persuaded Malkasian
he needed to experience war personally if he was going to write about
it. So Malkasian took a job as a State Department contractor, working
first in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan and then the Anbar Province
of Iraq. He agreed to go back to Afghanistan only if he could go to a
hot spot. Sent to work in the Helmand Province’s violent Garmser
District, he got his wish. His success in pacifying the local political
situation there and shaping a local, indigenous resistance to the Taliban
between 2009–11 brought him national attention and resulted in War
Comes to Garmser.
True to his inspiration, Malkasian’s book succeeds and remains
timeless for much the same reason War Comes to Long An does: Malkasian
never tries to do too much. He remains focused on the confl ict in his
district, telling the story of the Garmser District over some 30 years,
and he avoids offering advice or the bromides about the larger confl ict
that often litter other books about Afghanistan written from a single
perspective. Instead, Malkasian does a fine job of recording the history of
the Garmser District, from the large-scale US Agency for International
Development (USAID) irrigation and agricultural development projects
of the 1950s up to 2011, when he left the district. A postscript to this
paperback edition brings the story of Garmser up to 2015.
As few Americans ever could, or even attempted to do, Malkasian
understood the tangled, ever-shifting web of social confl icts in Garmser,
which pitted rival tribes against one another, indigenous landed farmers
against recently arrived squatters, and local strongmen against religious
leaders, and he explains them in a way that is accessible even to readers
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unfamiliar with Afghanistan. What emerges is strong evidence that at
the district level, as was the case in Long An, resistance to the Taliban
and the Viet Cong was a local, personal matter, driven by family feuds,
tribal politics, land disputes, and village political economies. Malkasian
and Race show clearly that in both wars, local resistance to guerillas
in remote districts was devoid of any notion of support for predatory
and corrupt national governments in capital cities—or even provincial
capitals—which were so removed from local lives they might as well
have been on the moon. Whether intentionally or not, in so doing
they debunk the great fallacy of counterinsurgency theory—the idea
that such isolated “ink spots” of resistance can somehow be linked up
and transmogrified into a pan-national movement in support of an
illegitimate government in time of terrible local violence in primitive,
deeply fractured tribal societies with no conception of national identity.
Indeed, no counterinsurgency in modern history has succeeded where
there was no pervasive, preexisting sense of national identity and where
the national government was not seen as legitimate by the great majority
of its citizens. Empirical data also shows no government has ever seen
its popular support increase during an insurgency or civil war.
Other lessons from War Comes to Garmser are less obvious. While
many men might have written a book about Vietnam like War Comes to
Long An, probably only Malkasian could have written this companion
volume about the war in Afghanistan. Malkasian’s success in Garmser
was almost unique: no other State Department official or military officer
anywhere else in the Pashto-speaking south and east of the country
(where until recently the conflict was largely confined) achieved anything
like what was accomplished in Garmser. The reason for this, which
undermined the US effort in the country, was simple: while overall US
involvement in Afghanistan closely mirrored the effort in Vietnam in
virtually every other respect, there was one critical difference.
During the 12 years of the Vietnam War from 1960 to 1972, the
United States trained tens of thousands of American military and civilian
personnel to functional fluency in Vietnamese. In the 16 years of the
Afghanistan conflict, the United States trained less than 50 to functional
fluency in Pashto, with most of them assigned to Kabul. With admirable
determination, Malkasian taught himself Pashto, and as the Washington
Post noted in 2011, his ability to communicate effectively and directly with
the elders and other local leaders in Garmser made his success possible.
Virtually everywhere else in the Pashtun south and east, US personnel
relied on the disastrously ineffective, unreliable, and indirect method
of interpreters, very few of whom were native Pashtuns and a majority
of whom had, at best, a questionable grip on the nuances of a language
which relies heavily on parables, folk sayings, and other culturally derived
idioms. This practice made impactful personal relationships, trust, and
even meaningful conversations between Americans and Pashtuns all
but impossible. In no small part, the US war in Afghanistan was lost
in translation.
Twice in 50 years, the United States took sides in a civil war in Asia,
occupied a country with large numbers of troops, imposed a culturally
illegitimate form of government on an illiterate peasantry, manipulated
elections, glossed over fraudulent outcomes, and propped up deeply
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unpopular governments riddled with drug lords. In both Vietnam
and Afghanistan, the US government misunderstood an elusive and
dedicated enemy, mistrusted a national army it created in its own
image (which was decimated by desertions and lacked the will to fight
for kleptocratic elites in a distant capital), and thought that somehow all
these issues could be overcome with superior firepower and slapdash
rural development.
The irony of War Comes to Garmser is that Malkasian successfully
crafts his book as a companion volume to War Comes to Long An, but
apparently he never saw the Afghan War itself as a reboot of the Vietnam
War and missed Race’s central lesson: the Vietminh understood the
war was about imposing social order from the bottom up, and military
confl ict was secondary. As one former Vietminh cadre tells Race in War
Comes to Long An: “You have the central government, then the province,
district, and village. But the lowest of the four is the level that lies with
the people. If the village level is weak, then I guarantee you, no matter
how strong the central government is, it won’t be able to do a thing.”
The United States spent the entire war in Afghanistan trying to build
up the national, provincial, and district governments, while the Taliban
controlled the villages and imposed an acceptable social order. Garmser
is back under Taliban control.

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Mission Failure: America and the World
in the Post-Cold War Era
by Michael Mandelbaum
Reviewed by COL Michael Dhunjishah, US Army War College Student
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University Press, 2016
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aving attended Yale University at the same time as President
George W. Bush and having known President Bill Clinton from
Oxford, Michael Mandelbaum wanted to examine what went wrong with
US foreign policy when his generation was put in charge. It was the end
of the Cold War and the United States was the most powerful nation
in the world, but all that power did not necessarily equate to the United
States being able to remake the world in its image. Why?
In his most recent book, Mission Failure: America and the World in
the Post-Cold War Era, Mandelbaum lays out a convincing argument
explaining how, even with the best of intentions, US foreign policy
failed to produce the more democratic and peaceful post-Cold War
world everyone expected. He contends that after the Cold War the
United States shifted towards acting more on its values than its
interests, and by doing so became focused on putting countries “on the
road to Denmark,” moving them to a more liberal, democratic system.
The failure, however, to realize the enormity of the task resulted in the
United States getting bogged down in nation- and state-building—
which, as always, are inherently difficult.
Throughout the book, Mandelbaum does an excellent job of
looking at all angles of these complex problems. As an example, he is
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quick to refute criticism placed on L. Paul Bremer III for the failure of
postinvasion Iraq, namely de-Baathification and disbanding of the Iraqi
military. Mandelbaum emphasizes that no one really knows what would
have happened if the Baathists remained in charge of Iraq after the
invasion or if Bremer had left the Iraqi army in place. He does, however,
explain Bremer’s logic in making these decisions and argues that keeping
both oppressive institutions in place might have exacerbated issues
with the Shia population and the Kurds. Although this is counter to
conventional wisdom, Mandelbaum is not afraid to look at these issues
from all points of view and provide more mature, seasoned analysis of
causes and effects.
Additionally, Mandelbaum is not afraid to call it like he sees
it. Although he worked on Clinton’s first campaign for president,
Mandelbaum provides a reasonably objective view of foreign policy
decisions regardless of party affi liation or his personal ties with those
in power. He finds fault with the foreign policy of Presidents Clinton
and Barack Obama, just as easily as he does with President Bush. In
today’s supercharged environment of political partisanship, this book
focuses more on what went wrong rather than blaming one party
or the other. This refreshing take allows readers to understand how
and why the United States got into problems in Somalia, the Balkans,
Afghanistan, and Iraq over the past 25 years. Mandelbaum walks readers
down the decision-making path of these leaders who, despite their best
intentions, for one reason or another, ended up leading the country into
situations where the United States failed to meet its stated objectives.
One of the strengths of the book is also one of its weaknesses.
Focusing on the last 25 years, many of the endeavors covered are still
ongoing or have recently ended. The benefit of this is that the book
serves as an initial compilation of strategic lessons learned or a “history
hot wash,” providing current foreign policy practitioners valuable
insights that may help shape future decisions. Because this is a first draft
of history, hower, there are many aspects to these relationships, events,
and long-term consequences that are unknown at this time. As with
any historical event, a more complete understanding does not manifest
itself until well after the events have taken place (typically after decades).
Nevertheless, Mission Failure provides a necessary historical overview
on issues currently facing the United States, thereby offering current
foreign policy practitioners and strategic leaders much-needed analysis
and perspective that might help them avoid making the same mistakes
in the future.
Finally, Mandelbaum hangs a little too much on the decision to
expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). His assertion
that the United States now faces a Russia that is hostile to the West due
to the expansion of NATO in the 1990s may eventually prove to be
correct, but placing all, or at least the majority, of the blame for the poor
state of US-Russia relations today on the expansion of NATO seems
myopic. Although it can be argued that the expansion of NATO led to
some of the issues between the two countries, the US relationship with
Russia is more complex and placing blame on one particular action is
problematic. Just as Mandelbaum is quick to question blaming Bremer
for all the failures in Iraq, it is shortsighted to blame all the failures of
US-Russia relations on the decision to expand NATO.
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Overall, Mission Failure is a terrific book that holds value for foreign
policy students, strategic leaders, and casual readers. Mandelbaum’s style
allows readers from all backgrounds to understand the intricacies of US
foreign policy as it played out in the post-Cold War era. His clear prose,
strong research, logical organization, and well-reasoned arguments keep
readers engaged throughout the book. Mission Failure should be required
reading for every military strategic leader and foreign policy practitioner.

A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy
and the Crisis of the Old Order
By Richard Haass
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus, US Army War College

A
New York: Penguin Press,
2017
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$28.00

World in Disarray is an examination of the changing international
system and the implications of these changes for US foreign
policy. In considering these issues, Richard Haass begins with a general
overview of international relations from the mid-seventeenth century
until contemporary times. He then provides brief reflections and
recommendations on many current global issues and emerging crises.
According to Haass, new and complex global dilemmas have raised the
possibility that one historical era is ending and another beginning. In this
evolving environment, new ways of thinking will be required to deal with
challenges such as climate change, the regulation of cyberspace, and the
possible rise of pandemic diseases that may kill millions.
Unfortunately, Haass also sees a simultaneous rise in world
disorder, whereby the level of international cooperation needed to
overcome these problems has eroded. He suggests the United Kingdom’s
planned withdrawal from the European Union (EU) could lead to the
breakup of the country and a partial unraveling of the EU. He further
points out that the post-World War I order is unraveling in significant
areas within the Middle East leading to huge problems with instability
in this part of the world. Complicating everything, the US share of
global power is shrinking and being partially redistributed into more
hands including both state and nonstate entities. Thus, in Haass’s view,
multilateral cooperation with a variety of countries and nonsovereign
international entities has become more essential than ever.
Haass states that no global orders can be automatic or self-sustaining
even when they serve the interests of a variety of countries that should
rationally seek to bolster such orders but do not always do so. To deal
with current and future problems in a more multilateral way, Haass puts
forward a concept he calls sovereign obligation, which he claims is an
updating of political realism. This set of ideas stresses governmental
obligations to work together with other countries to manage global
problems including slow-motion crises such as climate change and
potentially lightning-fast catastrophes such as pandemic disease, all of
which call for strong international agreements negotiated in advance.
Sovereign obligation would also call upon countries to work with other
nations to solve domestic problems (such as the rise of international
terrorist groups in their ungoverned spaces) that have important
international implications. Beyond multilateralism among states, Haass
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believes there is a vital, positive international role for nonsovereign
international entities such as multinational corporations, charities such
as the Gates Foundation, and nongovernmental organizations such as
Doctors Without Borders (255). According to Haass, an international
system can only become an international society when the latter reflects
a degree of buy in on the part of the participants including states and
important international nonstate entities.
Having identified multilateralism as an important part of the
solution for global problems, Haass notes the need for the United States
to maintain acceptable relations with other major countries that could
serve as partners in addressing some issues, while inevitably remaining
rivals on others. In this regard, Haass believes China and the United
States have managed to maintain a mostly mutual beneficial relationship,
albeit with some deterioration of friendly ties during recent years over
issues such as the South China Sea. He also states the United States
should have done more to help the Soviet Union, and then Russia,
make the transition from a controlled political and economic system
to a more democratic political structure and a market economy. Haass
further believes the United States supported rapid and provocative
North Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion, and this process now
needs to be paused to help prevent further damage to US-Russian
relations. According to Haass, the central challenge for the United States
in shaping relations with both China and Russia is to discourage bad
behavior in a way that does not preclude selective and valuable cooperation
on global and regional challenges.
Haass states Iran’s Islamic Republic is now approaching four decades
in age and can therefore be considered politically secure. This statement
is true enough to serve as a basis for strategic planning, but he also
views Iran with a great deal of concern. In particular, Haass expresses
reservations about the Iranian nuclear agreement with the United States
and its negotiating partners and maintains the Obama administration,
“committed the cardinal negotiating sin wanting an agreement too
much and therefore compromising too much” (133). He also takes an
extremely hard line on the 2013 crisis with Syria, in which President
Obama withdrew a previous threat (a so-called redline) to bomb Assad
regime military forces and infrastructure following the regime’s use of
chemical weapons against Syrian civilians. Instead, the administration
chose a policy of restraint in exchange for the verifiable destruction of
most of Assad’s chemical weapons and the infrastructure for synthesizing,
maintaining, and storing them. Often, when a country obtains its
objectives through diplomacy rather than violence, this result is viewed
as both a victory and an act of political maturity, but Haass dismisses the
Syrian surrender of such formidable capabilities as “a plus” but certainly
not a major factor justifying the decision. This evaluation is surely his
only step toward a dogmatic form of conservatism in a study that is
otherwise characterized by national interest-based pragmatism.
In summary, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis
of the Old Order stands as a collection of the author’s insights, opinions,
and perhaps prejudices. As a kaleidoscopic introduction to global
issues, the book certainly has potential value for students, and more
seasoned scholars may find many of the ideas presented well worth their
consideration. The central concept of sovereign obligation is hardly
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unknown even if Haass has developed a new phrase to describe it, but
his efforts to add some nuance to the concept are clearly useful. Thus,
the work is a rational, reflective, and useful look at global problems and
the US place in dealing with these problems as part of a wider world.

GRAND STRATEGY

American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative
Internationalist Grand Strategy
By Paul D. Miller
Reviewed by Lukas Milevski, Lecturer, University of Leiden
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ver since the end of the Cold War, grand strategy has become a
fixation among academics writing about American foreign policy
and international relations. With the successful conclusion of containment, many believed the United States required a new guiding idea to
lead it through a changed world. This thought triggered a sustained
debate throughout the 1990s, which abated only slightly during the
Global War on Terror, and which has returned with a vengeance in the
past decade. Paul Miller, currently associate director of the Clements
Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, but
once an actor within the actual national security apparatus, including the
National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, has now
waded into this unending debate with his newest book American Power &
Liberal Order. The book is aimed primarily, but not exclusively, at national
security professionals and real policymakers.
Miller’s main argument is the United States should not step away
from the world, as advocates of restraint or offshore balancing would
ask. But rather, the United States should maintain active engagement
to sustain the extant liberal order. To support this basic thesis, Miller
relies on a number of interrelated historical and theoretical arguments.
The main theoretical argument is American power and liberal order are
mutually reinforcing—American power sustains the liberal order, but
the liberal order, in turn, contributes to the sustenance of American
power and security. The prime historical argument is American power
and realism in foreign affairs, along with liberal order abroad, have been
the twin driving forces in American foreign affairs for more than a
century. In other words, American policymakers have long recognized
the relationship between American power and the liberal order and
have sought to protect and increase the latter, often, if not usually, with
beneficial results for both.
The theoretical and historical relationship between American
power and international liberal order is well argued. But it forms only
the foundation upon which the true purpose of the book is built. Miller
(deservedly) proudly notes one major distinction between his book and
those of most other academics is that he tackles the fundamental hard
question which separates a workable policy from an unworkable one—
implementation. How could a grand strategy focusing on maintaining
liberal order be implemented in practice? Miller argues against mainstream
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opinion in suggesting counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability
operations have important roles to play in such a grand strategy.
Miller recognizes selectivity in intervention is vital; he bases his
criteria on global power distribution, which is made up of three factors—
gross domestic product, material capabilities, and military spending. He
posits that it is worth intervening to shore up or install liberal order in
states which represent substantial contributions to the aggregate power
of democratic and liberal states in the world. For example, Somalia is
out, but for a number of reasons Afghanistan remains an important front
line. Miller examines every major region in the world, identifying certain
countries as being potential opportunities and others as being overly
troublesome spots not worth the effort required to transform them.
Miller also considers his proposed grand strategy from the instrumental
perspective, discussing in his final section various instruments of
national power and the vital role each has to play in implementation.
Miller has produced a thoughtful work on American power and
liberal order, complete with an initial discussion on how to implement
his preferred grand strategy (and he is emphatic it is only the starting
point for sustained serious thinking). It is, of course, entirely arguable.
His theoretical and historical chapters are largely convincing and
thought-provoking. But once he turns to implementation further
assumptions seep into his argument. He wholly accepts the veracity
of democratic peace theory and implicitly suggests democracy is the
most important factor in any international relationship—above history,
culture, and so forth. The democracies aggregate into one international
camp, and authoritarian regimes similarly form the opposing side. One
might wonder how India’s great power aspirations fit within this picture.
Miller’s vision of implementation is bound to be contentious, but this
is no surprise. Implementation is usually the most controversial aspect
of any policy, as it is in the details that policies are made or broken and
real-world consequences occur.
American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand
Strateg y will hopefully spark debate—both academic and official—
on the future direction of American grand strategy and, with its
emphasis also on the difficult questions of implementation, may set a
new standard for this particular genre of academic textual endeavor. It
is a book very much worth a read; in agreement or disagreement, it will
provoke thought.

The Spartan Regime: Its Character,
Origins, and Grand Strategy
By Paul A. Rahe
Reviewed by LTC Jason W. Warren, Concepts and Doctrine Director, Center for
Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

P

aul A. Rahe’s account of the Spartan regime of the late archaic and
early classical periods demonstrates how the peculiar social mores
and resulting political values of this polis underpinned Lacedaemon’s
strategic efficacy during its long Peloponnesian hegemony. Unlike
his previous Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, which I reviewed in this
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journal, Rahe’s new volume is an eminently readable, well presented, and
pithy affair, coming in around 124 pages of text. Relying on a host of
primary and secondary sources, Rahe succeeds in elucidating the social
and cultural backbone of what he considers a Spartan “grand strategy.”
Rahe repackages through the lens of political analysis Spartan-enforced
social cohesion in what would otherwise be well-tread intellectual
ground covered by the likes of Paul Cartledge, Stephen Hodkinson, and
N. M. Kennell. The strength of this volume also results in its weaknesses,
however, as some of the material in The Spartan Regime: Its Character,
Origins, and Grand Strategy is overly anachronistic, while digressions into the
fog of the eighth and early seventh centuries (BC) serve as a distraction.
Successfully avoiding the pitfall of presenting yet another account
on Spartan peculiarities, Rahe frames his discussion in a “political
science” and intellectual history framework. He considers this method
a lost political science of earlier eras, focusing more on human nature
and its limitations in producing sound leaders and political stability than
current theory. There are frequent allusions to classical philosophers
like Plato and Aristotle, the latter of whom comes in for favorable
commentary, and whose ideas Rahe especially utilizes as a vehicle for
his analysis. Rahe also projects back into time the thinking of
Enlightenment philosophes and early American political leaders to help
explain the checks and balances inherent in the Spartan regime, but also
how Lacedaemon differed from other such mixed-governments. This
setting uniquely places this volume apart.
Reaching forward to analyze backwards is not without literary risks,
however, and some of Rahe’s examples are unhelpful anachronisms. For
example, interjections such as “At least while the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans sufficed to isolate and protect it, the liberal republic established
by the American Founding Fathers could almost do without men of
a warlike demeanor” (40). This would be news to Parameters readers,
given an armed entity known as the US Army has existed since 1775
and before as colonial militias, and has fought in every decade since
the American Revolutionary War. There is nothing added with these
comparisons, opening the text to criticism and detracting from a focus
best left to earlier times. The same can be said about the idea of a “grand
strategy,” which in its current connotation anticipates a settled nationstate capable of projecting worldwide economic, diplomatic, cultural,
and military power, something the confines of Sparta’s 3,300 squaremile holdings could never approximate (93). Sparta’s strategy was not
grand, but insular, and perhaps the concept of a “strategic culture”
would have better served Rahe’s purposes.
Rahe begins by describing the paideia or, as he defines it, the
“education and moral formation [of the community] in the broadest and
most comprehensive sense” (xiv). He then analyzes the unique Spartan
institutions, laws, and constitution which together formed its politeia.
This is a rational and beneficial way of beginning the discussion on
the cultural factors that ultimately underlay the author’s portrayal of a
Spartan “grand strategy.” He then sets about detailing his conception of
nomadic groups of ethnic Dorians, which invaded the Peloponnese in
the Greek dark ages after the collapse of Mycenaean civilization. Rahe
lingers a bit too long here, attempting to piece together controversial
and sparse evidence into a coherent picture that is simply very difficult
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to establish. He could have better utilized this text space to demonstrate
a firmer link between Sparta’s social institutions and its supposed
“grand strategy,” the latter of which he does not come around to until
later in the book and then only again in the conclusion (105). Further
consideration of the structural shortcomings of property consolidation
resulting from a slackening pure-Spartan population and aristocratic
land grabbing would have proven more useful.
The book’s coverage of Sparta’s servile system as the foundational
element of its strategy and alliance is quite worthwhile. Particularly
enlightening is Rahe’s focus on the Spartan’s subjugation and
enslaving of the neighboring Messenians and the formation of the
“Spartan Alliance,” later expanded to the Peloponnesian League that
would face down Persia and the Delian League alike (106–20). For
it was the serfdom of the Messenians, predicated on Lacedaemon’s
earlier treatment of the Helots, which advanced a Spartiate class that
constantly prepared for war. Not having to concern itself with farming
for sustenance, Sparta concentrated on its army. Pure-born Spartan men
were cast into barracks at the tender age of seven and not allowed to leave
their particular cohort of comrades, if they survived, until military
retirement at 45 (interestingly not far off a current 20-year Army
retirement once the “cadet” Spartiates achieved full status around age
20). Rahe implies this focus on war was a result of military defeats such as
the so-called Battles of the Hysiae and the Fetters against neighboring
poleis in the first half of the seventh century. Thus, Sparta’s grand
strategy as the polis rose in fame and power rested on the backs of
oppressed peoples, while even posturing as a champion of liberty
among tyrants and seemingly without irony given the servile system,
which allowed this very championing. This necessitated keeping the
slaves down and the warlike Argives of the northeastern Peloponnese
out, often with the help of allies—the original members of the
Peloponnesian League.
The Spartan Regime will be of interest to classical scholars and readers
motivated by comparing a classical notion of political philosophy to the
Spartan regimes of the archaic and classical eras. The volume is replete
with excellent maps, which will help readers in this endeavor. The idea
of establishing a political framework for “grand strategy” based on social
and cultural bedrocks is an extremely useful concept at a time when
American and Western societies are generally disengaged with wars
around the globe fought on its behalf. Rahe’s piece serves as a useful
reminder, and perhaps a warning, that this current order of events is not
as it should be, and that even when cultural and military values align for
sound strategy, a nation-state is still at risk for defeat and subjugation.
Sparta learned this in the first third of the fourth century at the hands
of Epaminondas’ Thebans, and later, Philip II of Macedon.
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Air Power: A Global History
By Jeremy Black
Reviewed by Conrad C. Crane, Chief of Historical Services, US Army Heritage
and Education Center, and author of multiple books on airpower history
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eremy Black, professor of history at the University of Exeter, is the
most prolific writer of military history today. He seems to publish a
new book every few months. Air Power: A Global History is typical of
his products, another well-written summary of a broad topic. Readers
are undoubtedly aware of the phrase “a mile wide and an inch deep,”
and this work begins a kilometer wide and a centimeter deep, until Black
gets to the Cold War about halfway through. From that point on, except
for sparse coverage of the Korean War, the narrative is richer and more
comprehensive, and fully as global as the title implies.
Air Power is a book about technology and events, not people or
theories. Black deals with the famous aces of World War I in one
sentence, while providing a detailed analysis of the British development
of superior synchronizing gears to fire through propellers—an advantage
over the Germans the Royal Air Force was able to maintain into World
War II. Few notable air leaders appear, and rarely do any theorists get
more than passing mention. Only John Warden merits a more lengthy
discussion, but even that is incomplete. Black, however, does much better
in his descriptions of the evolution of aircraft. He is obviously a big fan
of the B-52, and a strong critic of the F-35, which he argues “may prove
to be an expense too far and an entirely unnecessary system” (289). He
favors specialized airplanes over multipurpose models, a course difficult
to pursue in times of tight defense budgets.
Black acknowledges the United States has made a unique commitment
to airpower, and that it is “part and parcel of the American identity” (8).
But, he never deals with the intellectual roots of the military application
of US airpower developed in the interwar years, and except for some
vague references to the influence of California, never covers commercial
or civil aspects of aviation at all. One cannot understand American airmindedness without analyzing that aspect of airpower, the most glaring
deficiency of the book. In contrast, Black’s coverage of Eurasian military
developments is very thorough, including Japan and China. He also does
well with naval airpower and discusses advances in air defenses, missiles,
and unmanned systems.
Throughout the book, Black maintains a skeptical tone about
the independent strategic accomplishments of airpower, emphasizing
instead its essential importance as part of a joint force. He argues that
Western airpower today is in a state of crisis. Air forces are very expensive
and hard to justify against other competing social and political agendas,
while international competitors are also building cutting-edge aircraft.
Airpower also seems less relevant against enemies pursuing irregular
warfare amidst populations, and other services seem better suited for
counterterrorism or counterinsurgency.
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Air Power: A Global History will be most useful for readers new to the
topic who are looking for a beginning overview. More knowledgeable
readers will still find much of interest, but they will also be more
cognizant of what has been left out.

Victory Was beyond Their Grasp: With the
272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the
Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich
By Douglas E. Nash
Reviewed by Richard L. Dinardo, Professor of National Security Aﬀairs, US
Marine Corps Command and Staﬀ College

W

hen it comes to studying the German army of World War II, one
notes that there are gaps in the record. These gaps get bigger
the lower one goes in the military hierarchy, and one can see this at The
National Archives at College Park, Maryland. The German records on
microfilm there are extensive for the Wehrmacht high command and
the army high command. The same can be said for army groups, armies,
and corps. Records for divisions get spotty. There are, for example, no
extant records for the 352nd Infantry Division for June 1944. Below
that, records are almost nonexistent. One might find regimental reports
occasionally nested within division records, but that is about it.
In 1994, Douglas Nash, a retired army officer who now works for
the Marine Corps History Division at Quantico, Virginia, acquired a
suitcase with a most interesting set of contents—the records of the 272nd
Fusilier Company, part of the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division. Once
armed with these records, Nash very carefully supplemented this source
with other German records from College Park and the BundesarchivMilitärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, the captured German
officer manuscript series, extensive American records of the units facing
the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division, and the secondary literature. The
result is the fascinating study provided in Victory Was beyond Their Grasp:
With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart
of the Reich.
Nash provides extensive background on the creation of the 272nd
Volks-Grenadier Division. Its immediate antecedent, the 272nd
Infantry Division, had been badly mauled in Normandy. Enough of the
division had survived, however, so it could be reconstituted, though
this involved drawing elements from other divisions that had been too
severely damaged to reconstitute. With the old territorial system of
generating replacements destroyed, the new creation had to incorporate
replacements drawn from excess Luftwaffe and navy personnel. Nash
also presents detailed analysis of the volks-grenadier division as an
organization. The new division’s slightly smaller size in relation to
the older infantry division was offset by improvements in firepower,
particularly in the infantry elements.
Nash then follows the division from its initial commitment in
the latter stages of the fighting in the Hürtgen Forest to the division’s
surrender in the Ruhr Pocket, while some elements were able to retreat
to the Harz Mountains before surrendering. A trained field grade officer
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with long service, Nash has an excellent eye for tactical situations and
the ability to describe and analyze them clearly. His analysis, spread
throughout the book, would have benefited from a short concluding
chapter offering broader conclusions about the volks-grenadier division
within the broader context of the German army.
Given the volks-grenadier division was created largely for defensive
purposes, having the records of the 272nd Fusilier Company was a major
asset to Nash’s research, as the company was the division’s counterattack
unit, in effect its fire brigade, and fortunate to have a cadre of officers
and noncommissioned officers who were able and experienced. Nash’s
description of events illustrates the combat philosophy of the German
army that the outcome of tactical battles often depended upon the
actions of one or two individuals. Thus, having an experienced officer
or noncommissioned officer was critical to maintaining the combat
effectiveness of a company. Nash also decribes clearly the situation of
the German army in the west in late 1944 in ways one does not always
consider. While it was well known the German army was short of
artillery ammunition, the army also experienced a shortage of small
arms ammunition, especially for some of the more modern weapons
fielded by the German army, such as the MP44.
One negative aspect of Nash’s book is due to a factor beyond his
control. The 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division played a relatively minor
role in the campaign. The unit was scheduled to play a role in the
forthcoming Ardennes offensive, but instead got sucked into the fighting
in the Hürtgen Forest, where a temporary commitment became a longterm one. The story of the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division, nonetheless,
is an excellent illustration of how the enemy often gets a vote in the
planning and conduct of operations.
To be sure, Nash does assume readers are familiar with the course
of the 1944 campaign in the west; however, novices will benefit from
his knowledge of the German army, its men, and its equipment at that
stage of the war. For students of the German army in World War II, as
well as students interested in the late 1944 campaign, Victory Was beyond
Their Grasp is a must read.

The Great War & the Middle East: A Strategic Study
By Rob Johnson
Reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg, Chair of War Studies and Professor of
History, US Army War College
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ob Johnson, in The Great War & the Middle East: A Strategic Study,
challenges the conventional notion that great power meddling in
the Middle East during World War I left poisonous legacies from which
the region still struggles to recover. That history, or at least the version
common in much of Europe and the Middle East today, posits that the
British in particular, while trying to find local allies to help dismember the
Ottoman Empire, made contradictory and dishonest promises to mutually contentious groups. These deals included the Sykes-Picot Agreement
(1916) that carved much of the Middle East into French and British
spheres of influence, the Husayn-McMahon correspondence (1915) that
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promised the Hashemites an expansive postwar Arab kingdom, and the
Balfour Declaration (1917) that promised the Jewish people a homeland
in Palestine.
This version of history places the blame for the tensions and violence
of the region on the British and, by extension, the Zionists in Palestine
whom the British allegedly favored to serve as their colonial agents.
By creating artificial borders and working with questionable rulers, the
British and French left the region too fractured and unstable to deal
with the problems of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Photographs of Islamic State bulldozers eradicating the Sykes-Picot
borders graphically show the self-styled Caliphate erasing a shameful
past imposed by foreign interference.
The book’s thesis that World War I alone is not responsible for the
region’s many problems is certainly a valid and welcome one. JewishArab tensions, the Sunni-Shia rivalry, and frustrations that bubbled up
in the Arab Spring may have root causes dating to the war, but a great
deal happened both before and since. Johnson, therefore, makes an
important argument in trying to return agency to the Arabs themselves,
riven as they were by internal rivalries, differing attitudes toward the
British, and an inability to compromise.
Johnson outlines his thesis logically and reasonably in a solidly argued
introduction. Having served in the British army in the Middle East, he
has a sense of both the continuity and change in the region’s endemic
confl icts since 1914. He argues that the British came to the Middle East
without a clearly articulated strategy to replace the Ottomans. Indeed,
it had been British policy until 1915 to keep the Ottoman Empire
intact as a bulwark against Russian expansion into the Dardanelles and
central Asia. British policy evolved as the war progressed and as various
elements of the British government in London, Cairo, and New Delhi,
as well as in the field, contended for control.
The remainder of the book, however, is a fairly conventional account
of the war in the Middle East, seen almost exclusively from the British
perspective. The first chapter is mainly tangential to the arguments so
well articulated in the introduction, dealing with the nature of strategy
as seen from London in the years immediately prior to the war. The
remaining chapters largely follow the major British campaigns from
Sinai to Gallipoli to Mesopotamia.
Readers interested in the Gallipoli Campaign will note Johnson’s
much more sanguine assessment of an effort usually seen as an
unmitigated disaster. While acknowledging the campaign’s futility on the
operational and tactical levels, he defends Gallipoli as a strategic success,
relieving pressure on Russia and altering the strategic environment
in Mesopotamia and elsewhere on the Ottoman periphery. He is
similarly sanguine about the strategic value of Britain’s costly advance
in Mesopotamia in 1917–18. In both cases, he cites the British need
to maintain prestige in the face of its millions of Muslim citizens in
India. More depth on this topic would have solidified this part of
Johnson’s argument.
Specialists will not find much new information in The Great War
& the Middle East. The book reads best as a survey of major British
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campaigns in the region. Johnson recognizes the global context of the
war, with decisions made in Russia, the United States, and France all
playing key roles in the outcome of the war in the Middle East. He
also understands how to employ the standard ends, ways, and means
approach to the evaluation of strategy, although he discusses operations
and tactics much more often than the subtitle suggests. While the book
does not quite reach the potential of its introduction, it does provide a
solid military history on a part of the world where the embers of 1914–18
have yet to cool.

“A Delicate Aﬀair” on the Western Front: America Learns
How to Fight a Modern War in the Woëvre Trenches
By Terrence J. Finnegan
Reviewed by Greg Pickell, LTC, US Army (Ret.)
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great deal has been written about the entry of the United
States into the latter stages of the First World War. All too
often, this coverage takes the form of high-level histories or narrative descriptions of well-known actions like Belleau Wood or
Meuse-Argonne. These books are sometimes described as coffee
table decorations. “A Delicate Affair” is not one of those books. This
meticulously researched history of one of the very first US combat
actions on the Western Front succeeds in getting below the over-done
high-level narrative and “into the trenches.” Author Terrence Finnegan
helps readers understand the nightmarish complexity and daunting
challenges involved in trench warfare in a way seldom matched in other
works on the subject. Hauntingly, his detailed assessment also looks
in great detail at the German approach to the action. In doing so, he
provides discerning readers much of the conceptual blueprint for the
German blitzkrieg seen 22 years later.
A Delicate Affair chronicles the experiences of the US 26th “Yankee”
Division as it entered the trenches near the destroyed village of
Seicheprey in mid-April 1918. The event was significant. Although other
American units entered the trenches before them, the 26th Division was
to encounter the first planned German attack specifically focused on
testing the mettle of the newly arrived American troops.
Not surprisingly, subsequent events were not kind to the 26th, which
was soundly beaten during the course of the engagement. Employing the
fruits of years of experience and refined tactics, the assaulting German
force succeeded in breaking through the lines on a relatively wide front
while taking almost 200 prisoners. Indeed, what the Americans later
thought was their success in halting the drive and forcing the Germans
back was really little more than a planned German withdrawal following
a successful large-scale raid.
The narrative of the 26th aside, A Delicate Affair is a significant
addition to the body of knowledge on World War I for several reasons.
First, the book succeeds in conveying the incredible complexity involved
in the movement and activity of any large body of troops. Finnegan then
multiplies this challenge by discussing in detail the activities of the 26th
before and during the battle. In the end, it becomes clear the myriad of
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actions required to employ the men of the 26th effectively was beyond
the capability of the inexperienced leadership at the time—and perhaps
beyond the means of any army faced with the challenges that confronted
the newly arriving Americans.
A second important point made by the author lies in the
effective working relationship enjoyed by the Americans and their
French counterparts. While the French may not have learned the lessons
of trench warfare as comprehensively as their German foes, they had
in fact made significant strides, and these lessons were passed on to
members of the 26th Division. Cooperation between US and French
leaders was similarly close, and stands in significant contrast to the
experiences of other American formations as well as the senior US
leadership. The close working relationship enjoyed by the soldiers and
leaders of the Yankee Division and their French hosts likely prevented
the Americans’ baptism of fire from being even more painful.
Perhaps the most interesting part of A Delicate Affair lies in its
presentation of the planning and execution of the attack from the
German perspective. Of all the major combatants in the First World
War, the German army proved to be the most adaptable, and their attack
at Seicheprey employed four years of hard-earned experience. Their
tactical use of artillery and mortars in synchronization with assaulting
infantry provides a model that remains valid even today. More
important was the Germans’ use of infiltration tactics. This technique,
in which attacking units flowed around and past centers of resistance to
achieve dislocation of the defense, can be directly linked to the blitzkrieg
tactics used by the German Wehrmacht in the opening stages of the
Second World War more than two decades later. This approach, often
overlooked by historians due to the differences in speed and scale
involved in infantry versus mechanized movements, was completely
missed by the French during this period.
A Delicate Affair is what a serious history should be—detailed,
comprehensive, and capable of providing answers to root-cause questions
that rarely see the light of day. The story of the 26th and the aftermath of
the battle may not be the most inspirational ever written, but that is not
the point. War is truly hell, and this book is ironically and appropriately
less than delicate in making that point. Exhaustively documented with
an extensive array of maps, tactical diagrams, and technical data, A
Delicate Affair is essential reading for leaders seeking a real understanding
of World War I in the trenches and the US entry into that fateful confl ict.
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America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise
in the National Security State
By Linda Weiss
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merica Inc.?: Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State is an
important, thought-provoking book that deserves careful attention
from both military and civilian strategic-level national security professionals. Dr. Linda Weiss, professor emeritus of comparative politics at
the University of Sydney, offers a rich, fascinating, and accessible analysis
of one of the most important aspects of American national security
prowess—leadership in technological innovation. The implications of
her analysis are far-reaching. Reading her book will be especially valuable
to anyone engaged in the enterprises of defense management, research,
capabilities development, and acquisition.
Weiss argues America’s extraordinary success in technological
innovation since World War II presents a puzzle other analysts have
not adequately explained. In her book, she explores why the United
States has been so successful in leading technological innovation for
an extended period of history, masterfully weaving together an analysis
of US political economy and national security that describes American
success since World War II, explains the emergence of various techniques
of state and market interplay that produced this success, and speculates
about future US prospects to sustain such an impressive record.
Her analysis starts with a major contrast. The United States did not
lead technological innovation, particularly in the military realm, by any
appreciable margin before World War II. In contrast, since World War
II the United States has led technological innovation, often by wide
margins, in the areas of atomic energy, missile technology, computers,
antibacterial drugs, the Internet, the Global Positioning System,
semiconductors, microwave technology, lasers, and jet aircraft. These
and many other innovations have been valuable for security and, in
many cases, have delivered significant ancillary benefits to society. So,
why has the United States been more successful since World War II?
Weiss identifies two prominent explanations common in national
security literature that she then challenges. One explanation identifies
innovation as a function of the hidden hand of free market capitalism.
The other finds the strong hand of government guiding defense spending
as a form of national industrial policy. Her close scrutiny demonstrates
neither explanation is sufficient, and her more compelling explanation,
which she terms “hybridization,” runs between:
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America’s propensity for radical innovation is not a ‘stateless’ story and freemarket capitalism is not how the United States achieved high-technology
leadership. Through an extensive array of public-private alliances and innovation hybrids, technology development programs and investment funds,
the United States has created not a liberal, but a hybrid political economy—
one that is shaped by a national security state deeply entwined with the
commercial sector.” (195)

The hybridization explanation offers a useful way to consider the
potential for continued American success and highlights potential
obstacles more clearly. Weiss shows there is no way to explain American
technological innovation without attention to the catalytic role of the
government and, in particular, the wide-ranging combination of national
government entities she terms the “National Security State” or NSS.
The NSS role is especially significant in the early, high-risk stages of
innovation. It is also important to note other key players in the NSS, in
addition to the Department of Defense and the intelligence community,
include the Department of Energy (with nuclear power and weapons),
the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
American technological innovation benefitted from an array of
national laboratories, higher education institutions, and corporations, as
well as from a permissive regulatory environment that allowed innovators
to benefit from commercial incentives. Examples of key
players include universities such as Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Stanford, Caltech, Carnegie Mellon, and Chicago;
federally funded research and development centers such as the
Los Alamos National Lab, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
the Sandia National Laboratories, the Lincoln Laboratory, and the
Mitre Corporation; and venture capital investment entities such as
the Small Business Investment Company (sponsored by the Small
Business Administration) and In-Q-Tel (sponsored by the Central
Intelligence Agency).
Looking forward, Weiss suggests there is little time for the United
States to rest on its laurels. Potential competitors are narrowing the
gap in technological capabilities. Her cautionary conclusion suggests
a pair of political and economic factors could impede continued US
technological innovation (such as the ongoing efforts of the third offset
strategy). One factor is a hyperpartisan domestic political environment
that may well sunder the bipartisan support that has permitted the
success of hybridization (particularly the effective role the state has
played in underwriting risk in the name of long-term potential gains)
and an economic system fixated on “financialism” that places short-term
gains at such a premium that innovative advancements are less likely to
flourish at the hands of the market alone.
America Inc.? is not an easy read, but it is nonetheless very accessible.
Weiss builds her complex argument carefully and steps readers through
it with a steady hand. The political economy of technical innovation is
generally not a story of dramatic events and catalytic moments (although
the sense of alarm and the subsequent response to the 1957 Soviet launch
of Sputnik is a major exception). Rather, the main story line is about
the accretion of choices over decades by many actors and agencies
navigating partisan politics and American culture. The argument is
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important and nuanced. The overarching history and associated vignettes
are fascinating and well chosen. Weiss brings the wisdom derived from
decades of study to a complex subject with great force.
The author’s argument is an important one for the United States
and its allies. Liberal civil society and its complex architecture are often
strained in times of crisis by the requirements of national defense. The
United States and Great Britain before it have been able to withstand such
pressures because of their abilities to find a firebreak, if you will, that
limits the magnitude of resource mobilization to counter adversaries.
High defense resource demands can be a powerful excuse for clamping
down on the inefficiencies and chaotic domestic confl icts at the heart
of pluralist, liberal democratic polities and free market economics. For
Britain, the most dramatic of firebreaks was the use of a limited portion
of its population and resources to build and operate the wooden walls of
the Royal Navy that could exploit the geographic advantages of its island
location. Similarly, the maintenance of military capabilities strongly
enabled by cutting-edge technologies has allowed the United States to
limit its resources and the portion of its population devoted to national
security. But as threats mount and geography shrinks, the costs of
maintaining an effective qualitative advantage become more daunting.
America Inc.? provides trenchant analysis and raises important
questions for policymakers and national security professionals to
contemplate in linking technological innovation to national security.

The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are
Better Than Others at Science & Technology
By Mark Zachary Taylor
Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies, US
Army War College

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
427 pages
$27.95

P

opular literature has focused on creative individuals (Walter
Isaacson’s Innovators, 2015) and innovative organizations (Schmidt
and Rosenberg’s How Google Works, 2014) in attempts to discern key
traits, processes, and cultures that produce the “secret sauce” and lead
to success. At the heart of this success is the ability of individuals and
organizations to develop and exploit new technologies with phenomenal
results. At a higher level of analysis, scholars seek to discern the factors
and conditions among nations that support growth in science and technology. Arguably, science and technology fuel the engines of national
economies and are linked inextricably to security interests.
One such scholar is Mark Zachary Taylor, a political scientist with a
doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His continued
interest in technology and the behavior of nations has resulted in several
publications on national innovation and political economy—the latest is
The Politics of Innovation. An associate professor of international affairs at
Georgia Institute of Technology, Taylor is well equipped to determine
“why some countries are better at science and technology.”
Taylor is intrigued by the analysis of British historian Donald
Cardwell which led to Cardwell’s Law: “no nation has been very creative
for more than a historically short period. Fortunately, as each leader has
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flagged, there has always been, up to now, a nation or nations to take
over the torch” (3). Thus, in The Politics of Innovation, Taylor examines
historical and regional cases of nation-states to test the law and in doing
so uncovers his insights. The introductory chapter includes a section,
“The American Imperative,” that demonstrates the applicability of
Cardwell’s Law to the United States. An obvious inference is the
United States is faltering as a leader in innovation and must therefore
understand the critical contributing factors in order to regain and sustain
its global leadership.
Taylor presents a comprehensive and systematic analysis of
international innovation practices, results, and trends. He provides a
series of definitions for often-used terms in science, technology, and
innovation that enable the use of frameworks and accepted metrics for
his wide-ranging examination. One framework is the “five pillars” of
innovation—“intellectual property rights, research subsidies, education,
research universities, and trade policies” (74)—he uses to scrutinize the
performance of countries. In chapter 5, “Why Nations Fail,” and in
chapter 6, “How Nations Succeed,” Taylor finds, “domestic institutions
and policies do not determine the rate and direction of national inventive
activities . . . institutions and policies do influence outcomes, but are not,
causal factors” (139) and “successful science and technology states are
typified by international networks of trade, finance, production, knowledge,
and human-capital flows that play important roles in determining
national innovation rates” (178). He also concludes that domestic policies
seeking to encourage innovation may have a paradoxical effect of
impeding it because of stakeholder resistance; therefore, governmental
intervention is necessary to sustain the effort. A major portion of the
book focuses on how nations innovate through the use of institutions,
policies, and networks. In the end, the interplay of political agendas
among powerful members within a society has the greatest impact on
national innovation performance.
Taylor introduces the concept of “creative insecurity” to propose
why nations innovate. Creative insecurity is “the positive difference
between the threats of economic or military competition from abroad
and the dangers of political-economic rivalries at home” (13). Taylor’s
analysis confirms the use of external threats as the impetus for nationallevel innovation in both the economic and military domains. While he
does not name the military-industrial complex as a major driver and
benefactor of research-and-development and science-and-technology
programs, he provides several cases where defense funding is viewed as
investments that generate innovation spin-offs for civilian use. Because
of the potential consequences of state-on-state confl ict, he cautions
against constructing and contriving external threats for the purpose of
creating growth in innovation.
In the United States of the twenty-first century, we have had several
calls to pursue science, technology, engineering, and mathematics as
education policy and to invest in research and development through
economic and defense policies aimed at securing national-level interests.
In a November 2014 memorandum, then-US Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative, a major
component in the development of the Department of Defense Third
Offset Strategy. The initiative’s charter is to “pursue innovative ways
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to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st century and
improve business operations throughout the Department.” Hagel closed
the memo with: “America’s continued strategic dominance will rely on
innovation and adaptability across our defense enterprise.” For this
reviewer, Taylor’s caution about threat narratives rings true—witness
current concerns about the emerging power of China, the resurgence
of Russia, and the recurring call to regain technological overmatch over
potential adversaries.
Parameters readers will be interested in the four-page section “Military
Resistance to Innovation” where Taylor asserts:
“Innovation is threatening to military personnel because changes to their
technology can sometimes demand changes to long-established strategic
doctrines, battlefield tactics, or bureaucratic organizations. Military advancement is built on these things . . . new military technologies can privilege one
branch or mission over another, thereby triggering interservice or intraservice rivalries.” (191)

We have seen the introduction of new technologies (e.g., stealth,
precision-guided munitions, sensors, cyber, etc.) that have shaped new
strategic and operational concepts—and met resistance from many
within the US military.
Taylor’s work is well researched, enlightening, and a worthy
read. His major contribution offers the lens of political science to the
strategic choices nations make in search of competitive advantage in
the global environment. National security professionals will recognize
this book is about the interaction among the instruments of national
power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—and thus
the innovation performance of nations is based ultimately on political
decisions. Whether Cardwell’s Law will hold for the United States
remains to be seen.

Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars
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Reviewed by Whitney Grespin, Director of Strategic Studies, Precision
Integrated Programs, PhD Candidate, Defence Studies Department, King’s
College London, and Graduate Teaching Assistant at the UK Joint Services
Command and Staﬀ College

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015
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P

ublic discourse about unmanned aerial systems—drones,
colloquially—has proliferated in years past, yet scholarly literature
on the topic has only recently begun to accumulate. In Sudden Justice:
America’s Secret Drone Wars, Chris Woods documents and assesses the use
of armed drones by the United States (and in some cases its close allies).
It is unclear whether the goal of the book is to serve as a thorough
historical record or a comprehensive policy prescription. Unfortunately,
the book does neither completely. The disjointed chapters largely record
the increasing utilization of drones for kinetic missions since 2001
in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as missions further afield in
Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Interspersed amongst these fragmented
vignettes are underdeveloped ruminations on the legal and moral

Book Reviews:Military Technology

159

implications of using the technology in asymmetric warfare to combat
nontraditional enemies.
I hoped to be impressed by the book; however, I was generally
underwhelmed by its lack of a nuanced understanding of both the
individual players as well as the broader game. Coming from the
unmanned industry perspective, Sudden Justice presents a superficial
overview of drone applications. For example, the widely accepted
military parlance for drones is less alarmist and articulates what
they are—unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are the
aircraft platforms used as part of a larger unmanned aerial system (UAS),
which may be comprised of multiple UAVs, as well as a ground control
system, and other launch/recovery equipment or communications
devices. The heavy reliance on the word drone triggers visions of
nightly news reporting on tragic deaths and their categorization as
“collateral damage.”
Adding to the sensationalist tone are myriad anecdotes that capture
retrospective criticisms of military and intelligence professionals about
lessons learned in the early years of UAS operations. As in any application
of new technology in a complex environment, there were many lessons
learned from successes, failures, and after-action reports, which form
today’s best practices in the field of UAS operations. Historically,
these lessons are important to record in this book. Practically, their
presentation comes across as condescending criticisms, implying those
responsible should have known better or acted otherwise.
Another perspective I found imbalanced was the chapter titled
“Game Face On: The Intimacy of Remote Killing.” While Woods
presents the issue of killing from afar as a new phenomenon that mental
health professionals are struggling to deal with alongside the operator
(remote pilot) community, it could instead be compared against the
literature on the psychological experiences of sniper teams—“eyes from
a hide” versus “eyes from the sky” (all the more relevant given the author
referred to an unmanned aircraft as an “aerial sniper rifle”).
In addition to melodramatic tone and word choices, there are also
basic factual discrepancies, such as Woods’s reference to the College of
William & Mary as “William and Mary University.” Furthermore, at
multiple points, Woods muddies the terminology and responsibilities of
US Special Forces (a distinct component of the US Army) with broader
US Special Operations Forces, while littering the book with superficial
and misleading assessments of well-documented, elite military elements,
making me question the depth of his understanding about these topics.
There are also instances where the relationship between quotes and their
endnote citations lacked context or clarity of intent, thus presenting an
opportunity for misinterpretation.
Woods also focuses on and criticizes kinetic applications, rather than
balancing his commentary with equally in-depth accounting of their
vast use as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gathering
platforms. While I respect Woods’s background and journalistic bona
fides, he bounces back and forth between praising drone technology as
“the most precise weapon in the history of warfare” and highlighting
failures of the precision and efficacy of drone strikes in the early years
of the technology’s use.
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If Woods’s intent for the book was to issue a call for public demand
of increased government accountability and military procedural
transparency, then he hit his mark. But he could have done so to a
wider audience in an op-ed piece rather than a book. If his intent was
to document the history of increased reliance on, and preference
for, UAS capabilities, then he would have done well to pick up
where Richard Whittle’s Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone
Revolution left off. As-is, the book comes across as a disjointed
historical record with an inconsistent mix of condemnation and praise
of the technology’s capabilities.
Is the topic of drone strikes interesting? Yes. Is increased discourse
about this public policy issue both important and appropriate? Yes. Does
Sudden Justice offer both breadth and depth sufficient to be considered
an authoritative source to inform all aspects of such discussions? No.
Readers may walk away better informed about relevant issues in a general
sense, but without a comprehensive understanding and coherent policy
perspective on the myriad capabilities of this technology—both kinetic
and otherwise—to improve the warfighting advantage for the United
States and its allies.

REGIONAL STUDIES: AFRICA

Exploiting Africa: The Influence of Maoist
China in Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania
By Donovan C. Chau
Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Adjunct Professor, US Army War
College, and Professor, International Relations and Comparative Politics,
Armstrong State University

Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2014
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n Exploiting Africa, Donovan Chau examines China’s relations with
Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania from the 1950s to the 1970s. He claims
China’s current official African policy is reminiscent of past Maoist-era
policies (148) and the policy is largely based on China’s identification as
a member of the developing world, or Global South, tied to the African
continent by a common sense of historic neglect and subjugation by
imperialist forces. Chau believes China’s African foreign policy is a “longterm, pragmatic behavior from the very beginning on the continent”
(148)—in other words, China’s policy has been strictly “über-realist.”
Viewed from historic and strategic perspectives, China’s current presence
demonstrates continuity with the past rather than a renewed focus in the
present or an altered direction for the future (3).
According to Chau, China’s rapprochement toward the African
continent from the 1950s to the 1970s, much like its twenty-first-century
foreign policy, demonstrated China’s desire to achieve superpower status
through a primary strategy of resource acquisition. To accomplish this
objective, China’s diplomatic relations with Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania
“used a mix of international political support, tangible development aid,
and economic and security assistance, both covert and overt” (4). Given
China’s central objective of attaining superpower status, Africa, with its
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abundance of natural and mineral resources, fit squarely into China’s
long-term plans and appetite for industrial development.
In addition to traditional means of diplomacy such as trade,
commerce, bilateral agreements, and the military, China used
domestic and international organizations to advance its political,
military, and strategic relations (22). While these government and
nongovernmental organizations varied from region to region, they
affected tangibly the targeted individuals and organizations (32). The
New China News Agency collected and disseminated news at home
and abroad (22–23) and was strategically located in countries and
regions around the world at a time when China did not maintain
official diplomatic relations with many nation-states (23). Another
important organization, the Commission for the Cultural Relations
with Foreign Countries, performed intelligence work and sponsored the
exchange of cultural and scientific delegations. Finally, the Afro-Asian
People’s Solidarity Organization, promoted solidarity among African
and Asian peoples; however, its true objective was to promote anticolonialism and anti-imperialism, both of which were secondary
objectives of Communist China (29).
Through three detailed case studies, Chau reviews China’s presence
in Africa, beginning in 1958 when China became the first country to
establish official diplomatic relations with the Provisional Government
of the Algerian Republic after its formation by Ferhat Abbas (44).
While China provided the newly independent Algeria with economic
and military aid, the Chinese used Algeria as a platform for a political
message of developing world and international unity (68).
Next, Chau describes China’s penetration of Tanzania as a smooth
process due to newly elected Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere.
Diplomatic relations, established in 1962 when China opened its
embassy in the capital Dar es Salaam, were rooted in shared imperial
and colonial experiences. To further cement their relationship, China
and Tanzania in 1965 signed a treaty of friendship and released a joint
communique in which Nyerere reaffirmed Tanzania’s commitment to
Communist China as the only representative of the Chinese people.
China’s multidimensional activities in Tanzania included political,
development, and security projects, including the construction of the
Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority rail line.
Finally, Chau shows how China’s early attempts to establish
diplomatic relations with Ghana after its independence in 1957 faced
opposition from President Kwame Nkrumah. For Nkrumah, it was
necessary to “search for African unity” (77) before establishing
diplomatic relations. Ghana finally recognized Communist China as a
sovereign independent state in July 1960, the second African country to
do so. As Chau points out, given Nkrumah’s political ideology emulated
the thinking of China’s Mao Zedong, Ghana became China’s base of
revolutionary operations “focused mainly on the training and arming
of African fighters” (91). Cozy diplomatic relations came to an end in
February 1966 when a military coup d’état ousted Nkrumah. China and
Ghana did not reestablish diplomatic relations until 1972.
In the twenty-first century, China is attempting to ascend to its
rightful place among the world’s superpowers by securing its economic
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needs—an ascendancy which began with the pragmatic moderates
who came to power under Deng Xiaoping and the establishment of
China’s special economic zones. Political commentators and pundits
assume China is pursuing a realist foreign policy, however, as Chau
shows, “today China is actively seeking opportunities of influence on
the continent [of Africa] by using the same general strategic approach
as it did in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s” (148). While China’s actions
in world affairs are still driven by revolutionary ideals, Chinese leaders
prioritize strategic objectives over ideological pursuits. China wants to
offer the world an alternative to the Washington Consensus with its
strict laundry list of rules, regulations, and obligations that are imposed
upon the developing world. Instead, the Beijing Consensus does not care
what kind of government or leadership a nation-state embraces as long
as the nation-state is willing to trade with China and recognize there is
only one China representative of the Chinese people.
Exploiting Africa makes a valuable contribution to understanding
China’s past involvement and continued presence in Africa. I highly
recommend this book to readers interested in world politics, international
affairs, and political science—and, most importantly, to current and
future military leaders.
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Reviewed by LTC (P) Jason B. Nicholson, Foreign Area Oﬃcer for Sub-Saharan
Africa
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I

n The Crisis of the African State: Globalization, Tribalism, and Jihadism in the
Twenty-First Century, editors Anthony N. Celso and Robert Nalbandov
present select case studies on contemporary African security issues.
Bringing together scholars and practitioners, this volume specifically
addresses the types of problems most likely to involve the United States
and its allies and partners—either directly or indirectly. Broadly organized into three sections, the book’s eight chapters explore the challenges
faced by African states posed by modernity, ethnic conflict, and violent
Islamic extremism.
The first section considers the impacts and opportunities offered by
the Arab Spring for northwest African jihadist movements. In chapter
one, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross explores Tunisia’s hesitant policy of
accommodation and confrontation with extremists that facilitated their
ability to survive and expand operationally following the collapse of
the regime led by dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. In chapters two and
three, both Celso and Henri Boré examine the French-led intervention
to drive al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies out of northern
Mali in 2013 and suggest how this confl ict informed potential future
regional counterterrorism operations.
The second section evaluates civil wars and the transition from rebel
groups to government. Reviewing the Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Rwandan
civil wars in chapter four, Ian S. Spears describes how victorious rebel
factions consolidated and legitimized their rule. In chapter five, Robert
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E. Gribbin analyzes the Rwandan genocide’s myriad effects upon society
and the government’s response to those challenges in the first five years
after the killing stopped. France and Libya’s interventions in Chad
from the 1960s to the 1990s are examined by Nalbandov in chapter six,
demonstrating the role of confl ict continuation and peacemaking failure
as by-products of external power proxy confl icts during civil war.
The last section highlights the cumulative consequences of the social,
political, and security problems identified in the earlier sections. Clarence
J. Bouchat discusses Nigeria as a microcosm of the structural challenges
facing African states in their attempts to provide legitimate and peaceful
means of political confl ict resolution for their often highly diverse
populations. The summary chapter by Celso and Nalbandov suggests
that while Africa’s political problems are substantial, the singular case
studies demonstrate successful solutions are possible if domestic political
elites create functional institutions to allocate resources equitably,
protect minorities, and govern legitimately.
The political processes discussed throughout the book, such as
modernization and democratization, imply winning and losing as
outcomes. Identity formation through nationalism is often accompanied
by ethnic cleansing and violence to establish in- and out-group identities
upon which to base societal resource distribution resulting from greater
productivity. Political development of the nation-state is deeply shaped
by the effects of industrialization upon identity construction. War,
particularly ethnic confl icts in nonindustrialized societies, also plays a
causal role in identity formation.
These themes make further study of African political dynamics
relevant because they are directly related to the authors’ discussions
of globalization, tribalism, and jihadism. The “fourth wave” of
democratization accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union and
its satellites may now be superseded by a “fifth wave.” Some of the last
Cold War regimes are in Africa (Tunisia and Egypt) and the Middle East
(Iraq and Syria). The political forces present in these states apart have
also been slowly emerging in sub-Saharan Africa where other remaining
Cold War vestigial regimes continue to exist.
Contemporary confl icts in the Middle East have assumed an ethnic
dimension suggestive of the forces of nationalism and identity formation.
The political unraveling of the Cold War order in the Balkans during
the fourth wave of democratization also resulted in highly destructive
ethnic confl icts. Political, defense, and security policymakers should
read The Crisis of the African State as indicative of the problems confronting
weak states that govern ethnically diverse populations in Africa. These
challenges possess the potential to activate populations politically in ways
they have not been mobilized previously. Understanding the root causes
of such confl icts facilitates addressing them now through sustained
engagement with African nations to develop legitimate, representative,
and democratic institutions that can withstand the strains imposed by
inevitable further development of the continent.
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